CA-2025-000342 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1442

What happens if a caravan site operator wishes to carry out a scheme different from that for which he has planning permission, and on which his site licence is based? If he wants to carry out the development without complying with one or more conditions of the existing planning permission, he can make an application to the local planning authority for that purpose under s.73 of the TCPA 1990. A successful application under s.73 results in the grant of a freestanding planning permission (R v Leicester City Council ex parte Powergen UK Limited (2001) 81 P & CR 5). If the description in a planning permission of the development approved, the “operative part”, does not meet the operator’s current requirements, he can apply for a new planning permission in the ordinary way. If successful, the site operator can apply for a fresh site licence based upon the new planning permission.

A permitted development right is also a form of planning permission, but it is granted by a development order (s.58 of the TCPA 1990). Such a right cannot satisfy the pre-requisite for the grant of a site licence laid down by s.3(3) of the 1960 Act. The applicant must show that he is entitled to the benefit of a planning permission for the use of the land as a caravan site granted otherwise than by a development order. Thus, the 1960 Act requires the site licence to be in harmony with an express grant of planning permission by a planning authority, where the planning merits will already have been considered.

How then does a Class B right which arises consequentially upon the grant of a site licence fall within this statutory framework? According to the appellant, the licensing authority and the Tribunals were obliged to disregard the “planning baseline” determined in the enforcement notice appeal because that involved purely planning matters. On that basis, the appellant also submits that the decision-maker was obliged to consider the merits of the location of the hardstandings proposed by the appellant ignoring any purely planning considerations. Thus, the FTT was entitled to approve the 18 caravan plots and to impose a condition requiring hardstandings to be provided for each of those plots. Then, it is said that the enforcement notice would not apply to operational development carried out in the future pursuant to the Class B right in order to comply with that condition.

There is a potential problem with that line of argument. I mention it in case it may need to be considered in another case. However, it did not form part of the submissions to us and therefore does not form the basis for my conclusions. Mr. Harwood said that the appellant relies upon the 1952 and 1966 planning permissions to authorise the use of the land as a caravan site and the Class B right consequential upon the FTT’s licensing decision (if reinstated) to authorise the operational development. That raises the consistency of that operational development with the 1966 permission. In so far as it is inconsistent, it is arguable that the Pilkington principle applies and the applicant cannot rely on both the permitted development right and the 1966 permission (Hillside Parks Limited v Snowdonia National Park Authority [2022] UKSC 30; [2022] 1 WLR 5077).

Putting that point to one side, in my judgment it is plain that the appellant’s argument is in any event misconceived. It comes back to its assertion that the planning baseline must be disregarded in site licensing because that is a purely planning matter. But the planning permissions in this case, which are a prerequisite for the grant of a site licence, must also form part of the “planning baseline”. On the logic of the appellant’s argument, those permissions would also have to be disregarded because they are purely planning matters. By the same token, any conflict between the proposed terms of a site licence and the parameters and requirements of the permission upon which it is founded would also have to be ignored. In other words, the fundamental flaw in the appellant’s argument is that it flies in the face of the principle that the site licensing regime should be operated in harmony with the planning regime including the relevant planning permission for the site.

In addition, the appellant’s argument makes a nonsense of the Class B right conferred by Part 5 of Sched.2 to the GPDO 2015. That right only arises if a site licence is granted under the 1960 Act containing conditions which require the carrying out of development. The right is conferred by secondary legislation. It should be read and applied in the context of the relationship between the TCPA 1990 (the parent statute for the GPDO 2015) and the 1960 Act. On the appellant’s argument, the Class B right would apply irrespective of whether or not the site licence was granted in harmony with the relevant planning permission upon which it depends, or the determination of planning rights under the TCPA 1990. In my judgment, that cannot have been Parliament’s intention when it enacted SI 1960 No. 1476.

In summary, if a site licensee wishes to operate a caravan site outside the parameters of the planning permission upon which the licence is based, or without complying with requirements of that permission, he needs to make an appropriate application under the TCPA 1990 for a fresh grant of permission or, where possible, a variation. That enables the merits of that different form of development to be assessed taking into account relevant planning considerations. He cannot circumvent that normal process by obtaining a site licence which goes beyond those parameters or relaxes those requirements, so that he can rely upon the Class B right to legitimise under the TCPA 1990 development which is not authorised by the express planning permission upon which the site licence is based.