AC-2025-MAN-000040 - [2025] EWHC 3018 (Admin)

This is a claim for judicial review. The focus of each of the Chief Constable’s grounds of challenge is the Panel’s assessment of the evidence before it. As to the approach I should take when assessing the legality of the Panel’s decision, I have been referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Salter v ChiefConstable of Dorset [2012] EWCA Civ 1047. In that case a police sergeant was accused of interfering with an investigation by instructing a constable to destroy evidence. He admitted the charge. His case was considered by a misconduct panel and he was required to resign. As the law stood at that time, the route of appeal was, first, by way of application to the Chief Constable for review. In Salter’s case the Chief Constable agreed with the misconduct panel. There was then an appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal. That tribunal allowed Mr Salter’s appeal, substituting a decision that he should be reduced in rank. On an application for judicial review Burnett J quashed the Tribunal’s decision and substituted a decision that the appeal to the Tribunal be dismissed.

The Court of Appeal considered an appeal from Burnett J’s judgment. The Court of Appeal accepted that the tribunal contained expertise, comprising as it did a legally qualified chairman, a retired senior police officer, and a member of a police authority. Nevertheless, when describing the role of the court vis-à-vis the decision of the tribunal, Maurice Kay LJ described an orthodox Wednesbury approach.

“22.

I turn to the third issue, irrationality. That sometimes misunderstood word means no more here than the reaching of a conclusion which no reasonable Tribunal could have reached on the same material with the consequence that its decision was (in the words of Jackson LJ in Salisbury) “clearly inappropriate”. To my mind, this is the central question in the present case. Did the [tribunal] exceed the limits that were reasonably open to it? ...”

The Court of Appeal went on to uphold Burnett J’s conclusion.

What are the “limits reasonably open” will be driven by context. The disciplinary structure in the place at the time of the judgment in Salter was different from the one now in place. In Salter the tribunal was an expert body in the sense that two of its three members had direct experience of the management and operation of a police force. However, that tribunal was itself sitting in appeal over other bodies having a similar level of expertise. When deciding whether the tribunal had exceeded the limits of the judgment available to it, Burnett J had had that well in mind and in consequence the limit applicable was arguably narrower for that reason.

The present disciplinary structure is different. In this case the Panel is the body that has the benefit of practical experience. That places it in a good position to consider what is necessary to give effect to the overall, high-level purposes of the police disciplinary system that the Panel had identified at the beginning of its decision in this case.

In other contexts where the High Court exercises jurisdiction over professional regulatory bodies, for example, over the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority and the Fitness to Practise Committee of the General Medical Council, this court has stated clearly that the sanction decisions of such bodies should be afforded considerable respect; see for example the summary of the law in Fuglers v SRA [2014] EWHC 179 Admin, per Popplewell J at paragraph 13. That is because such bodies are well-placed to assess what is necessary to maintain standards of the professions and maintain public confidence in those professions. In situations where the misconduct considered by a police misconduct panel concerns matters such as those in issue in Salter, which go to the integrity of the exercise of a police officer’s exercise the powers of his office when dealing with member of the public or otherwise, the panel is exercising a role comparable to that of the professional regulatory bodies such as the SRA and the GMC. In such cases the degree of latitude to be afforded by the High Court to sanctions decisions in the solicitors’ and doctors’ cases will readily read-over to decisions taken by a police misconduct panel. This was the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in Salter: see per Maurice Kay LJ at paragraph 21 approving the reasoning of Burnett J which in that case had been set out at paragraph 13 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

The circumstances of the present case are not quite of that character. Inspector Taylor’s misconduct did not involve a misuse of police powers in the exercise of policing functions. The short-lived affair between him and the PCSO resulted in misconduct having no policing-specific aspect. Nevertheless, such matters even though not involving a misuse of police powers, are capable of affecting public confidence in and the reputation of a police force. For this reason, I approach the decision in this case with the question of whether the Panel’s decision was “clearly inappropriate” well in mind, and with careful recognition of the Panel’s position within the statutory scheme as the body possessing expertise on questions of maintaining public confidence in and the reputation of police forces.

