[2025] EWHC 2475 (Admin)

It is now time to turn to the judgment of District Judge Callaway. At paragraph 14, the district judge noted that the appellant came to the United Kingdom in July or August 2024. He had a partner and two children, who at the time the date of the hearing before the district judge were aged seven and three. The district judge noted the settled status in the United Kingdom of the appellant and that he had a stable address over the past seven years. It was said that he worked as a self-employed builder. However, the district judge recorded that over the past one or two months prior to the hearing, the appellant had not worked as a consequence of poor health and the fact that he was awaiting a scan, scheduled for September 2024, owing to what the appellant described as water on his lungs.

There were medical records put forward in connection with the hearing before the district judge. He said that he had considered those records. I pause here to say that I have done so also. Indeed, I have considered everything that was before the district judge, as well as the additional material that I have admitted de bene esse.

At paragraph 15, the district judge noted that the appellant said he had been struggling with his mental health over the past three years. That was a condition exacerbated, the district judge noted, by the appellant's cocaine use over the past four years. Comment was made in relation to chest pains, lung function deficiencies, asthma or pleural infection and a feeling of generalised weakness.

There was a report from Dr Wood, who recorded that there was no current suicidal ideation. The appellant did report symptoms of depression with clear deterioration in the level of functioning over the pursuant three years. However, Dr Wood considered that there were no psychotic symptoms and that the appellant had good insight and capacity.

At paragraph 17, there was a suggestion from Dr Wood that the appellant had what were described as potential elements of PTSD.

At paragraph 18 and following, the district judge made clear findings that the appellant was a fugitive from justice. Nevertheless, at paragraph 20, the district judge noted that the conviction was of some age. However, the district judge considered that the appellant could not rely on the passage of time where a person had deliberately fled the jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the person concerned would have contributed to the delay.

In paragraph 23, the district judge dealt with the issue of injustice or oppression. I will return to this in due course. At the moment, however, it is relevant to note that the district judge found at paragraphs 23 and 24 that there was no oppression. He also applied a test relating to exceptionality and I shall return to that in due course.

At paragraph 25, the district judge set out the factors against extradition and those in favour of extradition. In paragraph 26, he concluded that it would not be oppressive to order extradition in the present case. Again, I shall have more to say about that.