BL-2024-000734 - [2025] EWHC 3003 (Ch)

It is suggested that I erred in concluding that any response or lack of response to requests for information in this case unarguably constituted a breach of the Information Provisions and/or a default permitting the appointment of the Defendants as administrators. The Claimants say that there could be evidence to be produced at trial which shows that the request made was not in fact valid, such that the failure to respond to it did not constitute an Event of Default under the Charge.

It is not clear to me how this argument could be made. The terms of the Charge are clear (and it was not disputed at trial) that a breach of the obligation to provide information constituted an event of default. It was accepted by both parties that no response of any kind was in fact given to the request made [13].

I deduce from the submissions of Mr Marshall KC provided in support of the grounds of appeal that the issue he seeks to raise here is that the terms of the e-mail dated 15 July were not in fact a valid request for the information prescribed in the Information Provisions. I think that this is an allusion to the fact that the e-mail signature block described the person making the request, Mr Fergusson, as a partner in Nimoi Holdings, whereas the actual Chargee was Niven. However, since it is not disputed that Mr Fergusson was at that time the sole director of Niven, and it was confirmed to the Chargeor that he was acting in that capacity when he sent the e-mail (see [52]), I do not see that this argument has any hope of success.