Discussion
55.I have evaluated the evidence in respect of a change of circumstances ‘on the ground’ and concluded that any changes M has achieved in her own lifestyle and circumstances do not amount to a significant change in circumstances for the purposes of CA 1989, s14D(5). 56.The suggestion was made on behalf of M during the course of oral submissions that the emergence of the new allegations against MGM may itself amount to a significant change in circumstances. 57.The Court of Appeal has held in the context of an application for permission to oppose an adoption application1 that the ‘change of circumstances’ required by ACA 2002, s47(7) ‘can embrace a wide range of different factual situations [and]… does not relate a change to the circumstances of the parents’. I see no reason why the approach should be any different in special guardianship cases. The requirement for a ‘significant change in circumstances’ should, in my judgement, be construed broadly. 58.That said, in my view it is difficult to characterise the emergence of fresh allegations in this case as a change in circumstances. The alleged events took place long before the care proceedings; the allegations were of course known to M in 2017 when the special guardianship order was made; and the evidence on which M now relies in support of her allegations, namely the school records from 2006, were available to the local authority during those proceedings. 59.I conclude therefore that there has not been a significant change in circumstances and that the requirements of CA 1989, s14D(5) are not met. 60.It follows that there is, strictly speaking, no need to go on to consider the second stage of the leave application, namely whether M’s application stands a real prospect of success (and the very fact that there has been no significant change in circumstances means of course that an application to discharge the special guardianship order would be highly unlikely to succeed). For completeness however, it is appropriate to record my doubts, even if M had achieved much greater change, that her application would stand a real prospect of success. T is a five-year-old child who has lived with MGM (and his aunt) since he was a young baby. His relationship with M is important to him but he has not spent significant time with her and his primary attachment must be with MGM. It is difficult to see how, if the special guardianship order were discharged, M could meet his obvious need for an ongoing and meaningful relationship with his grandmother and aunt in circumstances where she currently has no communication with either of them at all. 61.M’s argument, based on the observations of the Court of Appeal in paragraph 52(8) of Re M, that it is appropriate to grant leave in this case in order to permit a full and thorough investigation of the allegations M makes against MGM, carries much less weight in the circumstances of this case than it might have done had there been no investigation into the allegations by the police or the local authority, or had the investigations been less thorough. 62.I turn finally to the suggestion – raised for the purposes of rebuttal by the local authority, and without a formal application having been made by M – that the new allegations might justify revisiting the factual basis on which the special guardianship order was made, on the basis of the line of authority summarised by Peter Jackson LJ in Re E (Children: Reopening Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1447. This point was not fully argued before me, there being no application before me to set aside the order, but I would tend to agree with the local authority that the fact that the allegations are based not on evidence that has come to light after the trial but on matters known to M at the time when the special guardianship order was made, together with the length of time that has elapsed since the order, mean that the balance would be likely to fall down in favour of finality. 63.I therefore refuse the application for leave to discharge the special guardianship order.