AC-2024-LON-004257 - [2025] EWHC 2847 (Admin)

Fecha: 04-Nov-2025

The test on appeal

The test on appeal

In order to succeed on appeal, Mr Frunza must satisfy the conditions of either section 27(3) or section 27(4) of the 2003 Act:

“(3)
The conditions are that—
(a)
the appropriate judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently;
(b)
if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge.
(4)
The conditions are that—
(a)
an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing;
(b)
the issue or evidence would have resulted in the appropriate judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently;
(c)
if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person’s discharge.”

I was referred to a number of authorities considering the issue of unexplained delay in the Article 8 context, each of which reflected the particulars facts of the case before the court. The applicable principles in this area have recently been summarised by Fordham J in Gomulka v Poland [2024] EWHC 460 (Admin) at [19]-[20], and I gratefully draw upon that summary:

Delay and the passage of time may (a) diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest in extradition and/or (b) increase the impact of extradition upon private and/or family life.

ii)

In considering whether and to what extent delay and the passage of time does (a) diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest in extradition and/or (b) increase the impact of extradition upon private and/or family life, all relevant circumstances will be considered.

iii)

The fact that person whose extradition is sought is a fugitive from justice does not exclude the operation of Article 8, but “is nevertheless a powerful feature when considering the passage of time in the Article 8 evaluation. It can illuminate and inform both (a) the question of any diminution in the weight to be attached to the public interest and (b) the question of the impacts of extradition upon private and family life.”

iv)

There are limits to the appropriateness of interrogating the steps taken, or not taken, by the requesting state authorities and their UK agents, and in a case where the subject of the warrant is a fugitive from justice, this is especially the case.

The weight to be attributed to the impact of extradition upon private and family life – for all affected individuals whose Article 8 rights would be interfered with – will always necessarily be informed by the passage of time, having regard to all the circumstances.

I was also referred to authorities distinguishing between unexplained and unreasonable delay. In Konecy v Czech Republic [2017] EWHC 2360 (Admin), [42], Sir Wyn Williams cautioned against characterising delay as culpable simply because it is unexplained. Similar statements were made by Collins J in Wolack v Poland [2014] EWHC 2278 (Admin), [9] and Zielinski v Poland ]2007] EWHC 2645 (Admin), [13] (Richards LJ).