Case No. P022P70194

1.This is my judgment on the application by Amy Boudewijn (“Amy”) in Form C63 issued on 26 May 2022, seeking a declaration of parentage under s55A of the Family Law Act 1986. Specifically she seeks a declaration that Errol Washington Johnson (“Errol”) was her biological father. I say “was” because Errol died on 25 July 2002. 2.Amy’s objective is to get the Registrar-General for Births and Deaths to amend her birth certificate pursuant to Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, s.14A so as to identify Errol as her father.3.Amy has acted in person on this application at all times. 4.The application came before me on 4 July 2022. My order of that date dealt with a number of procedural matters. On that occasion I noted that the procedural issues were similar to those in Aylward-Davies v Chesterman & Anor [2022] EWFC 4 at [5] – [32]. 5.My order on that day noted that pursuant to FPR r. 8.20(1) the following were automatically joined as respondents to the application:(1)Errol(2)Bridget Sumpter Boudewijn, Amy’s adoptive mother (“Bridget”)(3)Pieter Ernest Boudewijn, Amy’s adoptive father (“Pieter”)(4)Denise Peever, Amy’s birth mother (“Denise”)6.On that occasion I heard an oral application by Amy to discharge Pieter and Denise as parties to the application . My order stated:“Although there is explicit power in a children case (FPR r.12.3(3)) and in a financial remedies case (FPR r. 9.26B(1)) to remove a party, there is no explicit power to do so for declaration of parentage applications made under FPR Part 8 and governed procedurally by FPR Part 19;In circumstances, however, where for all civil proceedings there is power to remove a party with the court’s permission (CPR r.19.4(1)), a comparable power must be implied into proceedings brought under FPR Part 8.”7.I confirm my view that such a power exists in proceedings under FPR Part 8. Indeed, I consider that the power exists in all forms of family proceedings.8.Amy’s reasons for seeking Pieter and Denise to be discharged as parties were stated to me orally and were put in writing in a witness statement dated 4 July 2022 filed shortly after the hearing concluded.9.Amy’s witness statement explained that her relationship with Denise broke down irretrievably over 10 years ago. She tried to contact her in May 2019 but Denise did not wish to kindle a relationship. Amy considers that this is because she (Amy) is a constant reminder of the painful events leading to Denise giving her up for adoption. As for Pieter, she explained that he is a Hare Krishna monk who has lived at a temple since 2000 and has limited access to modern technology. Further, she submitted that it would not be appropriate for him to be a party for medical reasons.10.Having considered these reasons I granted Amy’s application to discharge Pieter and Bridget as parties.11.I then raised the question of who might be the appropriate representative of Errol’s estate. Amy indicated that her brother Ashley Johnson, would be an appropriate representative, and I ordered accordingly.12.Next, I considered the order of His Honour Judge Levey dated 9 June 2022 which purported to transfer Amy’s application to the Principal Registry of the Family Division. I noted that there was no power for him to do so (see FPR r.29.17(3)-(4)). I have pointed on countless occasions that the power of transfer to the High Court is limited to puisne judges of the High Court (and judges of yet higher seniority). The limitation has been there for nearly nine years since the creation of the Family Court. Yet I see order after order made by circuit and district judges purporting to transfer proceedings to the High Court. It is completely inexplicable to me why this rule is not known and understood. Its terms were spelt out with crystal clarity in paras 26 – 28 of the President’s Guidance – Jurisdiction of the Family Court to High Court Judge level and transfer of cases from the Family Court to the High Court dated 28 February 2018 (as updated and reissued on 24 May 2021).13.That Guidance does not require Amy’s application to be issued in the High Court, as it is made under Part III of the Family Law Act 1986 and is therefore excepted from Item No.3 of the Schedule to the Guidance. I therefore determined that there was no good reason why Amy’s application should be heard in the Family Division, and treated the order of 9 June 2022 as having allocated this application to High Court Judge level within the Family Court. 14. I next considered whether Amy’s application would be heard in open court or in private and whether there should be any reporting restrictions.15.An application under s55A of the Family Law Act 1986 is governed procedurally by FPR Part 8 Chapter 5. FPR rule 8.1 states:“Subject to rules 8.13 and 8.24, applications to which this Part applies must be made in accordance with the Part 19 procedure”16.Rules 8.13 and 8.24 are not relevant to this application. It is therefore governed by the Part 19 procedure. An application under Part 19 procedure is heard in private under FPR rule 27.10, although members of the press and legal bloggers are entitled to attend under rule 27.11. 17.In Aylward-Davies v Chesterman & Anor [2022] EWFC 4 at [27] – [29] I held that where there were no minor children affected even peripherally by the application, there was no basis upon which a reporting restriction order could be made (see H v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1646 at para 21) and further that there was no good reason to depart from the principle of open justice by anonymising the judgment.18.At the hearing on 4 July 2022 I informed Amy of the need to apply for a reporting restrictions order if she should wish the media to be restricted in either attending the hearing, or reporting the proceedings. Further, if she wished the judgment to be anonymised she would have to apply for such an order, which would have to be served on the media and heard fully on its merits. Amy indicated she did not wish to make any such application and has not since done so.19.I therefore give this judgment without anonymisation.20.Finally I ordered that Amy had to file, and serve on Ashley and Bridget, a witness statement containing all the evidence upon which she wishes to rely to prove that Errol was her biological father, exhibiting any documents relied on by her (including any DNA test results). She duly did so. Asley and Bridget were allowed to file witness statements in reply. They did not do so.21.I now turn to the substance of the application.