CA-2025-000682 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1058

I would uphold the judge’s unappealed findings as they are described in this judgment. These refer to the forgeries (paragraphs 9 and 10), the abduction to Pakistan (paragraph 17), the assault on the mother (paragraph 19), the family council or Jirga (paragraph 20) and the abduction to the UK (paragraph 21). I do not consider this to be cherry-picking. On the contrary, what would be objectionable would be to give the father a third bite of the cherry without his having appealed from these soundly-based findings.

I would make an unequivocal finding of transnational marriage abandonment for the reasons given at paragraphs 92-93 of this judgment.

I would amplify the judge’s limited finding in regard to alienation in the manner set out at paragraph 91 of this judgment.

I would uphold the judge’s finding that the injury to A’s arm was an accident (paragraphs 72-73 of the judge’s judgment) and his refusal to make findings about poisoning (paragraphs 78-79).

I would set aside the findings at paragraphs 80-81 of the judge’s judgment in relation to the mother’s abuse of the children, for the reasons given at paragraphs 94-97 of this judgment.

I would set aside the finding at paragraph 77 of the judge’s judgment in relation to the knife and blood, for the reasons given at paragraphs 96 of this judgment.

I would leave it to the High Court to consider whether it wishes to engage in any further fact-finding in relation to any allegation not excluded by 4) above in respect of the mother’s treatment of the children. I have considered whether it is fair to the mother to potentially face a further hearing in relation to statements made by the children in such abnormal circumstances when those statements were not defined as issues at the hearing before the judge. However, the treatment of what the children have said may be significant for the court’s ability to promote their relationship with their mother. The judge to whom the matter is remitted for welfare decisions will therefore be best placed to decide whether there is a need for any further fact-finding. In doing so, regard will no doubt be had to proper pleading of the issues and to the nature of the evidence. The mother should not again be faced with the prospect of being found to have abused her children in a way that was not pleaded or put to her. Unless the court can be satisfied according to normal principles that further fact-finding is necessary and right, it will no doubt decline to embark upon it.