AC-2023-LON-000173 - [2025] EWHC 1897 (Admin)

For the Appellant, Rebecca Hill of counsel makes a number of criticisms of the DJ’s reasoning.

Ms Hill contends that the DJ was wrong to say that “there was no failure to respond to an order of the Court. There was no suggestion that the information was sought from the JA and they failed to respond in time. It was not requested at all.” She points to a CPS note from the initial hearing of the first extradition proceedings on 9 December 2021 which recorded a deadline of 17 February being set for “filing of further info including on if any of these sentences are aggregate sentences, fugitivity, the sentence outstanding, if that sentence is concurrent or consecutive and anything else the IJA deems necessary”.

Ms Hill points out that it was clear from the face of the Arrest Warrant that this case involved an aggregate sentence for a number of offences which was imposed subsequently to the trials for the offences in question. That, she submits, put the requesting state on notice that the Court would need information to be satisfied of the requirements of section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 regarding the requested person’s presence or absence at the hearing and any right to re-trial, those being matters as to which a requesting state must always satisfy the court at an extradition hearing.

Moreover, on 5 April 2022 the Appellant’s representatives served a statement of issues which raised the issue of compliance with section 20. On 13 April 2022 the CPS requested further information from the judicial authority. The request noted that the warrant was silent on the Appellant’s presence “in respect of the underlying convictions founding the aggregate sentence”, and asked whether there was an unqualified right to a retrial on surrender and as to his rights of participation. There was a prompt answer, on 19 April, saying “there is no such unconditional right”.

The extradition hearing took place on 25 April 2022. Counsel for the Respondent applied for an adjournment to address the section 20 challenge but this was refused, the DJ saying (per counsel’s note):

“‘It is for the CPS and the JA to have their case in order on the day the case is listed for final hearing. Proceedings are expected to proceed on the first hearing. It was on the 5th April that the CPS were taken directly to the issue and it nevertheless appears to have been overlooked by them. I have regard to the special objective and also the provision in the TCA at Art 615 where the expectation is that the final decision is taken within 60 days of the arrest. I also have regard to the point made that Mr Bakowski is privately instructing and there would be additional costs of a further hearing in due course, although I accept it could be that the CPS would pay those costs, but even then still the prejudice of further delay and further stress. Not satisfied good reason for the adjournment.’”

By the end of the hearing on 25 April 2022, both counsel agreed that section 20 could not be satisfied in respect of file nos. 956/04 and 209/05, as I have said.

By reference to those facts, Ms Hill contends that:

In these circumstances, Ms Hill submits that the second warrant must be seen as an attempt to avoid or undo, or as a collateral attack on, the decisions of DJ Godfrey and that the renewed proceedings are oppressive and an abuse of process.

In respect of Article 8 Ms Hill submits that the DJ was wrong to place only “little weight” on the age of the offending, occurring between 2000 and 2005, and to the appellant’s rehabilitation since then. She submitted that there was a lengthy and culpable delay in particular between 2011 and 2018, up to the point when an arrest warrant was issued.

In the meantime the appellant’s sister has been reconciled with him and does not want him to be extradited for the offences against her. He has since built a business, home and community ties in the UK and has a son born in November 2009. Ms Hill also submits that insufficient weight was given to the effect of extradition on the son, who will be separated from his father at a particularly sensitive age and will simultaneously endure financial hardship and potentially the loss of the family home. Statements by his parents show that he is now experiencing emotional and behavioural issues. Thanks to the repeated proceedings, the anxiety of the case has hung over the family for more than 3 ½ years.

Ms Hill invites me to consider the parents’ updated evidence which, by definition could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence at that hearing, following the approach in Josza v Hungary [2023] EWHC 2404 (Admin).

Overall Ms Hill submits that if the DJ were considering the case today, she would be compelled to find that extradition would be disproportionate.

For the respondent, Adam Squibbs of counsel emphasizes the fact-specific nature of the court’s assessment of the abuse of process issue. He submits that the DJ made no error on the merits of the case. There was no breach of an order in the first proceedings because the judicial authority was not directed to provide information about section 20. Section 20 was first raised only 20 days before the extradition hearing.

Mr Squibbs further submits that the DJ was right to treat the absence of bad faith as a relevant factor in the assessment. He contends that in this case, unlike Rymarski, the second proceedings included important new evidence in the form of the missing information on the section 20 issue.

Meanwhile, he submits, the public interest in extradition is high, having regard to the seriousness of the offending and the appellant’s fugitivity. Those factors outweighed the need for finality.

Mr Squibbs also resisted the suggestion by Ms Hill that the CPS could and should have made an earlier application to adjourn the first proceedings, given the closeness of the hearing at the time when further information on section 20 was originally sought and provided.

Mr Squibbs also resisted the appellant’s case as to the impact on him of the issue of a new warrant. Whereas in Jasvins the new warrant came 18 months after discharge of the old one, in this case the period was 6 months and there is no compelling evidence of any change of circumstances in that period.

As to Article 8, Mr Squibbs agrees that the Court should consider the fresh evidence de bene esse but submits that this ground of appeal should nevertheless be dismissed and therefore that the application to adduce fresh evidence should ultimately be refused because it would not have had a decisive effect.

Mr Squibbs points out that the DJ carefully conducted the necessary balancing exercise. He emphasises the seriousness of the offending, including the domestic abuse offence which was committed against children as well as against the appellant’s sister. The appellant left Poland as a fugitive, heightening the weighty public interest in extradition. His fugitivity also contributed to the delay, on which Mr Squibbs submits that the DJ took a balanced view. The appellant’s life in the UK has been built in the knowledge that he was a fugitive from justice. Although he has medical issues he will receive appropriate care in Poland. The DJ correctly assessed the impact on the family, which is not materially changed by the fresh evidence.

Overall Mr Squibbs submits that the DJ struck the Article 8 balance correctly.