Standard of Proof
Standard of Proof
The gravity of fraud allegations requires the evidence to be more convincing than for other less serious allegations. The principle is set out by Lord Nicholls in Re H (Minors) [1996] A.C. 563 [586–587]:
“When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than negligence.”
This principle was further set out in the context of allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation in UK Insurance v Gentry [2018] EWHC 37 (QB), per Teare J [19-21]:
“By contrast the present case is one where there is a dispute as to whether a fraudulent misrepresentation was made. It is therefore appropriate to bear in mind the improbability of a person acting fraudulently in the manner alleged of Mr Gentry. It follows that particularly cogent evidence is required in order to discharge the burden of proof. In short the nature of the allegation makes it appropriate to apply a standard not far short of the criminal standard.”
In the course of making submissions on the law, Mr Bonnier helpfully took me to The Ocean Frost [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 [57] per Robert Goff LJ:
“I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and to the overall probabilities.”
I have kept in mind the limitations on the evidence arising out of the Debarring Order and the consequent need to place greater weight on the documentary evidence, when considering whether CVS has discharged the burden of proof.
- Heading
- Introduction
- CVS’s witnesses
- Mr Smith
- Mr McQuade
- Mr Sargent
- Mr Foy
- Mr Hendren
- The facts
- Procedural history
- The Debarring Order
- Mr Bonnier’s Article 6 rights
- Mr Joel Hogarth
- Standard of Proof
- CVS’s case
- The Honest Belief in Investment Representation
- The Conditions Precedent Representation
- The Negotiations Representation
- Falsity
- Knowledge
- Intention
- Mr Bonnier’s intention in light of Aaqua’s financing
- The Aaqua App’s lack of functionality
- Reliance
- The Defendants’ case
- The Defendants’ submissions on Intention and the contractual provisions
- Estoppel
- Intention
- Summary of findings on liability
- Quantum
- Mitigation of loss
- Conclusions
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