AC-2024-LON-001877 - [2025] EWHC 2132 (Admin)

Section 226(1)(a) of the 1990 Act provides that a local authority has power to acquire compulsorily any land in their area if they think that acquisition will facilitate the carrying out of development, re-development or improvement on or in relation to the land. The First Defendant’s authorisation is needed in order to exercise that power of compulsory purchase.

The procedures enacted under Part 1 of the 1981 Act apply for the purpose of the First Defendant’s determination whether to confirm a compulsory purchase order made by a local authority pursuant to section 226(1)(a) of the 1990 Act. Where, as in the present case, the First Defendant’s appointed inspector decides that the compulsory purchase order should be confirmed, the acquiring authority must publicise that fact and serve notice of confirmation on any remaining objector. The compulsory purchase order becomes operative on the date on which notice of its confirmation is first published: see sections 15 and 26 of the 1981 Act.

Sections 23 and 24 of the 1981 Act enable an application to be made to the High Court questioning the validity of a compulsory purchase order. Insofar as material to the present claim, they provide –

“23(1) If any person aggrieved by a compulsory purchase order desires to question the validity thereof, or of any provision contained therein, on the ground that the authorisation of a compulsory purchase thereby granted is not empowered to be granted under this Act or any such enactment as is mentioned in section 1(1) of this Act, he may make an application to the High Court.

(2)

If any person aggrieved by -

(a)

a compulsory purchase order,

…

desires to question the validity thereof on the ground that any relevant requirement has not been complied with in relation to the order … he may make an application to the High Court.

(3)

In subsection (2) above “relevant requirement” means—

…

(b)

any requirement of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 or of any rules made, or having effect as if made, under that Act.

(4)

An application to the High Court under this section shall be made within six weeks –

…

(b)

in the case of a compulsory purchase order to which the [Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945] does not apply, from the date on which notice of the confirmation or making of the order is first published in accordance with this Act,

….

24(1) …

(2)

If on the application the court is satisfied that—

(a)

the authorisation granted by the compulsory purchase order is not empowered to be granted under this Act or any such enactment as is mentioned in section 1(1) of this Act, or

(b)

the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by any relevant requirement (as defined in section 23(3) above) not having been complied with,

the court may quash the compulsory purchase order or any provision contained therein… either generally or in so far as it affects any property of the applicant.

(3)

If the court has power under subsection (2) to quash a compulsory purchase order it may instead quash the decision to confirm the order either generally or in so far as it affects any property of the applicant”.

Rule 19(1) of the Compulsory Purchase (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 2007 requires the authorising authority, in this case the inspector, to give notice of their decision and the reasons for it in writing to the acquiring authority and any remaining objector. The 2007 Rules were made under section 9 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992. The requirement to give reasons is accordingly a relevant requirement for the purposes of section 23(2) and 23(3) of the 1981 Act.

The principles upon which the court decides an application made under section 23 of the 1981 Act are well established. They were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Margate Town Centre Regeneration Company Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Thanet DC [2013] EWCA Civ 1178 at [17] –

“17.

The applicable law is not in dispute and so I will summarise the relevant principles briefly.

a)

"A CPO should only be made where there is a compelling case in the public interest. An acquiring authority should be sure that the purposes for which it is making a CPO sufficiently justify interfering with the human rights of those with an interest in the land affected": see para. 16 of Circular 06/2004. To similar effect are certain observations of Lord Denning MR in Prest v Secretary of State for Wales [1982] 266 EG 527.

b)

A consequence of principle (a) is that "the draconian nature of the order will itself render it more vulnerable to successful challenge on Wednesbury/Ashbridge grounds unless sufficient reasons are adduced affirmatively to justify it on the merits": per Slade LJ in De Rothschild v Secretary of State for Transport (1988) 57 P. & C.R. 330.

c)

The grounds of challenge under section 23 do not entitle the court to revisit the merits of the decision, only to see whether there is any legal or procedural error in the confirmation: see the observations of Sullivan J, as he was, in R (James Powell and Others) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2007] EWHC 2051 (Admin) para.3.

d)

When deciding whether or not to confirm an order, the Secretary of State must have regard to all material considerations and must not take into account immaterial considerations. But it is for the court to decide what are material considerations: see Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 at 764 per Lor Keith of Kinkel.

e)

The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and adequate. In determining whether those criteria are satisfied the decision letter must be read fairly as a whole, as if by a well-informed reader: South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No.2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at 1964 per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood.

f)

The Court should interfere only if the decision leaves a "genuine as opposed to a forensic doubt" as to what has been decided and why: Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State (1993) 66 P. & C.R.263, 271 per Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.

g)

Where a decision maker has erred in law the decision should be quashed unless the court is satisfied that the decision maker would necessarily have made the same decision had the error not been made: see Simplex GE (Holdings) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] 3 PLR 25 at 42 per Staughton LJ.”