Case No 2024/01343/B4 - [2025] EWCA Crim 1370

As the judge noted, the maximum sentence for each of the 1956 Act offences of which the appellant was convicted was ten years' imprisonment. Pursuant to the approach identified by this court in R v HJ [2011] EWCA Crim 2753, the judge was obliged to sentence in accordance with the legislative provisions that were current at the time of the offending, but with "measured reference" to any definitive sentencing guidelines relevant to the circumstances established by the facts. As the Court of Appeal explained in that case, although the sentence must be limited by the statutory maxima in force at the time when the offences were committed, it would be wholly unrealistic to attempt an assessment of sentence by seeking to identify what the sentence for each individual offence was likely to have been had conviction and sentencing occurred when that earlier legislation was still in force. This approach has since been confirmed by the Guideline on Sentencing historical sexual offences.

In the present case, it was agreed that the relevant sentencing guidelines to which measured reference should be made were:

It is unnecessary for us to refer to the sentencing guidelines that were agreed to be the relevant equivalent in respect of the other offences.

Before going any further, we record that we are quite clear that the judge imposed the sentences that we have described in respect of counts 4 and 21. It appears that some confusion arose following a sentence query from HMP Full Sutton in January 2025, and an email chain with the Crown Court that followed, as to whether the judge had in fact imposed an extended sentence in respect of these counts, pursuant to section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020. However, it is apparent from his sentencing remarks that the judge did not make a finding that the appellant was a dangerous offender and did not impose a sentence under section 279, as opposed to section 278. Moreover, the judge said in terms during his sentencing remarks that the appellant was "a particular offender of particular concern". There was nothing said at the slip rule hearing that throws any doubt upon this.

There were Victim Personal Statements before the court from each of the five victims. The judge concluded that they showed that all five complainants had suffered severe psychological harm and that the effects had continued throughout their lives. He described the appellant's offending as "an appalling series of abusive behaviours". He also referred to the "orchestration by you of a denigration of their lives to suit your perverted sexual wishes".

In relation to the offending against C1 in count 4, the judge placed the modern day equivalent offending in category 2 Harm, in light of his finding as to psychological harm. He found that Culpability A applied in light of the presence of grooming behaviour and the abuse of trust. Under the current guideline we have referred to, this gave a starting point of 13 years' imprisonment and an offence range of 11 - 17 years' imprisonment.

In respect of the offending against C2 in count 9, the judge placed the harm in category 1 in light of the severe psychological harm and the fact that penile penetration of the mouth was involved. Culpability A applied for the reasons he had identified in respect of the offending against C1. Thus, in relation to the relevant modern offence, sexual activity with a child, this gave a starting point of five years' imprisonment, and an offence range of between four and ten years' imprisonment.

In relation to C3 and count 12 (where a concurrent sentence was imposed), the judge found that the level of harm was category 2 and that Culpability A applied because of the grooming. The judge accepted the appellant's submission that, "strictly speaking", there was no abuse of trust, as C3 had gone to the appellant's home to see his friends, C1 and C2, rather than to see the appellant. However, he commented that the appellant had "wheedled" his way into C3's affections by some disgraceful behaviour. Accordingly, the current equivalent was a category 2A offence, for which the starting point under the relevant guideline was three years' imprisonment, with an offence range of up to six years' imprisonment.

The judge described the offending in relation to C4 as "appalling". He categorised it under the current guideline as a category 2A rape, with a starting point of ten years' imprisonment and an offence range of up to 13 years' imprisonment. However, he did not explain how he arrived at the finding of Culpability A – a point to which we will return. The judge did refer to the appellant's grooming of C4, but this is not listed as a Culpability A factor under the rape guideline.

The judge described count 21 as a "terribly serious offence". In relation to the modern day equivalent, he found that harm fell within category 2, given the severe psychological harm. He found that Culpability A applied, but he did not indicate the basis of this finding. However, in light of his other findings, including his reference to grooming when he came on to count 22, it is apparent that this was on the basis of grooming. Under the rape of a child under 13 guideline, the starting point would be ten years' imprisonment, with an offence range up to 13 years' imprisonment.

The judge then imposed the sentences to which we have already referred. He described count 4 as one of the two most serious offences (the other being count 21). He referred to the appellant's conduct in count 4 as "just about as bad as it can get". He explained that whilst he might have been inclined to impose the maximum of ten years' imprisonment, he would reduce this to eight years. In relation to count 9, the judge said that he reduced the eight years he would otherwise have imposed to seven years, in order to take account of totality. In relation to count 14, he said he would have sentenced the appellant to nine years' imprisonment, but would reduce this to seven years. Similarly, he indicated in relation to count 21 that he would reduce the ten years' imprisonment he would otherwise have imposed to eight years. It appears that these reductions were also to reflect totality. The judge went on to explain the sentences he imposed, which we have already set out.

The judge informed the appellant that he would serve two thirds of the total custodial period of 30 years and that the Parole Board would then consider whether he should be released. When released, he would serve the additional licence of two years in the community on conditional licence and subject to supervision. We will return to the question of how the appellant's release date should be calculated.

The judge made reference to ordering the appellant to pay a victim surcharge. However, later the same day it was clarified with the judge, and recorded on the Digital Case System, that no surcharge was due, given the date of the offending. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for us to address that aspect.