AC-2025-LON-001896 - [2025] EWHC 2231 (Admin)

The Claimant, whose name has been anonymised using the cipher “BRO”, is a young male who was encountered in the United Kingdom in July 2021 when he claimed asylum. At that time, he was claiming to be under 18 years of age, but he was assessed to be an adult. If his date of birth, as recorded by the Defendant, is correct, then he is now 25 years old. He says that he is from Nigeria. It appears, from the papers I have read, that he travelled to the United Kingdom from another European country by hiding himself in the back of a lorry which came through the Port of Dover.

He has been diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia with psychotic features, and anti-social personality disorder. This appears to have, at times, led him to act in ways which have posed significant risks to himself or others.

Between July 2021 and April 2024, he was accommodated by the Defendant at various locations within England under Part VI of the IAA 1999. During that period, he was under the care of various mental health services, and he was twice detained under the MHA 1983. He also received criminal convictions in England for various offences, such as being in possession of a knife in a public place, damaging property, assaulting an emergency worker, and using threatening words or behaviour.

In October 2024, he was convicted of offences by a Scottish court. From the papers I have read, it appears that those offences were committed on a day in August 2021, at which time he was being accommodated by the Defendant at an asylum seekers’ accommodation facility in Wolverhampton. On that day, he had boarded a train from Wolverhampton, without having a train ticket or the means of paying for one. He then changed from train to train, eventually ending up in Pitlochry, Scotland. In Pitlochry, he had visited a shop where he got into an argument with the shopkeeper, whom he threatened with a broken bottle. He was also abusive towards police officers who were called to the incident.

The Claimant was required to attend the Scottish court in April 2024 to answer for those matters, but he failed to attend, apparently because he lacked the means to travel to Scotland. In consequence of his failure to attend, a warrant was issued for his arrest, and he was then remanded into custody in a Scottish prison. In October 2024, the Scottish court convicted him of the offences. In November 2024, he was sentenced by the Scottish court to 18 months imprisonment for those offences and therefore continued to be held in prison in Scotland. The Scottish court’s sentence specified that he would be released on conditional licence after the halfway point in that sentence, under the supervision of a criminal justice social worker (“CJSW”) (an officer of a Scottish local authority whose role, under the Scottish system, includes supervising offenders who have been released on licence). Amongst the licence conditions specified by the Scottish court was that the Claimant must live only at an address that has been approved by the CJSW.

As the Claimant had already served time in prison on remand since April 2024, the halfway point of his 18-month sentence was reached in January 2025. He was not, however, released from the Scottish prison at that time. That is because, on 20 January 2025, he was detained in the Scottish prison by the Defendant under immigration powers, pursuant to section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007. The Defendant’s detention of the Claimant was said to be with a view to effecting his removal from the United Kingdom to Nigeria, and to prevent him from absconding in the meantime. At that time, there was no extant asylum claim by the Claimant that required determination prior to the Defendant being able to remove him, since he has signed a letter in December 2024 withdrawing his asylum claim.

On 20 January 2025 (the first day of immigration detention), however, the Claimant’s then solicitors made representation to the Defendant to the effect that the Claimant had not understood what he was signing and that he had not wished to withdraw his asylum claim. As a result of this, on 22 January 2025, the Defendant agreed to reinstate the Claimant’s asylum claim. The Defendant nevertheless continued to detain the Claimant with a view to removing him, taking the position that it was realistic to estimate that he could be removed within a reasonably short period.

On 6 February 2025, the Defendant transferred the Claimant from the Scottish prison to Brook House Immigration Removal Centre in England, where his detention under the Defendant’s immigration control powers was maintained. Over the course of the rest of that month, various concerns were raised regarding the Claimant’s mental state. On 21 February, for example, a medical doctor (a GP at Brook House) completed a ‘Rule 35’ report raising concerns that the Claimant might be a victim of torture, and that there was a risk that ongoing detention would worsen his psychological health. Staff at Brook House also raised concerns regarding the Claimant’s erratic behaviour, and two blades were found in his room. The Defendant determined, after considering the Rule 35 report, that the Claimant fell within the ‘Level 2’ category under its ‘adults at risk in immigration detention’ (“AAR”) policies, and thus not the higher ‘Level 3’ category, and that his detention should be maintained. At that time, the Defendant was estimating that the Claimant could be deported within the next 8-10 weeks, and therefore his continued detention, in order to facilitate that deportation and prevent him from absconding, was deemed by the Defendant to remain proportionate.

It appears that the Claimant’s mental state may have stabilised to a degree after 28 February, from which date he was given periodical injections of slow-release aripiprazole (a medication used to manage and treat schizophrenia and certain other conditions). Notwithstanding this partial improvement, however, his behaviour continued to be a cause for concern. During March 2025, he was repeatedly placed in segregation, pursuant to Rule 40 of the Detention Centre Rules 2001. His behaviour at Brook House during that month included fire-setting, threatening to set fires, and inappropriate sexualised behaviour towards female staff. The latter behaviour included, for example, exposing himself to female staff members whilst making sexualised comments towards them.

On 2 April 2025, the Claimant was transferred from detention at Brook House to being detained at Lewes Prison. The reason for the transfer to the prison estate appears to have been that his behaviour could not be adequately managed within the style of regime at an immigration removal centre.

On 7 May 2025, the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) granted the Claimant conditional immigration bail. The bail conditions included what was effectively a specific pre-condition that needed to be satisfied prior to the grant of bail taking effect, namely that he be provided with, or otherwise obtain, suitable accommodation at which he would then reside:

“The applicant will reside at an address provided by the respondent or whatever accommodation is most suitable to the applicant’s mental health needs.

