[2025] EWCA Crim 1285

We have considered carefully all of these submissions. We bear very much in mind that the judge had presided over the trial and was best placed to assess the harm caused by these offences and the appellant's culpability.

There is, as we reminded Mr Gray in the course of submissions, an important part of the guideline which he had not set out in his grounds of appeal. At step 2 of the guideline, beneath the table setting out starting points and ranges, there is the following important paragraph:

Here, we are quite satisfied that there was a highly significant "other relevant factor" not included in the guideline, namely the fact that the appellant was a serving police officer and committed these offences whilst at work and, technically at least, whilst on duty. The offences were committed against fellow police officers. Furthermore, as the judge correctly emphasised in his sentencing remarks, quite apart from the harm suffered by the complainants, there was additional harm in the undermining of the public's trust and faith in the police force.

The wording of the paragraph in the guideline which we have just quoted makes it clear that an increase beyond the category range otherwise indicated may be appropriate by reason of a combination of aggravating or other relevant factors. The judge was, in our view, entitled to find that the location and circumstances in which the sexual assault in count 2 was committed aggravated that offence. The assault took place in a police car whilst the complainant was actually driving. In the event she made clear what she thought of the appellant’s conduct and it seems not to have impaired her driving, but the shock and surprise of being assaulted in that way could easily have had serious consequences for road safety.

The judge was fully entitled to conclude, in relation to count 4, that there was an imbalance of power between the appellant and the complainant. He was much older. He had been Y's supervisor and mentor. She was inexperienced and in her first professional job. The judge was entitled to treat as an aggravating factor the way in which the appellant, as the judge found, took advantage of the likely reluctance of his intended victims to report the sexual offences he was about to commit. He himself was an experienced police officer who had worked in public protection and the investigation of sexual offences.

The judge was entitled to treat as an aggravating factor the serious psychological harm both complainants had suffered, and the impact of the appellant's offending on their professional and personal lives. As this court made clear in R v Chall [2019] EWCA Crim 865; [2019] 2 Cr App R (S) 44, at [26], a sentencer may move upwards from the guideline starting point to reflect the fact that the psychological harm suffered, although short of "severe" (the level required for category 1) is significantly greater than would generally be seen in the offence in question.

Applying the guideline, we think this combination of aggravating and other factors entitled the judge to move outside the range for category 3B in respect of count 4, which he rightly judged to be the more serious of the offences. However, we do not think that it was appropriate to move out of category 3B in respect of count 2. The sentence imposed on count 2 was six months' imprisonment – the very top of the range for category 3B. There should have been some reduction for personal mitigation.

We note that in his sentencing remarks the judge referred to only two mitigating factors: the appellant's good character and the passage of time. The value of the latter as a mitigating factor was diluted because the delay was caused, in part, the judge considered, by the culture of non-reporting, of which the appellant had taken advantage.

However, there was additional personal mitigation to which the judge referred only briefly and in the different context of balancing the guideline factors for and against suspension. Although the appellant brought these consequences on himself, the fact is that there will be very serious financial and social consequences for the appellant and his family. Inevitably, he has now been dismissed from the Force for gross misconduct. Whether or not his police pension will be in peril remains to be seen, but it is certainly a possibility. His wife, perhaps surprisingly, also lost her job as a result (it seems) of the publicity surrounding the appellant's offending. There was a likelihood that the family home would have to be sold, but Mr Gray tells us this morning that that may no longer be the case. It was a question of whether, on the depleted family finances, they could afford to maintain that home.

We do think that the personal mitigation should have been more strongly reflected in the overall sentence and that the principle of totality also called for further adjustment. We are persuaded that the total sentence of 18 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. We therefore allow the appeal.

We think that the appropriate total sentence of immediate imprisonment should have been 13 months, rather than 18 months. To achieve that, we quash the sentence of six months' imprisonment on count 2 and substitute a sentence of four months' imprisonment. On count 4, we quash the sentence of 12 months' imprisonment and substitute a sentence of nine months' imprisonment. The sentences will continue to run consecutively, as before.

To that extent the appeal is allowed.

There is one further technical matter which has been drawn to our attention. The victim surcharge order is recorded in the sum of £156, when in fact it should have been £100. We simply direct that the record be amended accordingly.