CA-2024-002756 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1038

Ms Salmon, for Islington, emphasises the point that the closed list in section 113 was designed to achieve certainty. Each of the matters set out in section 113 (2) which expands the meaning of “child” are factual matters which can be established on production of either a birth certificate or a marriage or civil partnership certificate. Each of these is the sort of “vital piece of paper” to which the court referred in Wall. That objective would be undermined if a local authority had to undertake a qualitative examination of a relationship said to amount to a de facto relationship of step-parent and step-child. As this court made clear in Wall, where Parliament wished to extend protection to those in de facto relationships, it said so expressly.

Ms Davies, on the other hand, emphasises the general principle that a statute is “always speaking”. Just as the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27 considered the changing meaning of “member of the family”, so also this court must have regard to the changed meaning of “stepchild.” HHJ Bloom was wrong to restrict herself to what the word meant in 1985 when section 113 was enacted. The real question is what it means in 2024. A modern family relationship is not confined to legal or blood relationships.

At this point it is necessary to remind ourselves that we are not required to interpret section 113; but to interpret Islington’s policy. Ms Davies emphasised the fact that Islington’s case had always been that its policy replicated section 113. The interpretation of its own policy was primarily a matter for Islington and this court was bound to accept Islington’s stance in saying that the policy replicated section 113. I disagree both on the law and the facts.

So far as the law is concerned, the meaning of a policy is a matter for the court, although a policy is not to be interpreted as if it were a statute or a contract: see, for example, Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13, [2012] PTSR 983 at [18] and [19]. It is an expression of administrative policy intended to be a practical aid to decision making. So far as the facts are concerned, although the scope of Islington’s policy is based on section 113, it is clear that the language of the policy differs from that of the statute. To give one example, section 87 permitted a family member to succeed to a tenancy if they had “resided with the tenant throughout the period of twelve months ending with the tenant’s death.” The policy on the other hand allows succession by a family member if “they have been living in the property” for 12 months before the death of the tenant. There is no requirement that they have lived with the tenant during that period.

Ms Davies referred us to the decision of the House of Lords in R (Ahmad) v Newham LBC [2009] UKHL 14, [2009] PTSR 632. But that was a case about the lawfulness of a housing allocation policy, not its interpretation. Moreover, since the interpretation of a written document is a question of law for the court, the court is not bound by any concession or agreement made by any of the parties about what it means: Bahamas International Trust Co Ltd v Threadgold [1974] 1 WLR 1514; Ross v Bank of Commerce (Saint Kitts Nevis) Trust and Savings Association Ltd [2012] UKPC 3; Singapore Airlines Ltd v Buck [2011] EWCA Civ 1542, [2012] Pens LR 1.

In my opinion, as suggested by Elisabeth Laing LJ in argument, section 113 is a guide to the interpretation of the policy; but the policy remains the policy.

Unlike a statute, Islington’s policy is a unilateral document, which it may withdraw or amend at any time. It is not the kind of document which is intended to remain in place indefinitely. Indeed, in this case it is clear that Islington’s current policy took into account “recent case law” which is plainly a reference to the decision of this court in Wall.

While I accept that, in principle, recourse to a dictionary is a permissible tool in interpreting any document, it remains the case that, as Steyn LJ said in Arbuthnott v Fagan [1995] CLC 1396, 1402:

“Dictionaries never solve concrete problems of construction. The meaning of words cannot be ascertained divorced from their context. And part of the contextual scene is the purpose of the provision.”

Moreover, in view of the differing definitions it is worth recalling what Lord Denning MR said in his dissenting judgment on the interpretation of a will in Re Rowland [1963] Ch 1, 10:

“True it is that you must discover his intention from the words he used: but you must put upon his words the meaning which they bore to him. If his words are capable of more than one meaning, or of a wide meaning and a narrow meaning, as they often are, then you must put upon them the meaning which he intended them to convey, and not the meaning which a philologist would put upon them. And in order to discover the meaning which he intended, you will not get much help by going to a dictionary. It is very unlikely that he used a dictionary, and even less likely that he used the same one as you.”

I also reject the argument that the question is the meaning of “stepchild” in 2024. In my judgment, the meaning of the word is to be ascertained at the date when Islington issued its policy, or, at the latest, when Mr Seales died in 2021. That is the view that HHJ Bloom took; and I agree with her.

The definition in the on-line Oxford English Dictionary is extremely open-ended. It requires no qualitative assessment of the relationship between the child’s parent and the putative step parent, for example, by limiting relevant subsequent relationships to cohabiting relationships or even intimate relationships. Nor does it require any particular degree of permanence or commitment in the subsequent relationship. Nor does it require any qualitative assessment of the nature of the relationship between putative stepchild and putative step parent. It is fair to say that Ms Davies recognised in her oral submissions that the definition was far too wide for the purposes of succession rights. Hence her attempt to reformulate the meaning for which she contended (and which I consider she cannot pursue).

The preponderance of contemporaneous dictionary definitions strongly suggests that a “stepchild” is a child of a married person from a previous relationship, although that meaning has now to be slightly adapted to take account of civil partnerships. For what it is worth, that is also my understanding of the ordinary meaning of “stepchild”.

So, the question can be reformulated as: what is the meaning of “stepchild” in the light of the purpose of Islington’s policy? As in the case of section 113 itself, the purpose of the policy is to enable a closed category of readily identifiable candidates to succeed to a secure tenancy. As HHJ Bloom correctly put it at [42]:

“The aim is to provide a narrow group of relatives who are easily and objectively ascertained.”

It is true that an illegitimate child may not have a “vital piece of paper,” but a genetic connection between such an applicant and a deceased tenant can be readily ascertained by means of a DNA test.

Ms Davies pointed to other statutory definitions in different contexts which, if applied, might result in Ms Abdelrahman being treated as Mr Seales’ stepdaughter. I did not find these helpful. As Ms Salmon correctly said, all that they show is that when Parliament wishes to adopt a wide definition, it does so expressly.

In my judgment Islington’s policy is designed to be capable of implementation by a tenancy officer with the minimum of investigation. To adopt the meaning of “stepchild” argued at trial is likely to lead to costly and time-consuming investigation or even litigation as to who is and who is not a stepchild. That is the sort of situation which the policy is designed to avoid. HHJ Bloom made that point at [43] and I agree with her. The judge continued at [44]:

“If one reads section 113 there is a clear differential drawn between those who live together and those who are married or civil partners. In subsection (1) (a) a person who is in a direct relationship with the deceased can establish themselves as a successor. In relation to more distant relationships, such as children or parents et cetera in subsection (1) (b) it is notable that it is only a relationship by marriage or civil partnership that is to be treated as a relationship by blood. The subsection does not suggest, for instance, that if people live together their offspring will be treated as blood relations i.e. that such a person would be a niece. Why, then, should a stepchild be in a different position?”

I agree with that too. In my judgment the judge was right to reject the meaning of “stepchild” for which Ms Abdelrahman argued at trial.

It follows that, on the basis of the arguments advanced below, Ms Abdelrahman was not qualified to succeed to the tenancy under Islington’s policy.