First limb – Section 31(2)(i)
13.I stress yet again that it is not alleged that, at the time or immediately before the mother’s unfortunate injury, K was or had suffered harm. As such, I treat the mother as a parent who is completely blameless in this case. 14.The parties make a number of points in their submissions that threshold should not be found to be crossed:a.Firstly (and this is perhaps the most substantial point made on behalf of the Local Authority), they rely on the case of Re J (Children) [2013] UKSC 9, in which the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of proof in relation to the risk of future harm. Ms Troy submitted that the effect of the judgment of Baroness Hale in that case when applied to the present case is as follows:“In order to make a finding of significant harm for the future, it is submitted that the Court has to be able to establish that the likelihood of significant harm is attributable to a deficit in the parenting of the mother, as evidence by a past parenting failure. There does not appear to be any evidential basis upon which such a finding could be made”. Thus, she says, the Court cannot make a finding of the future risk of significant harm if there has been no such harm in the past, or there has been no past parenting behaviour identified. She adds to that that any such proposition is “factually hypothetical and in reality not even possible let alone likely”;b.The second submission made by the parties (and again I cite Ms Troy’s submissions) is that there was a “very similar set of facts before the court in the case of LCC v AB & Ors [2018] EWHC 1960 (Fam)”, and that the Court should apply that case accordingly;c.Thirdly, they submit that if the Court were to make a finding that threshold was crossed, that would in some way infer blame being placed upon the mother for putting her child at the risk of future harm. Further, that that would not be appropriate in particular in circumstances where the mother is a protected party;d.I will return to that in due course. 15.Ms Hancock (acting on behalf of the Official Solicitor for the mother) supported the submissions made by the Local Authority on all points. However, she emphasised the last two of those and cautioned against a decision of the Court which might involve the crossing of threshold and intervention of the state whenever a party has a significant illness which rendered them incapable of caring for a child. She submitted on behalf of the Official Solicitor that that would be a dangerous route for the Court to go down, and that that is not what the threshold criteria are for. 16.As I have already noted, the Court should be very cautious in disagreeing with a position agreed by all parties. However, I also recognise that I have a duty to K and to her welfare, and if the Court considers that the arguments raised are not correct, it should not flinch from saying so. In my judgment, they are not correct and I turn to them now.