AC-2025-LON-000331 - [2025] EWHC 2236 (Admin)

In the recent case of Pawel Kalandyk v District Court in Gdansk, Poland [2025] EWHC 602 (Admin), Collins Rice J meticulously examined the scope of “trial resulting in the decision” for the purposes of Section 20 and Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision. That case involved an individual whose suspended sentence was activated due to subsequent convictions and a failure to pay compensation. The central question was whether the suspended sentence activation hearing itself, or the proceedings leading to the subsequent convictions, constituted a “trial resulting in the decision” that would engage the protections of Section 20.

Collins Rice J affirmed the long-standing principle established in Openbaar Ministerie v Ardic (C-571/17 PPU) EU:C:2017:1026, that decisions solely relating to the execution or application of a final custodial sentence do not fall within the scope of Article 4a(1) unless they modify the nature or quantum of the sentence originally imposed. She said, “‘the decision’ had to be understood as ‘referring to the proceeding that led to the judicial decision which finally sentenced the person whose surrender is sought’”. The fact that further discretionary judicial decisions might be involved in activating a suspended sentence does not alter this, provided those decisions cannot change the original sentence itself. This means that Section 20 is not triggered by non-attendance at a hearing solely related to the execution of a suspended sentence.

Furthermore, Kalandyk critically analysed LU & PH v Ministry of Justice and Equality (C-514/21 and C-515/21) EU:C:2023:235, upon which the Applicant had sought to rely. Collins Rice J clarified that LU & PH reaffirmed the Ardic principle, stating that the activation hearing itself is not a relevant hearing for extradition purposes. While LU & PH held that a subsequent conviction (if it led to the activation of a suspended sentence and was obtained in absentia) would fall within Article 4a(1), this does not mean that the activation proceedings themselves are subject to Section 20 scrutiny. Indeed, Collins Rice J noted that the fact that a court considering suspended sentence activation has a general discretion in that matter, is not relevant for Article 6 purposes, “as long as that margin of discretion does not allow it to modify either the quantum or the nature of the custodial sentence”. She concluded that LU & PH “expressly confirms that activation hearings remain irrelevant for extradition purposes”.