AC-2024-LON-002640 - [2025] EWHC 2702 (Admin)

I have conducted a fresh balancing exercise. I have also considered the Judge’s article 8 factors checklist in the judgment at paras 53 (five factors in favour of extradition) and 54 (five factors against), but give them the weight I deem appropriate. As will be immediately apparent from the discussion above, I have modified that checklist in light of the new circumstances. I have identified and discussed all the relevant factors advanced by both parties and accorded them the weight I judge they merit.

I conclude that an extradition order is not disproportionate in this case given the appellant’s fugitivity and his limited ties to the United Kingdom, built as they have been in full knowledge of his fugitivity. I cannot accept that his fugitivity is “merely technical” as he asserts. I am satisfied, and the Judge found, that he deliberately evaded the criminal proceedings he was aware of. At no point has he informed the Romanian authorities of his presence in the United Kingdom in flagrant and deliberate breach of his notification duties under article 108. The public interest in this case includes returning a fugitive from Romanian justice and thereby honouring the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations; preventing this country becoming or being perceived to be a “safe haven” for fugitives from justice (HH); and preventing “crime or disorder” (ECHR article 8(2)), cited in Andrysiewicz at para 15. These are all, in article 8 terms, “necessary in a democratic society”.

The impact on his article 8 rights and more broadly those of his family is not “exceptionally severe”. While there is no exceptionality test (HH, paras 8-15; recently recognised in this court by ), the impact is not of a nature or degree to outweigh the subsisting and strong public interest, despite the nature of his offending, which I have particular regard to, conscious that it would not result in a sentence of imprisonment in the United Kingdom. But I must respect the judgment of the properly constituted Romanian court. As said by the Supreme Court in Norris, in an authority also considered by the Judge, in order to outweigh the public interest in extradition of a fugitive, the interference with human rights must be “extremely serious” (para 55). The court said at para 82 that

“only the gravest effects of interference with family life will be capable of rendering extradition disproportionate to the public interest that it serves”

That is not the case here. Therefore, a return order is not disproportionate nor incompatible with the appellant’s article 8 rights or those of his family.

I return to the fresh evidence application. If the Fenyvesi fresh evidence test at para 32 of the Divisional Court’s judgment is applied strictly, as it must be, the evidence sought to be adduced by the appellant is not “decisive”. Its admission would not result in the appellant’s discharge. Therefore, the application to adduce the evidence sought by the appellant is refused. As a consequence, the evidence sought to be adduced by the respondent in reply falls away and is refused. There is nothing remaining for it to reply to. It will be clear from the substance of my judgment that, as agreed by the parties, I have fully considered the evidence on a de bene esse basis.

Turning back to the merits of the appeal, the two grounds relied upon by the appellant fail. The appeal is dismissed.