A further general point concerns the effect of the “have regard” duty that applies to guidance issued by the College of Policing. This has recently been considered by the Court of Appeal in R(O’Connor) v Panel Chair, PoliceMisconduct Panel [2025] ICR 1137. In that case the court considered the effect of the Outcomes Guidance. The court emphasised points made in the introduction of that Guidance: that the Guidance is meant to outline a framework for assessing the seriousness of misconduct; that the contents of the Guidance are “non-exhaustive”; that the Guidance is not intended to “override the discretion of the person(s) conducting the … hearing, whose function is to determine the appropriate outcome”; that each case must depend on its own facts; and that Guidance cannot prescribe the outcome for every case. Thus, in the words of the Court of Appeal, the Outcomes Guidance did not “mandate” any “structured approach” or a specific outcome in any particular case. Instead, the obligation to have regard to the Outcomes Guidance means that a misconduct panel must consider the substance of the matters contained in the Guidance when considering the case before it.

In its substance, the Outcomes Guidance draws heavily on the judgment of Popplewell J in Fuglers (above), and also refers to a small number of other judgments (of the High Court and the Court of Appeal) which consider the disciplinary decisions of professional regulators. The greater part of the Outcomes Guidance comprises description of the three-stage approach applied by Popplewell J when considering a decision of the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal on sanctions to be applied to solicitors in misconduct proceedings. The material part of Popplewell J’s judgment, adopted by the Outcomes Guidance states as follows:

“Correct approach of a Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal to sanction

28.

There are three stages to the approach which should be adopted by a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in determining sanction. The first stage is to assess the seriousness of the misconduct. The second stage is to keep in mind the purpose for which sanctions are imposed by such a tribunal. The third stage is to choose the sanction which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question.

29.

In assessing seriousness, the most important factors will be (1) the culpability for the misconduct in question and (2) the harm caused by the misconduct. Such harm is not measured wholly, or even primarily, by financial loss caused to any individual or entity. A factor of the greatest importance is the impact of the misconduct upon the standing and reputation of the profession as a whole. Moreover, the seriousness of the misconduct may lie in the risk of harm to which the misconduct gives rise, whether or not as things turn out the risk eventuates. The assessment of seriousness will also be informed by (3) aggravating factors (e.g. previous disciplinary matters) and (4) mitigating factors (e.g. admissions at an early stage or making good any loss). These considerations are reflected in The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal Guidance Note on Sanctions issued in August 2012 at paragraphs 13 to 17. 

30.

At the second stage, the tribunal must have in mind that by far the most important purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions is addressed to other members of the profession, the reputation of the profession as a whole, and the general public who use the services of the profession, rather than the particular solicitors whose misconduct is being sanctioned. ... [reference to Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512]

...

32.

As this and other authorities make clear, although two elements of the sanction’s purpose may be to punish the solicitor in question and to deter repetition of similar or other misconduct by him, these are not the main purposes. The primary purpose of the sanction is to deter others and uphold the reputation of the profession (see e.g. Anderson per Treacy LJ at [72]). In determining sanction, the tribunal will properly have in mind the message which the sanction will send to other solicitors for the purposes of promoting and maintaining the highest standards by members of the profession, and the high standing of the profession itself in its reputation with the public at large. This latter aspect engages not only the public’s confidence in the standards maintained by practising solicitors, but also its confidence in the organs of a self-regulating body to conduct effective and fair disciplinary regulation. 

33.

At the third stage, the tribunal will first consider which category of sanction is appropriate from the range which is available to it.  ...”

Chapter 4 of the Outcomes Guidance contains commentary explaining how that approach might apply in the context of disciplinary proceedings against police officers. For example, the Outcomes Guidance identifies certain types of misconduct that, in the context of policing, have the potential to be particularly serious such as the improper, dishonest or corrupt exercise of police powers, and any action amounting to misuse of the authority that attaches to the office of police constable.

Even though Inspector Taylor’s misconduct did not involve misuse of police powers or misuse of the office of police constable, that did not mean that the obligation to have regard to the Outcomes Guidance was any the less important. Rather, the requirement resting on the Panel was to have regard to the general approach to the assessment of seriousness within the Outcomes Guidance. That assessment in this case also required the Panel to have regard to the matters set out in the Relationships Guidance, so far as any of them served to highlight actions or circumstances relevant to the seriousness of Inspector Taylor’s misconduct.

