AC-2025-LON-001576 - [2025] EWHC 2592 (Admin)

Rationality of the Decision to Recall

The key is rather, in my view, whether the Defendant’s reasons were rational ones, having regard to the statutory purpose (protection of the public) as well as the principles set out at paras 38 - 42 above. In assessing this, I have borne in mind the imperative of assessing those reasons in the light of the information that was available, or should reasonably have been known, at the time the decision was taken, in March 2023. Even accepting, as I do, that the broader concerns set out in the Recall Report (“… he is out of contact with probation and risk is not manageable”) were also relevant, still breaches of licence conditions formed a material part of the reasons given by the Secretary of State and must be assessed as part of the legality review by this Court.

The first matter relied upon was that the Claimant had breached the condition to ‘be of good behaviour and not to behave in a way that undermines the purpose of the licence period’. The second was a purported breach of the condition to ‘Keep in touch with the supervising officer in accordance with instructions given by the supervising officer’.

The Defendant now concedes that this second limb, a breach of Condition 5(iii), cannot be relied upon, given that the Claimant had never received any instructions from a supervising officer. To that extent, it is accepted that the reasoning was defective. But the Defendant says that broader rationale, of recall being necessary to re-establish contact with the Claimant, is still relevant and, considered with the breach of the first condition, properly justified recall.

As to the first breach of licence condition relied upon, to ‘be of good behaviour’, the Defendant says that this was breached as a result of the arrest for ‘drunk and disorderly’ conduct in January 2023. There were reasonable grounds to consider that the Claimant had acted in such a manner. The Defendant and Probation Service had been informed of the Magistrates’ Court charge by the Court – a reliable source - and appearance and there was no ‘heavy duty’ to investigate further (see R (Wilson) v Secretary of State for Justice, paragraph 42 above). At the date of the decision, the information available was that the charge had not been proceeded with as the Court believed that Mr Quilligan was subject to post-sentence supervision – it was not suggested that the charge was dropped as the evidence was weak (and the Parole Board was wrong to so conclude, later).

The Defendant also submits that the Claimant was behaving in a manner “undermining the purpose of the supervision period”, by “going between the Republic of Ireland and the UK and not submitting to his licence while in the UK” (see the Detailed Grounds of Defence at para 44). This is despite the Claimant’s lack of knowledge that he was subject to such conditions, ignorance not being an excuse (Keiserie).

The Claimant argues that the fact that a charge was brought was not sufficient to ground a recall – instead, enquiries into the underlying circumstances were necessary. Mr Rule KC points out that the offence of being ‘drunk and disorderly’ is a (relatively) minor one which is not punishable by imprisonment but by sanctions such as a fine. In addition, the condition should be read as a whole (“be of good behaviour and not behave in a way which undermines the purpose of the licence period”) – a requirement to be of ‘good behaviour’ is too wide and uncertain to be lawful, unless linked to the ‘purpose of the licence period’. Here, there was no such purpose – or, at least, not one known to the Claimant – because he had never been notified that he was on licence following his release from prison in Ireland in 2023. Similarly, he could not rationally have been criticised for failing to ‘submit’ to the licence in the UK when he had never been told he was subject to it.