Case No. ZC20C00330

, para 46. iv) It is possible for a parent unilaterally to cause a child to change habitual residence by removing the child to another jurisdiction without the consent of the other parent (In re R ). v) A child will usually but not necessarily have the same habitual residence as the parent(s) who care for him or her (In re LC ). The younger the child the more likely the proposition, however, this is not to eclipse the fact that the investigation is child focused. It is the child's habitual residence, which is in question and, it follows the child's integration which is under consideration. vi) Parental intention is relevant to the assessment, but not determinative (In re L , In re R and In re B ). vii) It will be highly unusual for a child to have no habitual residence. Usually a child loses a pre-existing habitual residence at the same time as gaining a new one (In re B ). viii) In assessing whether a child has lost a pre-existing habitual residence and gained a new one, the court must weigh up the degree of connection which the child had with the state in which he resided before the move (In re B —see in particular the guidance at para 46). ix) It is the stability of a child's residence as opposed to its permanence which is relevant, though this is qualitative and not quantitative, in the sense that it is the integration of the child into the environment rather than a mere measurement of the time a child spends there (In re R and earlier in In re L and Mercredi). x) The relevant question is whether a child has achieved some degree of integration in social and family environment; it is not necessary for a child to be fully integrated before becoming habitually resident (In re R ) (emphasis added). xi) The requisite degree of integration can, in certain circumstances, develop quite quickly ( article 9 of Brussels IIA envisages within three months). It is possible to acquire a new habitual residence in a single day (A v A ; In re B ). In the latter case Lord Wilson JSC referred (para 45) to those “first roots ” which represent the requisite degree of integration and which a child will “ probably ” put down “ quite quickly ” following a move. xii) Habitual residence was a question of fact focused upon the situation of the child, with the purposes and intentions of the parents being merely among the relevant factors. It was the stability of the residence that was important, not whether it was of a permanent character. There was no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time, let alone that there should be an intention on the part of one or both parents to reside there permanently or indefinitely (In re R ). xiii) The structure of Brussels IIA, and particularly recital (12) to the Regulation, demonstrates that it is in a child's best interests to have an habitual residence and accordingly that it would be highly unlikely, albeit possible (or, to use the term adopted in certain parts of the judgment, exceptional), for a child to have no habitual residence; As such, “if interpretation of the concept of habitual residence can reasonably yield both a conclusion that a child has an habitual residence and, alternatively, a conclusion that he lacks any habitual residence, the court should adopt the former” ( In re B supra). 7. In the case of