In its decision the Panel stated two relevant conclusions. The first was that in principle “mental health is a matter that can properly be considered in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct”. No point was or could have been taken with this conclusion since it does no more than recognise one of the general points on potential mitigating factors set out at paragraph 4.81 of the Outcomes Guidance. The second conclusion was that when the misconduct in issue took place, Inspector Taylor “… was dealing with diagnosed mental health conditions and his decision making at the time was impaired”.

The submission for the Chief Constable is that this finding was unsupported by evidence and that the Panel gave no reasons to explain how Inspector Taylor’s health affected his culpability. I do not accept this submission. One matter to have clearly in mind when assessing a submission such as this, which touches on the way in which a misconduct panel has reasoned its decision, is that those decisions must be read realistically and fairly. Notwithstanding that the chairman of a misconduct panel will be a lawyer, panel decisions are not intended to be significant works of legal scholarship. Decisions should state clear conclusions and reasons, but they are not to be picked over in search of respects in which they could have been better or more fully expressed, or for other immaterial error.

In the present case there was evidence to support a conclusion that Inspector Taylor’s decision making had been impaired. The Panel considered three reports prepared by Dr Ian Rogerson, a consultant psychiatrist, dated 14 February 2022, 7 November 2022, and 14 August 2023, respectively. Each report is addressed to the Greater Manchester Police Occupational Health and Welfare Unit, so it is a fair assumption that each was prepared at the request of those advising the Chief Constable. In the November 2022 report Dr Rogerson stated that he had been instructed

“... to advise on whether or not [Inspector Taylor’s] decision making might have been impacted by his mental health at the time of the allegations of sex on duty with a PCSO in early 2020”.

His conclusion was

“… that it is more likely than not that, at the time of the index incident, [Inspector Taylor’s] decision-making would have been impaired as a consequence of the mental disorder of Major Depressive Disorder and discontinuation of anti-depressant medication”

The Panel was entitled to accept that evidence and to rely on it as a matter going to reduce culpability. I can see no error in that course. The submission for the Chief Constable is that the evidence relied on was “insufficient”. However, that submission comes to no more than an invitation to this court to revisit the Panel’s evaluation of evidence. Generally, the submissions on this ground rehearse submissions on questions of evidence that must have been made to the Panel at the misconduct hearing. A court ought not to revisit factual findings other than in the clearest case. While it may be an error of law capable of correction on judicial review for a panel to reach a conclusion that is unsupported by evidence, the submission in this instance amounts only to the contention that the Panel “got the facts wrong” in that it ought to have assessed the evidence before it differently. In this instance, the Panel was entitled by reference to Dr Rogerson’s opinion to reach the conclusion it did.

This ground of challenge covers some ground already covered by
Ground 1. The Panel’s reference to culpability being at the “medium level” is a reference to a notion of its own devising. The Outcomes Guidance does not speak in terms of levels of culpability. Nevertheless, there was nothing wrong with that approach; it is a readily understandable statement of the Panel’s conclusion on the evidence. Nor do I consider there is any reason to conclude that the Panel’s assessment was wrong in law.

When considering culpability, the Panel clearly had in mind that Inspector Taylor and the PCSO had had sex, on police premises, when Inspector Taylor was on duty. Each of the latter two matters were relevant to Inspector Taylor’s culpability. The Panel’s conclusion on culpability was stated after the aggravating and mitigating factors were set out: see the passage quoted above, paragraph 10, at I – J. On a fair reading, the Panel must have had in mind the aggravating matters when considering culpability, and also other matters for example: (a) that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was consensual; (b) that at the time, Inspector Taylor’s judgment had been affected by the depressive disorder he suffered from; and (c) that the relationship had not entailed “abuse of a position of trust or authority as envisaged by the Guidance”. This latter reference is to the Relationships Guidance. That guidance recognised that many workplace relationships do exist. The Guidance does not seek to prohibit them. Rather, its focus is on the need for such relationships to be conducted “with complete professionalism in order not to impact negatively on service delivery or public confidence” (Relationships Guidance at paragraph 5). To this end, paragraph 6 of the Relationships Guidance states as follows:

“6.

