CA-2024-001138 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1337

In R(KV) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 2483; [2018] 4 WLR 166, Leggatt LJ said at [19]:-

“Where, as in the present case, it is established not only that deception was used but that, without it, an application for naturalisation as a citizen would not have been granted, it seems to me that it will be an unusual case in which the applicant can legitimately complain of the withdrawal of the rights that he acquired as a result of naturalisation. That is because the withdrawal of those rights does no more than place the person concerned in the same position as if he had not been fraudulent and had acted honestly in making the application. The position may be different, however, in a case where, as a result of naturalisation, the individual has lost other rights previously enjoyed which will not or may not be restored if he is now deprived of his citizenship. In such a case depriving the person of citizenship will not simply return him to the status quo ante but will place him in a worse position than if he had not been granted citizenship in the first place.”

(It was not suggested in the present case that Mr Onuzi has lost rights as a result of his naturalisation.)

In Laci v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 769; [2021] 4 WLR 86, Underhill LJ, having referred to the previous case of BA v SSHD [2018] UKUT 85 (IAC), said at [37]:-

“As to point (4) in BA, the broad thrust of what the UT says is that only exceptionally will it be right for a person who has obtained British citizenship by (in short) deception to be allowed to retain it. In my view that is entirely correct: the reason is self-evident. It is in line with what Leggatt LJ says in the first half of para. 19 of his judgment in KV. I note that he uses the term "unusual" rather than "exceptional". That may be because the Courts have been wary of treating "exceptionality" as a test as such, but I do not think that there is a problem here: the reason why such an outcome will be exceptional is that it will be unusual for a migrant to be able to mount a sufficiently compelling case to justify their retaining an advantage that they should never have obtained in the first place.”

SSHD v Daci [2025] EWCA Civ 18 was another case, strikingly similar to the present appeal, in which an appellant had applied for British citizenship using a false identity. Dingemans LJ said at [39]-[40]:-

“39.

In any event, as an adult, Mr Daci was asked on the form if he had ever engaged in any other activities which might indicate that he was not a person of good character, and he ticked the "No" box. Mr Daci signed a declaration confirming that the information he had given was correct. Mr Daci was not of good character because he had, in the words of the Secretary of State's good character guidance, practised deceit in his dealings with the Home Office by lying about his name, date of birth and nationality.

40.

The delay in the Secretary of State finding out about the fraud did not make the decision disproportionate. This is because Mr Daci had continued the deceit as an adult and the Secretary of State had acted promptly when the fraud became known to the Secretary of State.”

In Chaudhry it was held at [46] that where the fraud or false representation is disputed that raises a question of fact for the FTT to decide. The scope for FTT to depart from factual findings of the SSHD in deprivation cases, where deprivation is on the grounds that the appellant’s presence in the UK would not be conducive to the public good (s 40(2) of the 1981 Act), was the subject of detailed analysis by the Supreme Court in Begum (No. 1). It is unnecessary to draw on the judgment of Lord Reed PSC in that case, nor on the reaffirmation by the Supreme Court in U3 of the principles laid down in Begum, since it is agreed by both parties to this appeal that the law applicable to a case such as the present under s 40(3) is for present purposes sufficiently set out in Chaudhry.

Dingemans LJ summarised the position at [54]:-

“[In] my judgment the proper approach to an appeal under section 40A of the BNA 1981 from decisions of the Secretary of State made pursuant to section 40(3) of the BNA 1981 is:

(i)

it is for the FTT to find, in the event of a dispute, as a fact whether there was fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact for the purposes of section 40(3) of the BNA 1981;

(ii)

the decision of the Secretary of State on the causation issue whether the registration or naturalisation was obtained by the impermissible means is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds, in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1);

(iii)

the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion to make an order depriving a person of citizenship status is to be reviewed on appeal by the FTT on public law grounds in accordance with the principles referred to by Lord Reed in paragraph 71 of Begum (No.1); and

(iv)

it is for the FTT to consider whether the Secretary of State had acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including those arising under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Although due weight would need to be given to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State, the decision was for the FTT.”

The present case is factually much more straightforward than Chaudhry, where the appellant had made a successful application for naturalisation in his own name. The case against Mr Chaudhry (all of which appears to have been in dispute before the FTT and on appeal) was that he had previously attempted to obtain a passport in the name of a deceased child, with the intention of using it to obtain a driving licence. (The passport was obtained but the application for a driving licence failed.) The causative link between the deception and the obtaining of British citizenship was less clear than in the present case.

In the present case the deception is not in dispute. On the issue of causation, I consider it unrealistic to suppose that, despite the administrative mishaps in the handling of this Appellant’s case, he would have obtained ILR in 2006 if the decision-maker had known that he had obtained ELR by deception about his true nationality. But that is only the background to the critical question here, which is whether the grant of British citizenship by naturalisation in 2007 was obtained “by means of” fraud or false representation.

The whole basis of Mr Onuzi’s claim to refugee status was a false assertion that he was entitled to asylum as a Kosovo Albanian who had been persecuted or was at real risk of persecution from the authorities in Kosovo. This was entirely false because (as is now common ground) he was an Albanian himself who had lied about his identity because he did not want to be returned to Albania. In the words of the decision letter, he persisted with the deception over a period of twenty years, continued to submit fraudulent applications, and only admitted the truth after evidence of the fraud had been put to him. As DUTJ Symes rightly observed, this was a case of “historic and prolonged dishonesty”, and there was nothing in the decision-making history to break the causative link between the Appellant’s fraud and the grant of citizenship.

There is no public law error in the conclusion of the SSHD’s decision-maker in 2020 that, had the truth been known in 2007, the Appellant would have been refused British citizenship on the grounds that he was not of good character. On the contrary, I do not see how any other conclusion would have been a realistic possibility. DUTJ Symes’ decision is plainly correct, and I can see no reason to remit the case to the UT for a further hearing.