CA-2024-002683-B - [2025] EWCA Civ 1107

The present proceedings concern an order of Cranston J. made on 29 July 2016 and sent to the parties on 2 August 2016. It was made on an application to re-open the case. Cranston J. refused the application and certified it as being totally without merit. He made an extended civil restraint order. In his observations, he noted that the claim was issued on 28 May 2004 and permission refused on 17 September 2004. He noted that two other claims had been brought, one against a decision of 11 February 2009 of the Immigration and Appeal Tribunal refusing permission to appeal and another concerning a decision to remove the applicant where permission was refused on 4 August 2011.

Over 4 years later, on 20 December 2024, the applicant applied for permission to appeal against the order of Cranston J. of 29 July 2016. The basis of the application was that the order was said to be flawed as crucial documents and information had been withheld from the judge. That was based on an assertion by the applicant that she had been granted permission to apply for judicial review on 8 June 2004.

By order of 14 May 2025, I refused permission to appeal and refused an extension of time for filing an appellant’s notice. The reasons for that order should be read in full. In essence, I concluded that there was no evidence that permission to apply for judicial review had ever been granted on 8 June 2004. It was the application for bail that had been granted on that date. Secondly, I refused to extend time for the reasons given in the order.

By an application dated 20 May 2025, the applicant applied pursuant to CPR 52.30 for permission to re-open the order of 14 May 2025. That application was based on what was said to be fresh evidence which comprised in essence a series of documents submitted with the application. The material included references to the order granted on 8 June 2004, and commented that that order was not on the Administrative Court database. It referred to the 2004 judicial review claim form. It included references in documents prepared, it seems, by the applicant to Articles 3, 5 and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and said that the removal of the applicant from the United Kingdom on 1 November 2004 breached the UK’s obligations under that Convention as there was a stop order on removal and she had been granted bail.

By order dated 19 June 2025, I refused permission to re-open the refusal of permission to appeal. Again, the order contains reasons which should be read in full. In essence, the criteria for re-opening a final decision in CPR 52.30 were not met.The new evidence did not substantiate the claim that orders made in June 2004 meant that she had been granted permission to apply for judicial review. It was clear that Cranston J. was entitled to conclude from the order of 17 September 2004 that permission to apply for judicial review had been refused. Indeed it was clear from the observations of 17 September 2004 that bail was refused and the judge made it clear that the applicant could be removed from the United Kingdom. There was no proper basis for re-opening the order of Cranston J. of 29 July 2016. I certified the application to re-open the refusal of permission as being totally without merit. The order records that I also considered whether to make a civil restraint order and decided not to do so for the reasons given in the order.

By another application made on 29 July 2025, the applicant applied for a second time for permission to re-open the order of 14 May 2025 refusing permission to appeal against the order of Cranston J of 29 July 2016. The basis for that application was different from the earlier applications. The applicant relied on section 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998. That section deals with claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 in respect of a judicial act. It was said that there was an ability to challenge a judge’s decision on human rights grounds. In her application she said that she was requesting “permission to reopen my case for compensation and damages resulting from unlawful judicial acts”.

The application continued by saying that under the Human Rights Act 1998, individuals can challenge judicial decisions on human rights grounds without necessarily needing to appeal the original decision first. It said that this meant that a separate claim for damages or other remedies could be pursued directly even if the original judgment stands. It referred to section 9 allowing individuals to bring a claim for damages in respect of judicial acts that are incompatible with Convention rights.

In so far as that application identified the judicial acts said to give rise to a claim under section 9, the applicant again repeated that she was arrested and charged with illegal entry and overstaying and spent nearly 2 months in jails, detention camps and Home Office holding cells on false charges. The applicant then goes on to say that two court orders – the 28 May 2004 order stopping removal and the 8 June 2004 which granted bail – are not on her records at the Administrative Court Office. That, she claimed made the orders of Cranston J of 29 July 2016 and of Collins J. of 7 September 2004 void and amounted to breaches – I take it by those judges – of Article 6 of the Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998 and gave rise to procedural unfairness.

I refused permission to re-open by an order made on 29 July 2025. I incorporated the reasoning in the orders of 14 May 2025 and 19 June 2025 into the 29 July 2005 order. In summary, in so far as the applicant was contending that there were orders granting permission to apply for judicial review, that is wrong for the reasons given in the two earlier orders. In so far the applicant was relying on section 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998, that concerned what the applicant said was a free-standing claim for damages in respect of a judicial act. The claim was that Cranston J. or Collins J. had allegedly breached the applicant’s Convention rights. But for the reasons given in the order of 29 July 2025, that claim did not justify re-opening the refusal of permission to appeal against the order of Cranston J. First, if the applicant wanted to claim that Cranston J. had allegedly breached a Convention right, that claim would have had to have been brought within a year – and it was not. The same would apply if the applicant had wanted to bring a claim in respect of the acts of Collins J. in 2004. Secondly, claims for damages for judicial acts have to be brought in the High Court. The applicant – on this aspect of the case – was not seeking to appeal the decision of Cranston J. refusing permission to re-open (which is the only matter this Court was dealing with). Rather, she would be claiming that Cranston J. had allegedly breached a Convention right. That free-standing claim for damages for a judicial act would have had to be brought in the High Court not by way of an appeal against the refusal to re-open an earlier case. The same would be true of any free-standing claim in respect of the decision of Collins J. I also certified the application to re-open as being totally without merit.