Appropriate workplace relationships

In determining whether or not a relationship creates any negative impact on the legitimate aims of policing, the following factors could be considered:

•

a power imbalance is not used to initiate, control or maintain the personal relationship

•

physical and intimate relations do not take place on duty, or off duty on police premises including police vehicles

•

the relationship does not have an adverse impact on the workplace e.g., by creating division and/or friction between those in the relationship or amongst work colleagues

•

there is no fear, fraud or workplace benefit driving the relationship

•

the relationship has no influence on workplace decisions or activities and is not being used to gain or provide some workplace advantage

•

lines of reporting are not abused or compromised.”

Taking all matters together, the Panel’s assessment of culpability as “at the medium level” was one that was reasonably open to it. It must be had in mind that the Panel’s reference to a “medium level” is set in the context of the conclusion the Panel had already reached that Inspector Taylor’s conduct amounted to gross misconduct. Thus the “medium level” is a medium level within a category of serious misconduct.

One particular submission made for the Chief Constable was that the Panel’s statement that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was “not an abuse of a position of trust or authority as envisaged by the guidance”, was inconsistent with the conclusion stated earlier under the heading “Authority, respect and courtesy” that Inspector Taylor had “abused his position of authority in relation to his and [the PCSO’s] rank” (the passage is set out above at paragraph 5). I do not accept this submission. The two conclusions are not inconsistent. The former was reached specifically by reference to provisions to the Relationships Guidance. The latter was made by reference to the second of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in the Schedule to the 2020 Regulations which speaks in terms of “treating … colleagues with respect and courtesy”. It is notable that although the Panel did characterise the relationship as showing a lack of courtesy and respect, it nevertheless stated that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was consensual and that there was no evidence of “manipulation” by him. If the totality of the Panel’s findings on this matter are considered, there is no material inconsistency.

The Chief Constable’s other submissions in support of this ground comprised a rerun of submissions that must have been made to the Panel at the hearing. Those submissions emphasise, for example, the aggravating factors listed in the Panel’s decision including that the sexual intercourse took place at work. The submission is that these matters were “ignored” by the Panel. I disagree. These matters were not ignored. On a fair reading of its decision, the Panel took these matters into account and evaluated all of them (and all other circumstances). The conclusion the Panel reached was a conclusion reasonably available to it.

The Panel’s conclusion was that “harm and the risk of harm [was] at the medium to high level”. The Chief Constable’s submission relies on paragraph 4.74 of the Outcomes Guidance:

“4.74

Where gross misconduct has been found and the behaviour has caused – or could have caused – serious harm to individuals, the community and/or public confidence in the police service, dismissal is likely to follow. A factor of the greatest importance is the impact of misconduct on the standing and reputation of the profession as a whole. …

The substance of the submission, however, is not really that the Panel did not have regard to this part of the Outcomes Guidance. Rather the submission is that the Panel’s assessment of the level of harm was an assessment not reasonably open to it. The Chief Constable’s primary point is that “no reasonable member of the public” would share the panel’s view that Inspector Taylor’s conduct was merely “unprofessional”.

I do not consider this is a matter where it is appropriate to go behind the assessment of an experienced misconduct panel. A reasonable member of the public would be aware of all the circumstances of the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO: that it was a consensual relationship; that it had not rested on any misuse of a position of authority; that Inspector Taylor’s decision-making had been impaired by depression; that the relationship had been short-lived; and that it had not had any significant impact on policing. Taking all these matters into account the Panel’s conclusion was a permissible option.

The submissions for the Chief Constable also placed emphasis on how knowledge of the relationship had affected other members of the neighbourhood policing team, including the PCSO. I was taken to the evidence before the Panel on this point. In its decision, the Panel recognised both the upset suffered by the PCSO, and the difficulties caused to other officers (both those in the neighbourhood team and Inspector Taylor’s peers) who had to deal with what the Panel referred to as the “fallout” from the end of the relationship.

