Relevant legal framework
13The legal framework has been characteristically dealt with in some details in the skeleton argument submitted on behalf of the applicant by Ms Gamble and Mr Powell. At paragraphs 5 - 8, it sets out the statutory provisions in relation to eligibility to apply for this declaration under s.55A of the Family Law Act 1986. It is quite clear from that the applicant meets the gateway requirements to make such an application. She comes within the definition of somebody who can make the application and the jurisdiction of the court is founded on either domicile or habitual residence. The applicant was born in this jurisdiction, this is her domicile of origin, and so it is quite clear that that requirement as well as the habitual residence requirements are met. 14The next matter that the court has to consider is whether the evidence that has been relied upon by the applicant establishes that D is her birth father and if it is, the requirement under s.58 of the Family Law Act 1986 needs to be considered, which provides:“Where on an application to a court for a declaration under this Part the truth of the proposition to be declared is proved to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall make that declaration unless to do so would manifestly be contrary to public policy.”It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that there is nothing and no features in this case that would indicate that making the declaration sought is contrary to public policy.15One of the matters the court has had to grapple with is the procedural requirement set out in the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) r.8.18 - 8.22. In essence, the provision provides that in an application for a declaration of parentage, r.8.20(1) provides that:“(i) The person whose parentage is in issue except where that person is a child; and(ii) 16The applicant’s birth parents have died, the evidence demonstrates that. The applicant is the person whose parentage is in issue. The question that I have raised with Mr Powell is whether there should be any notice given of this application to either the nieces and nephews, the cousins, or to the adults who are D’s surviving children.17Mr Powell makes the point that the requirements of this application are to make a declaration. The purpose of a declaration is to declare what is an existing factual situation. The framework is that providing the applicant meets the gateway requirements to be able to make the application and if the evidence establishes that D is her birth father, then subject to any public policy considerations raised by s.58, the court is required to grant the application.18Also, the FPR 2010 provide in relation to the Attorney General that under r.8.21(1):19So, the Rules specifically exclude the need to be able to give the Attorney General notice of the application prior to it being issued and even though under r.8.20(4) the court needs to consider whether the Attorney General should be given notice of the application, it is only necessary for the court to consider that and to exercise its discretion one way or the other depending on the particular circumstances of this case.20In my judgment, having considered these provisions, the relevant legal framework and the information the court has, I do not see any useful purpose will be served in giving notice to any of the individuals I have identified because, essentially, the declaration is to declare a factual situation if established by the evidence. The purpose of serving them would only cause delay. It is not necessary in light of the evidence the court has for them to be able to be joined to the proceedings or be given notice to enable the court to determine the application that is before it. So, for those reasons, I do not consider that there needs to be any further steps taken in the particular facts and circumstances of this case for any other person to be given notice of this application, I include in that the Attorney General.21Mr Powell and Ms Gamble have been able to track down a previous case that has dealt with a similar situation to this. It is the decision of Hogg J in the case of M v W (Declaration of Parentage) [2007] 2 FLR 270. Factually, it has a number of similarities to the situation that the court is dealing with in in this case. The applicant in that case was placed for adoption soon after birth. The birth certificate carried the mother’s maiden name only and not the birth father’s name. The birth father had returned to Australia, where he remained. The mother signed a declaration of acknowledgement of parentage in which she named the Australian as the father and in the following year the applicant was granted Australian citizenship. There had been communication between the wider family in Australia and the applicant sought a declaration of natural parentage as a matter of great importance to his self-perception and sense of identity.22The respondents to that application included the various members of the birth father’s family that still lived in Australia, who all supported the application, and the Attorney General, who also supported the application. That case was decided prior to the changes in the FPR 2010 which provides the framework within which the court is considering this application.23The issue in relation to declarations of parentage in the context of adoption was more recently considered by MacDonald J in the case H v An Adoption Agency (Declaration of Parentage Following Adoption) [2020] EWFC 74. That was in an entirely different context, where the birth father of a child who had been adopted was seeking a declaration that he was the birth father. There was evidence to suggest that the purpose behind that application was to cause complications in relation to his birth child who had been adopted.