Re Shanavazi
[2021] EWHC 1832 (Ch), with her considerable experience from a Chancery perspective, when faced with a similar case to this one agreed with my reasoning in Re AC.13.Having satisfied myself that I am entitled to authorise the applicant to enter into a contract for sale on behalf of B, I am persuaded that, when considering the paramountcy of B’s welfare, it is in his best interests to grant the authorisation sought. The value of B’s share is substantial and there are no known debts. The proposed sale is at a price of €320,000 such that B’s 50% share would be €160,000 less a pro rata contribution to sale costs. At present, B can make no meaningful use of his share of the property. There is no significant link with France anymore; the family barely visit the property. B’s family life is in England. B himself seeks a sale of the property, so as to assist him at university in due course, and explore other investment opportunities, including purchasing a rental property in this country. Rental income defrays some of the running costs, but does not provide a meaningful net income. A ready and willing purchaser has been identified and the evidence suggests that if this opportunity to sell is not grasped, it may become more difficult to secure a sale.14.I will accordingly grant both limbs of the application.
Procedural points
15.It may assist to give some general guidance as to the appropriate procedure for these sorts of applications which, in the ordinary course of events, will be uncontested.16.An application of this nature, being for a Specific Issue Order, must be made in Form C100. Much of the form is not relevant to applications of this nature, but it is easy to navigate and complete. 17.Paragraph 5(b) of Form C100 says: “Do not give a full statement, please provide a summary of any relevant reasons. You may be asked to file a full statement later”. Because of the technical aspects of these applications, involving applicable law in foreign jurisdictions, and the need to avoid delay, I consider it essential that a witness statement is filed in support, setting out the circumstances in full. It is unlikely that brief reasons set out on the form will be sufficient. 18.By FPR 2010 rule 12.3(1), every person whom the applicant believes to have parental responsibility for the child must be made a respondent to an application in private law proceedings, which includes for a Specific Issue Order. Usually, in circumstances where the applicant is one parent, and the other parent is sadly deceased, there will be no automatic respondents. It is possible to envisage a situation where another family member has parental responsibility by court order, in which case that person must be made a respondent, but such cases will be rare. 19.It is highly unlikely that the child would need to be joined; probably only if the child fundamentally disagrees with the application, and is of an age where he/she can validly object.20.It will sometimes be the case that other persons are legally or beneficially interested in the relevant property. In my judgment, any third party who has, or appears to have, a legal or beneficial interest in the property that is the subject of the application should be (i) notified of the application; (ii) invited to provide confirmation as to whether they do or do not oppose the application; and (iii) reminded that they may, if so advised, make an application to be joined to the proceedings pursuant to FPR 2010 rule 12.3(3). In the present case, B’s adult sister was formally made a party, and indicated no opposition in her Acknowledgment of Service. It seems to me that, in fact, it was not necessary to join her; notification of the proceedings and confirmation of her position would have been sufficient. Usually, in my view, third parties will not need to be joined absent good reason, because their rights are not generally affected by the sort of application before me today. It is unlikely that a third party would oppose authorisation to accept an inheritance, which is personal to the minor. As for an authorisation to enter into a contract for sale, that is not an order for sale; it simply entitles the applicant to enable a sale to be effected on behalf of the minor. A third party is not prohibited from opposing a sale under the relevant domestic law if he/she thinks fit. 21.Where the child who is the subject of the application is thought to be Gillick competent, his or her views should usually be sought informally by the applicant. 22.The applicant should claim a MIAM exemption (the C100 does not provide a specific category for exemption in cases of this nature, but in my view, it is sufficient to claim the exemption without identifying a specific category) and the court should dispense with the need for attendance at a MIAM.23.In Re AC, I concluded at paragraph 23 that the appropriate venue for a Specific Issue Order application such as this is the Family Court. That remains my view. The President's Guidance “Jurisdiction of the Family Court: Allocation of cases within the Family Court to High Court Judge level and transfer of cases from the Family Court to the High Court” dated 24 May 2021 does not require that an application of this kind must be allocated to judge of High Court judge level. Applications of this nature can be dealt with by judges of District Judge or Circuit Judge level sitting in the Family Court. That, of course, does not prevent, in the usual way, the application being allocated to a judge of High Court judge level on the ground of complexity.24.When I first saw the application, I contemplated whether to dispose of it on paper without the need for a hearing, given that it is unopposed. I have come to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the cost and burden of legal proceedings, ordinarily it is appropriate for there to be a hearing on an application of this sort. It involves the welfare of a child. Precisely because applications of this nature are one sided, the court needs to be extra vigilant to be satisfied that the child’s welfare is not prejudiced. There is an analogy with an infant approval hearing for personal injury settlements, mandated by Part 21 of the CPR, which requires a court hearing for approval of the final award. In my judgment there should usually be a short hearing before a judge to approve the order sought, although the ultimate decision on this must rest with the judge.25.The first listed hearing can be, and usually should be, treated as the final disposal hearing. 26.Finally, I observe that an application for a Specific Issue Order of this sort will, absent court order to the contrary, be heard in private by reason of FPR 27.10 rule 27.10. That is unlike the position in the Chancery Division where any application would ordinarily be heard in open court (see, for example, Hays v Hays and Re Shanavazi).
- Approved Judgment
- Introduction
- Re AC (A Child) [2020] EWFC 90.
- The application
- The background
- The 1996 Hague Convention
- Re AC
- responsibility
- duties
- the child’s own name
- in his or her own name
- Hays v Hays
- Re AC
- Hays v Hays [2015] EWHC 3825 (Ch)
- or disposal
- South Down Trustees Ltd v GH [2018] EWHC 1064 (Ch).
- Re AC.
- Procedural points
- must
- Hays v Hays
- Re Shanavazi
