202401229 B2 - [2025] EWCA Crim 945

Fecha: 25-Jul-2025

The Lady Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill, CJ

The Lady Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill, CJ :

Introduction

On 1 June 2006 in the Crown Court sitting at Sheffield Mr Stephen Niland (“the Applicant”) pleaded guilty to one count of causing grievous bodily harm to his three-month daughter, Molly, on 10 October 2005, contrary to s. 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (“the s. 20 offence”) (“the 2006 conviction”). He was later sentenced to (and served) 2 years 3 months’ imprisonment.

On 27 February 2020 Molly died as a result of a chest infection linked to the brain injury and associated disabilities that she had sustained in 2005. The Applicant was charged with her manslaughter and was tried for that offence in the Crown Court sitting at Sheffield (Mrs Justice Lambert DBE (“the Judge”) sitting with a jury) between 5 and 27 March 2024 (“the manslaughter trial”). Causation was not in issue. Rather, the Applicant denied committing any assault on Molly. He stated that he had only pleaded guilty in 2006 because he was told that the medical evidence against him was overwhelming and he would receive a shorter custodial sentence. At the conclusion of the trial, he was acquitted.

He now applies for leave to appeal against the 2006 conviction on the basis that it is unsafe (for the purposes of section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968). He also applies, as he must, for a very substantial extension of time (6,488 days) in which to do so. He makes a further application to vary his Grounds of Appeal so as to be able to advance the following Grounds:

Ground 1: he entered a guilty plea on the basis of advice that the medical evidence against him was overwhelming and in order to get a shorter sentence.

ii)

Ground 2: there was no other evidence which unequivocally supported his acceptance of guilt at the time.

iii)

Ground 3: there have been developments in medical science since the time of the original proceedings, in particular, as to the extent to which the “triad” alone can be said to be diagnostic of abuse.

iv)

Ground 4: he was subsequently tried before a jury in circumstances where he bore the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that he had not assaulted Molly. The jury, having heard all the evidence relied upon by the prosecution at the time of the original proceedings, and further evidence obtained subsequent to those proceedings, acquitted him. Thereby the jury were satisfied on the balance of probabilities that his plea was equivocal and that he did not cause Molly grievous bodily harm. (This was the single original Ground of Appeal.)

In her oral submissions, Ms Lewis KC for the Applicant made it clear that her primary submission was contained in Ground 4 alone: the simple fact that the jury acquitted the Applicant at the manslaughter trial is sufficient to render the 2006 conviction by way of guilty plea unsafe. However, in the alternative, Ms Lewis submitted that the circumstances as a whole, including the factors underpinning Grounds 1 to 3, render the 2006 conviction unsafe. She did not contend that Grounds 1 to 3 either together, or cumulatively with each other, were sufficient to allow the court to quash the conviction. They were relied on only in support of Ground 4, if necessary.

The relevant principles applicable to the application for an extension of time and to vary are well-known: see R v Thorsby [2015] EWCA Crim 1; [2015] 1 WLR 2901 and R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285; [2018] 1 Cr App R 33 respectively. It is convenient to assess the merits of each application in the context of a consideration of the merits of the substantive grounds as a whole.