[2025] EWCA Crim 1196

Here, too, we have concluded that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. In respect of count 2, the starting point was five years' imprisonment, with a category range of four to ten years. That is based on penetration of the complainant's vagina by the appellant using his finger – harm category 1; and the abuse of trust, specifically the targeting of a particularly vulnerable child and a disparity in age – culpability A.

Miss Larton accepts the categorisation. She submits that there is nothing that requires an increase from the starting point of five years, and therefore there should be a movement back to the starting point.

We do not agree. The judge was entitled to take account of the young age of the complainant (13 years) as a significant aggravating feature. Another aggravating factor is that the complainant needed help because she was unwell with tonsilitis. As set out earlier in this judgment, she became ill as she came out of the bath and passed out. It was then in respect of a particularly vulnerable child that the appellant inserted his finger into her vagina. Whilst that did not involve a threat or the use of violence, the combination of those matters justified both the 1A categorisation and going above the starting point to the extent that the judge did.

The judge was entitled to impose consecutive sentences in relation to separate offences. In particular, the offences for which there were sentence of six years and nine years' imprisonment respectively were separated in time by about two years. Further, there were other offences on other occasions, separate from those offences, thereby justifying the further consecutive sentences of six months each. A decision to have made these sentences concurrent because they were sexual offences committed by the appellant against the same complainant would not have reflected the overall level of criminality.

The judge had in mind the principle of totality. This was reflected in part by the imposition of concurrent sentences in respect of counts 4, 5, 6 and 12 with the sentence on count 7. The judge expressly took into account totality in respect of count 3. The sentence imposed on count 3 was six months' imprisonment, which was the starting point for category 3, and culpability A (abuse of trust, specific targeting of a vulnerable child, and significant disparity in age).

In the circumstances of count 3 and the facts as related above, the sentence could have been in the upper part of the range, from a higher level community order to three years' imprisonment.

The judge also expressly took into account totality in respect of the sexual assault (count 9), where the sentence imposed was six months' imprisonment. It could have been longer. The starting point was two years' imprisonment. The judge could have sentenced in the upper part of the range of one to four years.

From the abusive and gross nature of the facts summarised in respect of counts 3 and 9 above, the grave nature of the offending is readily apparent. The references to totality by the judge were not formulaic, but they were real adjustments to the sentences in order that the overall sentence would be just and proportionate. But for the principle of totality, the sentences in respect of counts 3 and 9 in particular would have been longer.

The judge did not expressly say that, taking into account the principle of totality, an overall sentence of 16 years' imprisonment was appropriate, but it is apparent from the sentencing remarks that the judge had that well in mind. In our judgment, so serious was the offending and so bad were the consequences on the complainant that a long sentence of imprisonment was justified.

The judge had regard to the medical evidence in respect of the appellant and took into account his age, his poor health, and such mitigation (albeit limited) as there was.

The overall sentence of 16 years' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive, bearing in mind the nature of the offending and the very severe consequences to the childhood and life of the complainant.

The sentencing judge was the judge who had presided over the second trial. He was in a particularly good position to determine the appropriate sentence. He was able to reflect the level of the appellant's criminality and its effect on the complainant. That was all brought to bear in the sentencing exercise in which the judge properly reflected the principle of totality in the different way set out above.

Looking at the sentence as a whole, it was not manifestly excessive and there was no error of principle. For all these reasons the appeal against sentence will be dismissed.