AC-2024-MAN-000347 - [2025] EWHC 2630 (Admin)

In providing that in cases of apparent conflict between the two statutory purposes, a relevant authority must attach greater weight to the purpose of conserving and enhancing the natural beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of the area comprised in the National Park, sub-section 11A(1A) of the 1949 Act gives statutory effect to the Sandford principle. The Sandford principle derives from a report in 1974 of the National Park Policies Review Committee chaired by Lord Sandford, which included the following advice –

“2.15

The first purpose of national parks, as stated by Dower and by Parliament - the preservation and enhancement of natural beauty - seems to us to remain entirely valid and appropriate. The second purpose - the promotion of public enjoyment - however, needs to be re-interpreted and qualified because it is now evident that excessive or unsuitable use may destroy the very qualities that attract people to the parks. We have no doubt that where the conflict between the two purposes, which has always been inherent, becomes acute, the first one must prevail in order that the beauty and ecological qualities of the national parks may be maintained”.

Statutory effect was first given to the Sandford principle by section 62 of the Environment Act 1995, which for that purpose enacted and inserted sub-section 11A(2) into the 1949 Act. Sub-section 11A(2) has since been replaced in its application to National Parks in England by section 11A(1A) of the 1949 Act (enacted and inserted by section 245 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023). The terms in which the Sandford principle is given statutory effect are, however, unchanged.

In R(Stubbs) v Lake District National Park Authority [2021] PTSR 261 an issue arose as to the nature or degree of conflict between the two statutory purposes which was necessary to bring the Sandford principle into play. At [39] Dove J said –

“In my view the starting point for the consideration of this issue must be the statutory language of section 11A(2), read in the context of the statutory framework within which it sits. It is clear from section 5 of the 1949 Act that the two statutory purposes are set out on an equal footing, and are both objectives which are to be pursued in the management and operation of National Parks and the exercise of the powers contained in part II of the 1949 Act. On the face of section 5, therefore, there is no justification to distinguish between the two purposes. It is clear to me that section 11A(2) is included within the 1949 Act as a means of resolving situations where it is no longer possible to treat both of the purposes equally, and not possible through management or stewardship to satisfactorily accommodate both purposes. I accept the submission made by Mr Westaway on behalf of the defendant, that the use of the word “conflict” in section 11A(2) is not to be understood as referring to any conflict or friction between the two purposes set out in section 5. Those purposes will very often be at odds with each other in the absence of any intervention to resolve them (such as the erosion caused to popular paths by walkers, cyclists or horse riders). Thus, something more than simply conflict which is not managed must arise for the provisions of section 11A(2) to be triggered. In truth, it does not appear that this proposition is controversial. Where the National Park Authority judges that the conflict can no longer be satisfactorily mediated through management or stewardship then, in circumstances where it is judged that both purposes cannot be accommodated and the National Park Authority concludes that it must make a choice, section 11A(2) makes clear that it is the first of the purposes which is to be afforded greater weight. Whether this is described as a conflict which is acute, or unresolvable, or irreconcilable is a matter of semantics. However, each of these adjectives properly describes the point at which section 11A(2) comes into play, in order to resolve a conflict which cannot be properly accommodated through management measures when greater weight then has to attach in the decision-taking process to the first purpose of conserving and enhancing the natural beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of the area comprised in the national park”.

At [40], Dove J referred to the judgment of Holgate J in R(Harris) v Broads Authority [2017] 1 WLR 567 and said –

“In my view Holgate J was correct when he observed that the provisions of section 11A(2) impose “relatively broad duties, which are largely dependent upon the value judgements made by a National Park Authority from time to time”. It is clear that broad and often subjective judgements will need to be formed by a National Park Authority in relation to how the best interests of both of the purposes set out in section 5 are to be served by the decisions which it makes. In addition to these judgments, the question of whether or not there is a conflict which engages section 11A(2) is a further exercise of judgment in relation to the broad duties imposed on the National Park Authority. What is clear from the language of the statute, and the way in which section 5 and section 11A(2) of the 1949 Act interrelate, is that section 11A(2) arises in circumstances where the National Park Authority reaches the judgment that a conflict between the two purposes is such that it cannot be resolved or reconciled and the preference for the first statutory purpose under section 5 of the 1949 Act must arise. Section 11A(2) is a necessary means of breaking the deadlock where the interests of the two purposes cannot be mediated through a management or stewardship solution”.