CL-2024-000694 - [2025] EWHC 1647 (Comm)
Commercial Court

CL-2024-000694 - [2025] EWHC 1647 (Comm)

Fecha: 30-Jun-2025

INTRODUCTION

(A)

INTRODUCTION

1.

This is the return date for a worldwide freezing order (“WWFO”) obtained by the Claimant at a without notice hearing on 7 February 2025, in aid of a Latvian-seated arbitration between the Claimant and the Defendant (“BBB”), pursuant to section 44 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the Act”).

2.

BBB applies (i) to set aside the claim form, (ii) to set aside an order made by Dias J on 16 April 2025, on the papers, extending the time for serving the claim form, and (iii) to discharge the WWFO.

3.

BBB’s application to set aside the WWFO was made on five grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the claim form had expired; (2) lack of jurisdiction under section 44 of the Act; (3) failures to satisfy the requirements for a freezing order test; (4) material non-disclosure, and (5) breaches of the Claimant’s undertakings. However, the court made a case management decision prior to the hearing to address ground (a) first, and that ground was the subject of the hearing before me on 23 May 2025. Ground (1) itself has three elements, with BBB alleging that:

i)

the one month deadline for serving the claim form had expired before the WWFO was obtained and BBB was served;

ii)

the court had no jurisdiction, on the facts, to extend the time for serving the claim form retrospectively; and

iii)

there was a concealment of material facts in the extension application.

4.

In addition, the Second, Seventh and Eleventh to Thirteenth non-cause of action Defendants (“the CCC Defendants”) contend that the WWFO should be set aside as against them due to the expiry of the claim form and, in any event, on the grounds that (a) they are not parties to the arbitration agreement between the Claimant and BBB, and (b) the court has no power under section 44 of the Act or Practice Direction 6B § 3.1(3) to grant a freezing order against a non-party to the arbitration agreement.

5.

For the reasons set out below, I have come to the conclusions that time for serving the claim form had expired by the time the WWFO was granted and by the time the claim form was purportedly served; the grounds for a retrospective extension of time were not, and are not, made out; and the Claimant failed to disclose material facts on the extension application. Accordingly, the claim form and the order purporting to extend the time for serving it must be set aside, and the WWFO must be discharged.