I consider the Panel was right to refer to these matters, but also right not to exaggerate their significance. It is clear that when the relationship ended the PCSO was upset. That was most likely a reflection of her sadness and distress that the relationship was over, mixed with elements of shame or embarrassment that the relationship had ever occurred (at the time the relationship developed both she and Inspector Taylor were in relationships with others). These are all ordinary human emotions; they are intense for a brief period but then tend to pass. Likewise, other officers in the neighbourhood team will have felt awkward and embarrassed. Yet the Panel was entitled not to overstate such matters. In particular it is evident that the Panel did not accept the assertion in the Regulation 30 notice that Inspector Taylor had “caused a toxic working environment for junior colleagues”. Having reviewed the evidence gathered prior to the Regulation 30 notice it is clear that this allegation was not supported by evidence; it was a gross exaggeration of the evidence that was available (or a gross misuse of language to describe the circumstances as “toxic”). It is deeply regrettable that such an allegation appeared in the Regulation 30 notice at all. Be that as it may, what is material for present purposes is that the Panel’s assessment that the harm caused was “medium to high” was a conclusion reasonably open on the evidence. This ground of challenge therefore also fails.

The Panel listed both the aggravating factors and the mitigating ones. The submission for the Chief Constable is that the Panel failed to evaluate these matters. This submission relies on the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in O’Connor (above). Following consideration of the panel decision in that case, Nicola Davies LJ concluded as follows:

“54

Notwithstanding the listing of aggravating and mitigating factors, I am satisfied that the Panel did not provide an adequate analysis and, resulting from it, adequate reasons for its findings in respect of seriousness and within the finding of seriousness the levels of culpability and harm. These findings were important as they provided the factual basis for the first stage of the Panel’s determination upon sanction. In my view the absence of such reasoning is a significant omission and represents an error of law.

...

56

My finding that the absence of analysis and reasoning by the Panel on the issues of seriousness, culpability and harm represents an error of law, means that the essence of Ground 2 of the appeal, as it was presented to this court, is made out. ...”

The central point here concerns the sufficiency of the Panel’s reasoning. In this context, lack of analysis or evaluation is synonymous with an absence of reasoning. Sufficiency of reasoning must depend on the circumstance of the case in hand and must rest on a fair and reasonable consideration of a panel’s decision, looked at in the round.

In this case there are criticisms that could be levelled at the Panel’s identification of aggravating and mitigating considerations. Some of the aggravating factors (the references to “multiple proven breaches of standards” and to the “messaging” taking place “over several weeks”) are matters already accounted for in the description of the misconduct. Similarly, some of the mitigating factors do not show mitigation, only the absence of matters that if present would have aggravated the misconduct (for example, the references to Inspector Taylor “not blaming others” and to the fact that there was only one sexual encounter). However, if the Panel’s decision is read in the round, I consider such criticisms would be unfair and would rest on an over-reading of the decision, akin to treating it as if it were a sentencing exercise conducted pursuant to Sentencing Council Guidelines.

Overall, the decision is sufficiently reasoned. The decision identifies Inspector Taylor’s misconduct: that he had sex with the PCSO on police premises while he was on duty and then failed to disclose this when asked by Inspector Smith. The decision acknowledges that the relationship between Inspector Taylor and the PCSO was not of itself objectionable by reference to the Relationships Guidelines because the relationship was consensual and had not been initiated or pursued by Inspector Taylor through misuse of his authority as a police inspector. The decision further recognised that when other officers became aware of the relationship (which was around the time the relationship came to an end) the working relationships in the neighbourhood policing team were disrupted. Officers within the team were taken aback that the relationship had happened at all. The PCSO was very upset. The sergeant in charge of the neighbourhood team was left to deal with all this the best he could. The decision stated that these matters in different ways engaged three of the Standards of Professional Behaviour. When it came to identifying aggravating and mitigating factors what the Panel did was to identify aspects of what had happened that explained why and to what extent what had happened was serious. While it is correct to say that these matters were not “analysed” there was no need to do that in this case because all the matters identified spoke for themselves. Further “analysis” would have served no purpose beyond repeating the same points using different words.

A further issue is whether the overall approach described in the reasons given was consistent with the Outcomes Guidance to the extent of the “have regard” duty at section 87(3) of the Police Act 1996. I consider it was. The point of substance in that Guidance is that misconduct panels should assess the seriousness of misconduct by reference to the general method described by Popplewell J at paragraph 29 of his judgment in Fuglers. That method promotes consideration of all the circumstances of a situation. In this case, and considering the decision in the round, the Panel did consider all circumstances, and the decision is a sufficiently reasoned explanation, including by reference to matters that the Panel highlighted the gravamen of the misconduct and those the Panel considered placed what had happened in fair context. This ground of challenge therefore fails.

