Costs
76.Following the distribution of this judgment in draft I have received from Ms Williams an application for costs on behalf of the wife. The accompanying Form N260 states the wife’s costs to be £26,515.40. She seeks her costs, to be summarily assessed by me on the indemnity basis. 77.So far as costs are concerned this appeal is governed by FPR r.28.2. This applies Part 44 of the CPR with certain exceptions. One exception is CPR r.44.2(2)(a) which expresses the general rule that costs follow the event. Therefore, the court starts with a so-called clean sheet. However, in Baker v Rowe [2009] EWCA Civ 1162, [2010] 1 FLR 761 at [25] Wilson LJ stated: 'Even where the judge starts with a clean sheet, the fact that one party has been unsuccessful, and must therefore usually be regarded as responsible for the generation of the successful party's costs, will often properly count as the decisive factor in the exercise of the judge's discretion.' 78.Similarly, in Solomon v Solomon [2013] EWCA Civ 1095 Ryder LJ held at [22] that: “…the starting point for what are described as ‘clean sheet’ cases is that costs follow the event.” 79.Therefore, in clean sheet cases a soft costs-follow-the-event principle applies. In my judgment the principle is not so soft where the application is an appeal. In a child maintenance case there is a reasonable argument that at first instance it should be very soft: see KS v ND (Schedule 1: appeal: costs) [2013] EWHC 464 (Fam), [2013] 2 FLR 698 at [19]. However, an appeal is in a different category altogether. In KS v ND at [34] I stated: “In my judgment on any financial remedy appeal, including an appeal in Schedule 1 proceedings, costs should prima facie follow the event. Certainly that would be the position on a first appeal to the Court of Appeal and I cannot see why any different rule should apply on a first appeal to the High Court or the County Court. Even if the father had not made a Calderbank offer he would prima facie be entitled to his costs; the existence of his offer strengthens his case considerably. There are no good reasons why, subject to the questions of quantum and timing, he should not have his costs.”80.In this case, as noted in the main judgment, the husband sought to renew Grounds 1 and 3. I dismissed that application and held it to be totally without merit. Williams J had ordered the renewal application to be heard alongside the main appeal. The wife was therefore drawn into that process and needlessly incurred costs in relation to it. Further, on 16 March 2020 the wife made an open offer to settle the appeal. Essentially she sought that appellant should accept the decision of the trial judge; on that basis she would not seek any costs of the appeal. The husband did not respond with an open offer of his own. Although FPR PD 28A para 4.4 does not in terms apply to an appeal governed by r.28(2), in my judgment, an obligation to negotiate to compromise any piece of family litigation, including an appeal, should be recognised. A 81.Therefore, the husband’s pursuit of totally meritless grounds, and his failure to negotiate, amount in my judgment to conduct for the purposes of CPR 44.2 (4) and (5). This conduct makes an already strong case for an order for costs irrefutable in my judgment. The more difficult question is whether the basis of assessment should be standard or indemnity. 82.For costs to be awarded on the indemnity basis it has to be shown that there is some circumstance which takes the case ‘out of the norm’. In Three Rivers District Council & Ors v The Governor & Company of the Bank of England