£6,483,623
. For a 58 year old woman this would generate a Duxbury income of £325,000 annually. It goes without saying that receipt of this amount would abundantly meet the wife’s needs, with much to spare.29.The wife will receive her share of the carry and co-investment by means of contingent lump sum orders against the husband. It is unreasonable and unrealistic for her to seek to be granted a formal transfer of part of the husband’s proprietary interests in the funds. 30.On the above calculations the husband will receive, net of tax:i)in 4½ years’ time from Fund 1, €5,887,243 as carry and €526,382 co-investment, a total of €6,413,625 or £5,528,987, and ii)from Fund 2 in 6½ years’ time, carry calculated at €15,768,430 and co-investment, after credit is given for future commitments paid by him of €1,251,337, calculated at €3,649,380, a total of €19,417,810 or £16,739,491. 31.Thus the estimated net total from both funds receivable by the husband is £22,268,479; while the wife is estimated to receive from Fund 1 £6,483,623. These are not, of course, present values as some of the payments will not be received for four years and some not for six. This 77% : 23% split fairly recognises that by the end of each fund just under half of the work in Fund 1, and two-thirds of the work in Fund 2, will have been done by the husband alone after the dissolution of the marital partnership. The split divides the marital carry and the marital co-investment equally.32.I am satisfied on the balance of probability that the wife will receive in 4½ years’ time sums of the order I have set out in para 28 above and that the husband will receive sums of the order set out in para 30 in 4½ and 6½ years’ time. Obviously they will not receive those sums exactly. But I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that sums of that order will be received by them then. 33.The basic rule of civil judging, as expressed by Lord Diplock in Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166 at 176 (and reiterated by Lord Hoffmann in Re B (Children) [2009] 1 AC 11 at [2]) is that:“In determining what did happen in the past the court decides on the balance of probabilities. Anything that is more probable than not it treats as certain.” 34.This binary rule ought logically to apply equally to judicial findings about the likelihood of future events. However, in my judgment where the court is exercising the discretion under s. 25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 it should be entitled to take into account not only the probability of a future happening (P) but also the probability of it not happening and something else completely different happening (Q). 35.We are told that it is unhelpful to put precise percentages on the probability of a future event: see Re B at [44] per Baroness Hale. So I will confine myself to saying that I judge the likelihood of W receiving nothing as being negligible. What Q represents is the risk that the wife receives very substantially less than £6.5 million. I will weigh this risk in my disposition below.
The wife’s trust interests
36.These are as follows. It should be noted that two of the trusts are defendants to what seems to be a speculative claim by a trustee-in-bankruptcy.37.The 1994 Trust holds two life insurance policies on the wife’s parents’ lives presently worth $550,000 and with combined death benefits (on a second to die basis) of $2 million. This trust is a defendant to the civil litigation just mentioned. The trust is divided into five equal shares for the five daughters. The wife is principal beneficiary of her share. The trustees are required to pay the net income, principal or both to the principal beneficiary and her lineal descendants, with first consideration being given to the principal beneficiary’s needs. 38.