AC-2025-LDS-000036 - [2025] EWHC 2641 (Admin)

The Claimant’s second Ground of challenge is that the Defendant, in determining where the allocated accommodation would be located, (i) failed to take into account the Claimant’s particular circumstances, (ii) failed to give adequate reasons and/or (iii) acted irrationally. In the light of my ruling on Ground 1, I can deal with this and the further Grounds relatively shortly.

There is a dispute between the parties as to the extent to which the various claimed vulnerabilities were before the decision-makers at various times during the progression of the decision making process. I do not consider it necessary to go through the decisions and analyse what matters were available for consideration and when, or the extent to which they were considered. Such an analysis makes no difference given that any matters which were considered were in fact considered in the context of the wrong Policy, that is in the application of the ‘no choice’ policy and the exceptional circumstances test.

The Claimant’s case is that the SSHD failed to take into account the following matters:

Mr Ogilvie-Harris submitted that, if these matters had been taken into account, the Defendant would have determined that the Claimant was vulnerable and that he needed to be accommodated in Essex. He submitted no weight was given to the above factors in considering suitability of accommodation precisely because they have been approached in the context of the no choice policy and the exceptional circumstances test. The June 2025 letter expressly states “… It is not accepted that access to your raised support network is sufficiently exceptional to displace the no choice accommodation policy”. Given my finding on Ground 1, in my judgment this challenge must inevitably also succeed. I recognise that the decision in relation to location may not be different, but that decision must be taken in the light of the correct policy and without applying the ‘no choice’ policy taken from a different policy which does not apply to the Claimant.

Inevitably the June 2025 letter also fails to give adequate reasons precisely because the reasons are directed to the wrong policy. So far as the challenge of irrationality is concerned, it is asserted that the Defendant cannot rationally decide the Claimant is not vulnerable. It is asserted that, whilst there is no definition of vulnerability in the policy, one would consider it self-evident that a 70-year-old man who speaks limited English and has health conditions is vulnerable. It is further asserted that the needs which arise from that are that the Claimant needs to remain close to his community and support network and that it was therefore irrational to determine that the accommodation which met his needs was accommodation offered in Sheffield. I make no findings as to whether the Defendant cannot rationally decide the Claimant is not vulnerable. However, I do accept that the decision can be challenged as irrational on the basis that the wrong policy tests have been applied. Ground 2 succeeds.