CR-2024-MAN-000540 - [2025] EWHC 2159 (Ch)

It is appropriate that I say something about the other issues raised by Mr Faik with regard to the state of account as between the Company and Milltom.

In the schedule that he has prepared, showing the balance due to Milltom of £88,613.78 referred to in paragraph 38 above, Mr Faik has only allowed for interest at a rate of 5.75% per annum as against 8% per annum as claimed by Milltom. I consider that Milltom must be entitled to an interest at a rate of 8% per annum on the outstanding balance due to it as secured by the ICO/FCO. As contended by Milltom, its debt is a judgment debt, and I note that the FCO dated 21 March 2023 provides for interest to accrue at a daily rate of £110.19 on a judgment debt of £502,732.56, which is indeed interest at a rate of 8% per annum (£110.19 per day amounts to £40,219.35 per annum which equals 8% of £502,732.56). Thus, interest at a rate of 8% per annum is, as I see it, expressly provided for by the FCO.

So far as the complaint that Mr Craig’s remuneration ought to be capped at 5% of realisations by application of section 109 (6) LPA is concerned, I note that the latter provision is of application where the receiver is appointed under the statutory power, where no remuneration is specified, or the remuneration is provided for by the appointment. However, the terms of a mortgage or charge can provide for remuneration at a higher rate than 5% - see section 101(3) LPA 1925. Further, the remuneration allowed to a receiver appointed under an express power of appointment should be specified in the mortgage or charge, or on their appointment, and in the absence of such an express provision, the receiver will be entitled to a proper remuneration as a quantum merit – see Fisher and Lightwood (supra) at [28.14].

In the circumstances, I do not consider that it can be simply stated that Mr Craig’s remuneration is limited to 5%, and that it will be necessary to look at the terms of the relevant charges granted over 5 and 6 Gezzerts Rise, which are not before the court, in order to determine what remuneration Mr Craig might be entitled to. If the proper basis is a quantum merit, then Mr Faik may be entitled to insist upon further information as to the amount of work carried out by Mr Craig as LPA receiver before reaching a view as to the reasonableness thereof.

So far as Mr Faik’s objection in respect of legal fees is concerned, again Mr Faik may be entitled to insist upon further information in support of the same and evidencing the fact that they were actually and reasonably incurred.