202403476 A2 - [2025] EWCA Crim 1384

The appellant pleaded guilty to causing or permitting the unlawful felling of the trees. He did not rely upon the exemption for tree works carried out in order to implement a detailed planning permission. That is consistent with the evidence that the works affecting protected trees required by the 2016 permission for a 4-bedroom house had been completed by February 2017.

Instead it was confirmed to us that the works were carried out so that a driveway could be created and in order to enhance the amenity of the land for the construction of a much larger family home which had not yet been permitted. The judge was entitled to take that factor into account as increasing the fine to be imposed.

The appellant pleaded guilty on what was described as a “strict liability basis”, but the basis of plea has to be read in context. The appellant accepts that he knew about the TPO. In paragraph 1 of the basis of plea he accepted that he ought to have known what trees were or were not covered by the order and should have made the necessary checks. As a matter of common sense, that must be right, because of the large number of trees felled on land occupying more than 3 acres. That obviously raised questions for the appellant as landowner about where the trees protected by the order were located in relation to the area he wished to have cleared. It has not been suggested that the contractors went further than the instructions they were given by the appellant as to the objectives or results he wanted to be achieved.

Although it was agreed by the parties that the appellant did not deliberately defy the TPO, in our judgment it is unrealistic to describe the degree of culpability here as no more than “low or no culpability”. According to p.17 of the Guideline on Environmental Offences that term applies to “an offence committed with little or no fault”, for example where a genuine accident occurs despite proper preventative measures being in place, or where such measures were overcame by exceptional events. Instead, that culpability was no less than “negligent”.

The undertaking to plant trees is not a mitigating factor. By s.206 of the 1990 Act the appellant was under a statutory obligation to replant in any event, which could be enforced by a tree replacement notice under s.207. Furthermore, such notices generally require the planting of much younger specimens, which do not represent a like for like replacement of established or mature trees.

We do not accept Ms. Chalkley’s submission that even if there had been low or no culpability, the degree of the harm caused was of relatively little significance. The nature and degree of the harm is generally of central importance. Here a large number of trees were cut down over a substantial area of land. They were trees at least 20 years old. They had been protected by the TPO because of their amenity value when the order was made in 2008. There was no suggestion that they ceased to have amenity value. The judge was entitled to rely upon the additional contribution made by those trees to biodiversity and to carbon storage. On that last point, the country’s woodlands and trees, and the Government’s policy to increase tree coverage nationally, form a significant part of the UK’s contribution to achieving Net Zero by 2050 (see e.g. R (Smar Holdings Limited) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2025] EWCA Civ 1041 at [11]-[14]).

The judge was told that it had not been possible for a surveyor to value the land with the trees removed in order to assess any financial benefit from the offence because it was not possible for the land to be accessed safely. Ms. Chalkley said to the judge that the absence of financial benefit was the reason for no confiscation order being made in this case. It might be thought that the appellant was fortunate in that regard. At all events, this did not affect the level of the fine. On the other hand, the judge was entitled to take into account the personal benefit to the appellant that the unlawful tree felling improved the amenity of the land for his purpose of seeking to build a large family home.

The appellant did not provide information on his means and an investigation was not ordered. The appellant does not submit that the judge was not entitled to take the view that the appellant is a “very wealthy man worth many millions”. That was a relevant factor.

Taking into account all the circumstances of the case and the need to pass sentences which deter offending of this kind, we conclude that the fine imposed of £200,000 after credit for plea was not excessive, let alone manifestly excessive. The fine was proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and to the appellant’s means.

Lastly, we reject the submission that the fine involves any disparity with the fines of £20,000 imposed by the same judge on each of the two arborists. The circumstances were plainly different. They cut down 60-70 trees between them, half the number of trees in relation to which the appellant pleaded guilty. In passing sentence, the judge had regard to the modest means of the arborists, whereas the appellant’s means did not justify any reduction. Lastly the overall removal of 132 trees was for the appellant’s personal benefit, the amenity of his intended new family home. There was no disparity between the appellant and the arborists. In any event, there was ample justification for the fine imposed on the appellant.