AC-2024-LON-000883 - [2025] EWHC 2019 (Admin)

Mr Armstrong maintained in writing that the Secretary of State had a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal against the adverse costs order. He submitted that the appeal right was an adequate alternative remedy, so that the Secretary of State should not have resorted to judicial review proceedings. Ms Lisa Giovannetti KC, who appeared with Mr Richard Evans on behalf of the Secretary of State, submitted that there was no right of appeal from SIAC’s decision and that a claim for judicial review represented the only means of challenge.

The right of appeal in SIAC review proceedings is governed by section 7(1A) of the Act. Under that section, an appeal right arises only where SIAC has “made a final determination of a review” and an appeal may be brought only against “that determination.” There is force in Ms Giovannetti’s submission that the Secretary of State withdrew the decision in FGF’s case before any final determination was reached. Moreover, the wording of section 7(1A) suggests that the subject of the appeal must be the determination of the review. Section 7(1A) would therefore appear to exclude appeals against decisions on ancillary matters such as costs.

We do not however need to decide whether a right of appeal existed because Mr Armstrong accepted that the availability of an appeal right would not deprive the Administrative Court of jurisdiction to determine the claim but would be relevant only to the court’s discretion to hear it (Leech v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison [1988] AC 533, 580-581, per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton). He agreed, albeit on a pragmatic basis, that we should determine the claim as the proceedings had reached a substantive hearing for which the court was ready. Given Mr Armstrong’s position, we did not hear full argument on the extent of any right of appeal and prefer to reach no conclusion on that question.

Before turning to the facts, it is convenient to give an overview of SIAC’s jurisdiction.