CA-2024-002477 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1054

The next question is whether the court has power to extend the time limit contained in clause 14.3(a). Any such power must be found in section 79(1) of the 1996 Act, which provides:

‘Unless the parties otherwise agree, the court may by order extend any time limit agreed by them in relation to any matter relating to the arbitral proceedings or specified in any provision of this Part having effect in default of such agreement.’

Section 79 goes on to say that an application for such an order may be made by any party to the arbitral proceedings, and CPR 62.9 describes the procedure which must be followed when making such an application.

In the present case, however, the parties have clearly excluded the possibility of such an application. Clause 14.3(b) contains an express waiver of ‘all rights to make an application or to appeal to the English courts under the Arbitration Act except pursuant to clause 14.3(a)’. An application for an extension of time is an application under the Act and has therefore been excluded. In the language of section 79(1), the parties have agreed otherwise.

Therefore the question whether this court should grant an extension of time does not arise. If it had done, however, Mr Eronat would have faced at least two difficulties. The first is that the judge’s decision that, if there was jurisdiction to do so, he would decline to grant an extension was an exercise of his discretion. He referred to the fact that no application for an extension had in fact been made, that there was no explanation for the delay, that finality and compliance with time limits in arbitration cases were important, and that Mr Eronat’s legal representative was clearly aware of the time limit as evidenced by his request to the tribunal. I can see no error of principle here which would entitle this court to intervene to overturn a discretionary decision. The second is that section 79(6) provides that the leave of the court, which means the High Court, is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under the section. Although we heard no argument about this, and would have needed to do so if the point had been decisive, I can see no answer to the submission by Mr Richard Morgan KC for the respondents that this court would have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judge’s refusal to extend the time.