In large part, this ground of challenge overlaps with all other grounds considered so far. Each of those grounds challenged a different aspect of the Panel’s assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct, an essential part of any decision on the sanction to be imposed. However, the specific focus of this ground of challenge is two-fold. The first part is direct to the Panel’s reference, under the heading “Sanction”, to “exceptional” features of the case – that the situation was not “… a case of sexual predation or of an abuse of power for sexual purposes … [but] … based upon the evidence the panel have seen, a mutual interaction between the parties.”. The direction of the Panel’s reasoning is to the effect that it is these matters (which the Panel also describes as “unique”) that caused the Panel to impose a final written warning rather than dismissal. The submission is that this language shows the Panel mis-evaluated matters: the things it described as “exceptional” and “unique” were nothing of the sort.

As the 2020 Regulations now stand (since 28 May 2025). the language of “exceptionality” appears in regulation 42(3)(b) of the 2020 Regulations as the marker between cases where gross misconduct will result in summary dismissal and other (“exceptional”) cases where a different, lesser, penalty will be imposed. However, this Panel’s decision pre-dates that alteration to regulation 42(3)(b) which, at the material time was in the form set out above at paragraph 8.

By reference to regulation 42 as it then stood it might be thought that the references to “exceptional” and “unique in the Panel’s decision are a little awkward. That may be so, but I do not consider that this betrays any legal error.

The Panel’s conclusion in the sanction part of its decision should be considered taking account of what had gone before. The Panel had concluded that Inspector Taylor’s misconduct amounted to gross misconduct for which his culpability was “at the medium level”, and which had caused a medium to high risk of harm. The overall conclusion was that the seriousness was “at the medium level of seriousness”. The Panel had also (under the heading “Outcome”): (a) referred to the purpose of the misconduct regime (as stated at paragraph 2.3 of the Outcomes Guidance); (b) noted that the sexual encounter at work, on duty, was a one-off which had happened at a time when Inspector Taylor’s decision-making had been impaired; and (c) stated that what had happened clearly could have an impact on public confidence in policing”.

This context is important. The sections of the decision prior to the heading “Sanction” show that the Panel considered Inspector Taylor’s misconduct to be serious and of the sort that could justify dismissal. The point the panel is making, on a fair reading of the decision, is that it was the matters it described as “exceptional” (lack of either predation or abuse of power) that tipped the balance between a decision to impose a final written warning and a decision to dismiss. Understood in this way this approach is consistent with the Outcomes Guidance which, at paragraph 7.4 states “… The more serious the conduct found proven against the officer, the more likely it is that dismissal will be justified”. In this sense, in every decision on sanctions there will be tipping points which will identify for the decision-maker which sanction to apply. That is what this part of the Panel’s decision described: i.e., to explain why it had decided not to dismiss Inspector Taylor.

The second part of this ground concerns the Panel’s assessment of the likely public reaction to Inspector Taylor’s misconduct. The Panel stated (at paragraph S of the passage set out above at paragraph 10) that informed members of the public – those aware of all matters known to the Panel – “would see this decision as fulfilling the purpose of the misconduct regime”, namely maintaining public confidence, upholding high standards of conduct and deterring misconduct, and protecting the public. The Chief Constable’s submission is that that conclusion was irrational and that “any reasonable member of the public would be appalled” by Inspector Taylor’s misconduct.

I do not consider that the Panel’s conclusion was irrational. The Panel had carefully assessed the seriousness of the misconduct. On matters on such as what disciplinary action is appropriate to maintain public confidence, the expertise of a panel, derived from the experience of its members, is not lightly to be second-guessed. When this Panel sought to put itself into the shoes of an informed, reasonable member of the public, it reached a conclusion that was within the range permissibly open to it having regard to the objectives of the police misconduct regime which, as is clear from the decision, were objectives that the Panel had well in mind.

At the hearing, the Chief Constable accepted that this ground, as set out in his Skeleton Argument, did not raise any matter beyond those raised by the first five grounds of challenge, taken together. That is correct. The Outcomes Guidance is directed to the substantive consideration of the circumstances of a case. It does not set procedural rules. Moreover, in this case, the points pursued by the Chief Constable under this heading are all to the effect that the Panel mis-evaluated the situation before it and for that reason reached a wrong conclusion. All such matters have already been considered under the first five grounds.