CL-2018-000297, CL-2018-000404, CL-2018-000590, - [2025] EWHC 2979 (Comm)

Fecha: 14-Nov-2025

The Proposed Appeal

The Proposed Appeal

The application by SKAT for permission to appeal was for an appeal with limited scope, as compared to the scope of the claims pursued by SKAT at trial. Thus, SKAT sought permission to appeal against:

(i)

the dismissal of its claims for damages for deceit against (only) Sanjay Shah, Mr Horn, Rajen Shah, Mr Klar, Mr Patterson and Mr Jain (to whom I shall now refer, collectively, as the ‘primary respondents’), and then:

(a)

in the case of Mr Patterson and Mr Jain, only its deceit claims alleging deception by the dividend payment representation or the tax representation; and

(b)

in the case of Sanjay Shah, Mr Horn, Rajen Shah and Mr Klar, only its deceit claims alleging deception by the dividend payment representation, the tax representation or the honest custodian representation;

(ii)

the dismissal of its claims for:

(a)

unjust enrichment, against 45 of the Liability Defendants, identified in Appendix 3A to the Order, and

(b)

proprietary remedies, against 39 of the Liability Defendants, identified in Appendix 3B of the Order,

in each case so far (if at all, and only) as that claim was made at trial upon the basis of SKAT’s claim to have made payments induced by deception on the part of one or more of the primary respondents.

I shall refer to SKAT’s claims for damages for deceit against the primary respondents within the scope of the application for permission to appeal as the ‘primary claims’. I shall refer to the Liability Defendants identified in Appendix 3A and/or Appendix 3B of the Order as the ‘secondary respondents’, and the unjust enrichment and proprietary claims against them within the scope of the application for permission to appeal as the ‘secondary claims’. I note for completeness (it had no impact on any decision I had to make) that all six primary respondents are also secondary respondents appearing in both Appendices.

10.

The limitation of the secondary claims expressed at the end of paragraph 8(ii) above is a consequence of the fact that SKAT pursued unjust enrichment or proprietary claims at trial only if and to the extent that it established that it had been induced by fraud to pay invalid tax refund claims. The judgment, given effect by the general dismissal of all of SKAT’s claims, determined against SKAT that it had not been so induced. There is theoretical room, therefore, for SKAT to pursue unjust enrichment or proprietary claims further only if and to the extent that it overturns that determination. It only seeks to do so by, and to the extent of, its proposed appeal in respect of the primary claims.

11.

I should also make clear that the only proprietary claims in respect of which SKAT sought permission to appeal were what might be called pure tracing claims. That is to say, its claims alleging that, even in the absence of any relevant guilty knowledge, dishonesty or fault on their part, a secondary respondent today holds some asset or assets on constructive trust for SKAT, because in equity their interest in that asset can be traced back, according to SKAT, to the payment by it of one or more tax refund claims under a mistake induced by the fraud (as alleged) of one or more of the primary parties. Claims alleging knowing receipt or dishonest assistance, made at trial, were not to be pursued further.

12.

Finally as to the scope of the appeal for which I was asked to grant permission, in my view it is not open to SKAT to seek to pursue Mr Horn in the Court of Appeal on an allegation that he practised deceit by the honest custodian representation. SKAT’s claims against Mr Horn founded upon that alleged representation were withdrawn in closing on a concession that it was not fair to seek judgment against Mr Horn on them (judgment at [471]). I would have refused permission to appeal come what may, therefore, in respect of the dismissal of deceit claims against Mr Horn founded upon that representation.