CH-2025-000012 and CH-2025-000014 - [2025] EWHC 2697 (Ch)

I consider it appropriate to merely express a provisional view in relation to costs at this stage, in that there will inevitably be argument in relation to the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal, and how my decision in relation to the latter might impact upon the order that the Judge might have made below. However, I would make the following observations.

I do not, for my part, consider that Mr and Mrs Gold are to be criticised for their Solicitors having not produced a Statement of Costs at the end of the trial, or on hand down on 10 December 2025. There is no presumption in favour of assessing summarily costs after the conclusion of a five-day trial, and, that being the case, it seems to me that there can have been no expectation on the parties in the present case to have produced Statements of Costs to be available at the end of the trial or at the hand down of the Judgment when costs were considered.

The Judge had a wide margin of appreciation so far as the exercise of her discretion in relation to costs was concerned, and an appeal court will rarely interfere with such an exercise of discretion unless some clear error of principle can be established. It is clear from how she dealt with the question of costs in the penultimate paragraph of the transcript of the hand down hearing on 10 December 2024, that she he had in mind the alternative of an issue-based order as to costs, but quite rightly, I consider, concluded that matters were better dealt with by a percentage based approach to costs.

Mr Thakerar argues that insufficient weight was given to Mr Daniel and DFH’s success in relation to certain issues, such as successfully reducing the amount that Mr and Mrs Gold claimed to be entitled to recover by way of loan repayments. However, the Judge had the advantage over this Court of seeing how the various issues played out during the course of the trial, as well as reaching a view in respect of the conduct of the respective parties.

In the circumstances, and given that no clear error principle has been established in the approach taken by the Judge, I would require a great deal of persuading that I should substitute my own discretion for that of the Judge in respect of the order that she made in respect of costs, namely that each party should pay 50% of the other party’s costs.

Consequently, subject to further submissions on the point following hand down of this judgment, I would be inclined to dismiss Ground 5 of the appeal relating to the Costs issue.