Background
Background
This is the third challenge in the High Court to the notice and involves the third decision of a planning inspector in respect thereof. The notice was first appealed under section 174 of the 1990 Act by Bhupendra Singhal, a director and sole shareholder of the Claimant, and his wife, the company secretary. They were represented at that appeal hearing by John Hobson QC, as he then was. Apart from a change of wording in the notice to “the material change of use of the main dwelling house from use as a dwelling house to use as 3x self-contained residential units” the appeals were dismissed by the first inspector in a decision letter dated 15 December 2016 and the notice was upheld. However, the Claimant then appealed to the High Court under section 289(6) of the 1990 Act. The permission hearing took place before Rhodri Price Lewis QC, as he then was, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. He gave permission, on the basis that it was arguable that the inspector erred in law as to the availability of permitted development rights in respect of the outbuilding,
That led the parties to agree a consent order, approved by the court on 5 April 2019, allowing the appeal and remitting it back to the Secretary of State for redetermination, on the basis amongst other matters that the inspector erred as to the availability of permitted development rights in respect of the outbuilding and rear extension. At that hearing, the claimant was represented by Richard Harwood QC, as he then was. By a decision dated 14 September 2021, the second inspector amended the wording of the notice in similar ways to the first, extended the time for compliance to six months but otherwise upheld the notice.
The Claimant again sought to appeal the second inspector’s decision under section 289 of the 1990 Act. The matter of permission came on before me, and by order dated 8 December I granted permission on the ground that it was arguable that the inspector failed to consider whether planning permission should be granted for the rear extension and outbuilding on their own merits. When the substantive hearing came on before me, counsel for the Secretary of State indicated that the appeal was not resisted, and by order dated 27 April 2022 the matter was again remitted for redetermination because of that failure.
At the hearing before the third inspector, the Claimant was again represented by Mr Harwood KC, as he had become. The result was as indicated above. The present challenge in the High Court followed and the statement of facts and grounds set out five grounds, as settled by Mr Harwood KC. At the permission hearing, the Claimant was represented by its director Mr Singhal, as it was on the substantive hearing before me, and the Secretary of State was represented by Mr Riley-Smith, as she was before me. Permission was given on only three grounds, as set out and renumbered below.
The grounds, as drafted by Mr Harwood KC are as follows:
The inspector acted unfairly in including the condition removing permitted development rights,
The inspector failed to take into account, or if he did, failed to give adequate reasons since he did not mention it, the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF),
In concluding that one of the three rooms in the outbuilding would not be required for a purpose incidental to the enjoyment of the dwelling house, the inspector failed to take into account material considerations or failed to give adequate or intelligible reasons.
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