[2025] EWCA Crim 1353

Mahek Bukhari was 22 at the time of the offending and 24 at the time of sentence. She had no previous convictions or cautions. She was a social media influencer. Her mother had accompanied her to social events which led to the mother meeting young men, including Saqib.

The judge began his sentencing remarks with these words.

“The prosecution categorised this case as a story of love, obsession, and extortion; and in that they were right. They were also right in categorising this case as one of cold-blooded murder. TikTok and Instagram lie at the heart of this case; you, Mahek Bukhari, being an influencer on both platforms. That was the reason you, Mahek Bukhari, dropped out of university. Had you not done so, you would now have been a young graduate with your whole life in front of you. But now you consign yourself to prison for all of your best years.”

The judge went on to say that Ansreen’s head had been turned by the perceived glamour of the world of influencers. Plainly, the judge assessed Mahek’s role as a central and pivotal one. He accepted, however, that she was immature beyond the norm for her age.

The judge’s approach to setting the minimum term in her case can be summarised as follows. The case being one of double murder, the starting point was one of 30 years. There were six aggravating factors: (1) a significant degree of planning, which had gone on for some weeks; (2) it was a group attack in which Mahek played a leading and prominent role; (3) the events had involved masks weapons and a co-ordinated pursuit; (4) there had been direct threats of harm by Mahek to Saqib, part-way through that pursuit; (5) she had failed to summon assistance; and (6) she had deliberately decided to provide a false PIN Number for her phone which led to its contents being deleted. Those factors increased the starting point to one of 36 years. There were three mitigating factors (1) the absence of an intention to kill; (2) the appellant’s youth and lack of maturity; and (3) her previous good character. Those brought the minimum term down to 32 years. From that figure the judge deducted 4 months to reflect time spent on qualifying curfew. He identified the further period to be deducted to reflect time spent on remand as 332 days. The net minimum term was not stated.

The single judge gave leave to appeal against the minimum term as disproportionate for what come down to four main reasons: that the judge (1) wrongly attached weight to the appellant’s career as a social media influencer; (2) wrongly disregarded the background of Saqib’s provocative behaviour, blackmail and threats; (3) failed to take proper account of the appellant’s youth and immaturity; and (4) struck an unfair balance between the aggravating and mitigating factors in the case.

In support of these grounds, Mr Millington KC made the following points. The judge’s reliance on planning was overstated. The fact that the offender was provoked is a statutory mitigating factor, identified in paragraph 10(d) of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. Paragraph 10(e) identifies as a mitigating factor the fact that the offender acted to any extent in fear of violence. Yet the judge allowed no discount for the blackmail and other reprehensible behaviour of Saqib, which included threats to come with mates to confront Ansreen and Mahek that night. The minimum term applied to this appellant was far longer than those identified in relation to Ansreen and Rekan Karwan, although the aggravating factors in their cases were the same and Ansreen lacked the mitigating factors of youth and immaturity.

We have reflected on these points, and on the bundle of additional documents with which we were shortly provided before the hearing, which are relied on as underscoring the mitigation that was before the judge.

The judge identified the correct starting point. The murder of two or more persons by an offender aged 18 or over at the time of the offence is “normally” treated as an offence of “particularly high” seriousness for which the appropriate starting point in determining the minimum term is 30 years (paragraph 3(2)(f) of Schedule 21). The judge was plainly entitled to conclude that this appellant’s culpability was greater than that of other defendants because she played a leading role in this group offending, but we do find it hard to see that the appellant’s role as a social media influencer added anything to that point. The judge correctly identified the other aggravating factors of this appellant’s case. However, in our judgment he placed excessive weight upon the first of those factors. The evidence certainly justified a finding of considerable planning but not that the appellant had been planning what happened in the event. That was a new and markedly riskier plan which was developed a short while before the deaths occurred.

So far as the mitigating factors are concerned, we think it important to note that the statutory list identifies matters that “may be relevant”. The sentencing exercise requires the application of judgment to the facts of a given case. Assuming, without deciding, that blackmail can in principle mitigate culpability we are not persuaded that the judge was obliged to find that it did so in the case of this appellant. She was not the target of the blackmail. Her response was of a different nature to the blackmail threat and disproportionate to that threat. Her plan to have Saqib “jumped” was formed well before the threats of violence relied on, which were mainly implicit. We find it hard to see any real link between any of Saqib’s behaviour and the events on the A46 that led to his death. At any rate, we do not think that, on the facts of this case, either of the points relied on could ever have had any great force.

We do however agree that this appellant’s youth and her acknowledged immaturity were given far too little weight. Those factors are nowadays recognised as highly material when sentencing adults below 25 years of age. They ought to have exerted a substantial downward pressure on the minimum term in the case of this offender, an immature 22-year-old at the time of the offences. For these reasons we are satisfied that the judge struck the wrong balance between the relevant factors. His decision to uplift from the starting point was unjustified. He undervalued the mitigation. In all the circumstances the overall balance, struck properly, takes the case below the statutory starting point.

We therefore quash the minimum term and substitute one of 28 years, less 4 months to reflect time spent on qualifying curfew. From the resulting period of 27 years and 8 months there must also be deducted the 332 days spent on remand in custody. By our calculations that yields a term of 26 years and 285 days. Those conclusions deal fully with any question of disparity.