By virtue of para 3(8) of schedule 10 of The Immigration Act 2016 this grant of bail will not commence until such address has been provided.”

That grant of conditional immigration bail has subsequently been renewed by the FTT on several occasions, most recently on 24 July 2025, on essentially the same terms. Despite all those grants of immigration bail, the Claimant has not been released on bail. As at the date of the hearing before me, the Claimant has thus remained in detention for around 15 weeks during which he has had the benefit, on paper, of conditional bail granted to him by a judicial body. The reason why he has remained in detention throughout that period is essentially that he has not been provided with, or otherwise been able to access, a suitable accommodation address in the community. His lack of an accommodation address outside detention has rendered him unable to meet the pre-condition to his release specified by the FTT.

The Claimant’s lack of an accommodation placement has persisted despite his having requested s.95 accommodation from the Defendant. On 23 May 2025, the Defendant agreed that she would provide him with support for under section 95 IAA 1999, following his release from detention, so as to protect him from destitution to which he would otherwise be exposed. Yet the Claimant’s practical situation, as at the time when this judicial review claim was filed on 12 June 2025, was that he remained in detention at Lewes Prison. That continues to be his situation today.

It is obviously a matter of concern that the Claimant has remained in immigration detention for 15 weeks after having been granted conditional bail. In fairness to the Defendant, however, the making of appropriate arrangements for the Claimant’s release from detention is not without practical complexities, for reasons that include the following:

In early June 2025, the Defendant proposed a s.95 accommodation address for the Claimant in Glasgow. On 20 June 2025, however, the CJSW decided that the proposed accommodation was unsuitable.

On 26 June 2025, the Defendant proposed a further s.95 accommodation address in Scotland, this time in Alloa, Clackmananshire. That address was approved by the CJSW on the following day. But the Claimant’s release to that accommodation did not proceed. That is because, on 3 July 2025, a multi-disciplinary meeting took place at which it was said that the Claimant would be detained on mental health grounds under section 3 MHA 1983. On that date, the Defendant withdrew her decision to provide support for the Claimant under section 95 IAA 1999, reasoning that the Claimant would not be destitute if he was being detained in a mental health facility where accommodation and meals would be being provided to him.

On 14 July 2025, however, the Claimant was assessed by a consultant forensic psychiatrist, who concluded that Claimant did not meet the criteria for detention under section 3 MHA 1983. The Healthcare Mental Health Unit at Lewes Prison sought to challenge that assessment by requesting that it be reviewed by a Medical Commissioner, because of concerns as to whether the Claimant could be released to the community without this giving rise to unacceptable risks.

On 29 July 2025, this judicial review claim came before Deputy High Court Judge Karen Ridge for consideration of the Claimant’s application for an interim order that he be released from immigration detention. Earlier in the morning of that day, a multi-disciplinary meeting had taken place at Lewes Prison, the outcome of which was that it was agreed that the Claimant did not meet the criteria for detention under section 3 MHA 1983. Judge Ridge decided to adjourn the interim relief application, so that further information could be obtained regarding the options available in terms of accommodation and other support for the Claimant post-release. ECC and SNEE-ICB were joined to the proceedings as Interested Parties.

On 5 August 2025, a social worker from ECC or the local mental health provider, Essex Partnership University NHS Trust, undertook an assessment of the Claimant under section 117 MHA 1983. The assessment concluded that the Claimant’s needs, for the purposes of section 117, were essentially to be provided with periodical injections of slow-release psychotropic medication and for his mental health medication plan to be kept under review. This could be achieved by SNEE-ICB referring the Claimant to the local mental health team in whatever area of the UK his post-release accommodation was located. That local team would in any case make their own assessment of the Claimant and could potentially identify additional needs that ECC or SNEE-ICB might then have a duty to fund or meet under section 117. The ECC social worker also considered the Care Act, but did not, at the time, find the Claimant to have any specific care or support needs under the Care Act. Accordingly, the assessment made by the ECC social worker did not hold out any prospect of either ECC or SNEE-ICB providing accommodation for the Claimant, whether under section 117 MHA 1983 or the Care Act.

I note, in passing, that it is anyway not clear to me that ECC would be the local authority responsible for providing any care and support to which the Claimant might be entitled under the Care Act. As Ms Hampshire, who appeared before me for SNEE-ICB explained, there are specific rules that apply for determining which ICB and local social services authority are responsible for providing support under section 117 MHA 1983 to a person who has previously been detained under section 3 of that Act. The rules and guidance for determining which local authority is responsible for providing care and support to which a person is entitled under the Care Act are not the same.

By the time of the hearing before me, around two weeks had passed since the ECC social worker had communicated her assessment. But the Defendant had still not reverted to agreeing to offer support, including accommodation, for the Claimant under s.95 IAA 1999. The Defendant’s position was that it would be premature for her to do so, given that, pursuant to s.95, such support can be provided only where the asylum-seeker is “destitute” in the sense that he has no other means of obtaining accommodation and/or meeting essential living needs. Mr Howarth, Counsel who appeared before me on behalf of the Defendant, drew attention to two lines of enquiry relating to the Claimant’s potential entitlement to accommodation which he said remained unresolved: (1) a concern that ECC had not properly assessed whether the Claimant had “accommodation-related needs” for the purposes of the Care Act; and (2) an offer of private accommodation in a shared flat in Bournemouth, England, which had been made to the Claimant by a private individual, in respect of which approval from the CJSW had been requested.