AC-2024-LON-001902 - [2025] EWHC 2848 (Admin)

The first point taken against Mr Houldsworth is that the application for an extension of time should have been set out in the Claim Form rather than in the accompanying Grounds of Challenge.

As to this:

In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr Houldsworth has brought a properly formulated application for an extension of time, it being sufficient for this purpose that the application was made in a document accompanying the Claim Form.

An extension of the three month time will only be granted where there is good reason or adequate explanation for the delay. Paragraph 6.4.4.2 of The Administrative Court Guide 2025 states:

“In considering whether to grant an extension of time, the Court must first determine the date from which the relevant time period started to run so that the period of delay can be calculated correctly. The Court will then consider all the circumstances, including whether an adequate explanation has been given for the delay, the importance of the issues, the prospects of success and whether an extension will cause substantial hardship or prejudice to the defendant or any other party or be detrimental to good administration.”

The Guide refers to Maharaj v National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago [2019] 1 WLR 983, [38] in which Lord Lloyd-Jones stated:

“Here it is important to emphasise that the statutory test is not one of good reason for delay but the broader test of good reason for extending time. This will be likely to bring in many considerations beyond those relevant to an objectively good reason for the delay, including the importance of the issues, the prospect of success, the presence or absence of prejudice or detriment to good administration, and the public interest.”

At [47], he continued:

“While prejudice or detriment will normally be important considerations in deciding whether to extend time, there will undoubtedly be circumstances in which leave may properly be refused despite their absence. One example might be where a long delay was wholly lacking in excuse and the claim was a very poor and inconsequential one on the merits, such that there was no good reason to grant an extension”.

In this case, the explanation offered is that Mr Houldsworth’s legal team wrongly believed that the FTT had jurisdiction to determine Ground 3. In support of the request for an extension of time, Mr Afzal KC relies on the decision in R (Weis) v HMRC [2025] EWHC 2479 (Admin). In that case, the tax payer had been given specific assurances as to their tax domicile by HMRC, which later changed its view and issued a closure notice assessing Mr Weis for tax. Mr Weis pursued his complaint by various means: an appeal against the closure notices brought on 4 June 2019; and a request for a statutory review in which legitimate expectation arguments were raised. In that review, HMRC said a legitimate expectation argument would not fall within the scope of the statutory review process. Mr Weis also made a complaint under HMRC’s internal complaints process, in response to which HMRC denied that any legitimate expectation had been created. A complaint was also made to the Adjudicator’s Office, although for reasons which were in dispute, that did not progress substantively. The judicial review proceedings were brought within one month of the Adjudicator’s Office stating that the complaint was closed. There was also an ADR process in which both Mr Weis and HMRC participated.

The “good reason” offered for the extension of time sought was the pursuit of the internal complaint and the Adjudicator’s Office process, together with the ADR process for the later part of the period.

Sheldon J found that it was reasonable for Mr Weis to seek a statutory review which took matters from 10 May 2019 to 17 December 2021. As to the delay from 17 December 2021 to 11 June 2024, Sheldon J held that the pursuit of the internal review process which concluded on 11 May 2022 explained that delay, with the referral to the Adjudicator’s Office on 8 August 2022, and the commencement of the ADR process which ended in early April 2023 explaining much of the later delay. He held that there was unjustified delay thereafter of some 14 months, but that there was good reason to extend time nonetheless. In this regard he relied upon the following matters: