[2025] EWCA Crim 1414

We refer to the decision in AYO and in particular to the principles which were set out by this court at paragraphs 23, 24, 53 and 75. It is well-established that sentences in excess of 30 years should only be passed in exceptional circumstances and a court must consider very carefully whether to impose a sentence after trial in excess of 30 years.

In our judgment the judge in this case did sufficiently identify factors which justified treating the present case as an exceptional one meriting a sentence after trial in excess of 30 years. There were, for example, three victims. According to the guilty pleas there were at least 53 rapes and at least 28 offences under section 6 of the 2003 Act. But, just as important, there were the other factors to which the judge referred and which are not the subject of criticism, in particular the control, manipulation and cruelty which governed the conditions in which each of these three victims had to live for such a long period.

However, we conclude that the judge was wrong to proceed on the basis that a sentence at trial was as great as 37½ years. In our judgment, having regard to the principles in Part 4 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Definitive Guideline, the appropriate sentence after trial, in the particular circumstances of this case, was 33 years.

The matter does not end there. Although Mr Varley concentrated his fire on one aspect of the judge's reasoning, namely the decision to treat the offending as exceptional so as to justify a custodial sentence after trial longer than 30 years, the issue before the court is whether the end result of the sentences passed by the judge was manifestly excessive. That question needs to be looked at as a whole and not compartmentalised into separate subjects treated in isolation. We would add that in his very well-judged submissions on behalf of the appellant Mr Varley accepted that point.

We note that there was no real mitigation available to the appellant. The pre-sentence report does not reveal anything which would have assisted him in that regard.

It is necessary to return to the guilty pleas. They were entered on the day the trial was listed to begin. Mr Varley says that the Crown was notified a week beforehand that pleas were likely to be forthcoming and on the Friday before the trial they were formally notified. He submits that this was important because it meant that the victims could be told about this before that weekend. However, we also note the judge had previously said in his remarks that the appellant could have indicated his guilty pleas at a much earlier stage so as to spare the victims months of anguish. That too is a factor which has to be borne in mind when assessing credit for plea.

Mr Varley says that the appellant was entitled to credit for his pleas "in something of the order of more than 10 per cent" which was somewhat ambiguous. He subsequently said:

We do not accept that the judge made any deduction for remorse. There was nothing in the judge's remarks to suggest that. The pre-sentence report explicitly said that the appellant did not show real remorse and we see no reason to question that assessment on the material before us.

The definitive guideline: "Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea" lays down appropriate credit for plea at different stages of the trial process which take into account the benefits of an acceptance of guilt, including reducing the impact of crime on victims and saving victims from having to testify. The earlier the guilty plea, the greater those benefits and the greater the amount of credit for plea. The judge had previously said in his remarks that the appellant could have chosen in this case to spare the victims months of anguish. There was no suggestion that there was some legitimate reason for the appellant being unable to accept his guilt at an earlier stage.

The guideline plainly states that one-third credit for plea is appropriate if given at the first hearing at which a plea or indication of plea is sought, which in this case would have been the Magistrates' Court (see R v Plaku [2021] EWCA Crim 568; [2021] 4 WLR 82). After that first stage the maximum credit for plea is 25 per cent. Here the judge allowed a figure close to that level. Ordinarily a plea on the first day of trial attracts a maximum credit for plea of 10 per cent. We do not see why the late indications given during the preceding week would have justified a credit of 20 per cent, although we accept that some flexibility around 10 per cent was appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

We bear all these matters in mind in order to do justice to the case as a whole. In our judgment the custodial term which should have been imposed on counts 2, 10 and 21 in the overall circumstances of this case, after allowing credit for the pleas, should have been 28 years rather than 30 years. We therefore quash the sentences on counts 2, 10 and 21 and substitute an extended sentence on each count with a custodial term of 28 years and an extended licence period of three years, making an overall sentence of 31 years combining those two elements.

We turn to the special custodial sentences which, as a matter of law, were wrongly imposed. We quash the sentence on count 4 and substitute a determinate sentence of eight years. We quash the sentence on count 5 and substitute a determinate sentence of 10 years. We quash the sentence on count 13 and substitute a determinate sentence of eight years. We quash the sentence on count 14 and substitute a determinate sentence of 10 years. We quash the sentence on count 24 and substitute a determinate sentence of eight years. We quash the sentence on count 25 and substitute a determinate sentence of eight years.

All of the sentences will run concurrently, both those to which we have expressly referred and those other sentences imposed by the Crown Court and which remain undisturbed.

The overall effect of our decision is that the appellant will serve an extended sentence of 31 years, comprising a custodial term of 28 years and an extended licence period of 3 years.

Lastly, we refer to the victim surcharge. In the transcript of the sentencing remarks the judge said that the surcharge applied in this case. It did not because the dates of some of the offending pre-dated the commencement of the relevant legislation. We confirm for the avoidance of doubt that there is no victim surcharge applicable in this case.

To this extent only the appeal is allowed.