CL-2025-000376 - [2025] EWHC 2875 (Comm)

Fecha: 05-Oct-2025

The American Cyanamid Principles

The American Cyanamid Principles

22.

The relevant principles are as follows:

(1)

The Court must be satisfied that there is a “serious issue to be tried”. If so, then the fundamental question is whether granting or withholding an injunction is more likely to produce a just result: National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corp [2009] 1 WLR 1405 at [16].

(2)

In answering that question, the Court should consider (i) whether, if the injunction is refused, damages would be an adequate remedy for the applicant; and (ii) whether, if the injunction is granted, damages would be an adequate remedy for the respondent.

(3)

Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of damages for either party, the Court should determine where balance of convenience lies. The “basic principle is that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other”: National Commercial Bank v Olint at [17].

(4)

If the risk of irremediable prejudice does not differ widely, it may be appropriate to take into account the relative strength of the parties’ cases: American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, per Lord Diplock at 409, and the further authorities cited at paragraph 39 below.

(5)

Where the factors are evenly balanced, it may be a counsel of prudence to preserve the status quo: American Cyanamid, per Lord Diplockat 408.

23.

The relief sought against the RAE Parties is mandatory insofar as it requires RAE to take positive steps to facilitate the payment of the Disputed Proceeds into escrow. It has been said that the Court should only grant mandatory relief where it has a high degree of assurance that the injunction will be found to have been properly granted. It is, however, now well-established that mandatory injunctions are not governed by different principles, and that to the extent that the test of “high degree of assurance” has any continuing relevance, its rationale is that a mandatory order usually carries a greater of risk injustice than a prohibitory order which maintains the status quo. In the present case, however, a mandatory order merely facilitates the payment of the Disputed Proceeds into escrow and thereby maintains the status quo. Its effect is therefore more akin to a prohibitory order.