CA-2025-000597 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1458

Subject to those observations, I think it helpful to begin by considering some basic principles relevant to committal for a civil contempt consisting of infringement of an injunction by an injunction respondent. Many cases have emphasised that an injunction must state clearly and unequivocally what conduct by the respondent is prohibited, so that a respondent knows precisely what it may and may not do; that such prohibitions will be strictly construed; that a heightened standard of procedural fairness is required when an applicant seeks to commit a respondent for breaching the injunction; and that breach of the injunction must be proved to the criminal standard of proof (e.g. Pan Petroleum AJE Ltd v Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum Co Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1525, para 41; Navigator Equities Ltd v Deripaska [2021] EWCA Civ 1799, [2022] 1 WLR 3656, para 82; ADM International Sarl v Grain House International SA [2024] EWCA Civ 33, [2024] 1 WLR 3262, para 80; and Navigator Equities Ltd v Deripaska (No. 2) [2024] EWCA Civ 268, para 47).

The rationale for these basic principles is obvious, not least because of the serious consequences, including committal to prison, which may follow from a finding of contempt.

It would be inconsistent with these principles to hold that an injunction respondent could be in contempt for doing an act which, although not prohibited by the injunction, was contrary to an undefined spirit or purpose of the injunction. As Mr Malek put it, that would be to replace certainty with impressionism. Mr Lissack did not suggest that an injunction respondent could be guilty of a civil contempt in such circumstances. Rather, he invoked the concept of a criminal contempt.

Of course, it is perfectly possible for an injunction respondent to commit a criminal contempt by doing something which is not prohibited by the injunction – for example, by physically interfering with the course of the trial, threatening witnesses or publishing material likely to prejudice a fair trial. But it is clear from the cases considered below that where the conduct complained of is limited to what is said to be subversion of the purpose of an injunction without actually breaching its terms, there is no scope for holding an injunction respondent guilty of a criminal contempt.