other person connected with [the child]
”. This approach – and the ethos of the CA 1989 which is supportive of wider family involvement in the child’s life, save where that outcome is not consistent with their welfare – is mirrored in guidance and regulations which I comprehensively reviewed in Re H2, which I do not propose to rehearse here. 18.In this case, adoption for F is not currently the care plan, nor indeed is it actively under consideration, but it appears to be in the mind of the Local Authority given the vulnerability of the mother and her current and recent circumstances. The infelicitously worded reference in the application to ensuring “that it can tick the “nothing else will do” box” perhaps exposes a somewhat formulaic and mechanical approach to the task facing a court in these circumstances; it should be remembered that the suite of cases which followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 underline the importance of a holistic evaluation of the “realistic” options where adoption is being considered, so that an adoption agency, and/or a court can satisfy itself, before pursuing adoption, that “nothing else will do”. I infer that the Local Authority has in mind that were adoption to be ‘on the cards’, the statutory checklist in section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (‘ACA 2002’) and specifically section 1(4)(f)(ii) ACA 2002 would come into play viz. “the ability and willingness of any of