Case No. FD21P00367
Family Court

Case No. FD21P00367

Fecha: 13-Abr-2022

On what basis may an adoption order be set aside or revoked?

50.It is well established that an adoption order, once made, will only be subsequently set aside or revoked in ‘wholly’ or ‘highly’ exceptional circumstances: see for example Re M (Minors) (Adoption) [1990] 1 FCR 785; [1990] 1 FLR 458 (CA), Re K(Adoption: Foreign Child) [1997] 2 FCR 389; [1997] 2 FLR 221 (CA) and HX v A Local Authority (Application to Revoke Adoption Order) [2020] EWHC 1287 (Fam); [2021] 1 FLR 82. The acknowledged authority on the point is the Court of Appeal decision in Webster v Norfolk County Council [2009] EWCA Civ 59; [2009] 1 FLR 1378.51.In Webster a 2 year old child, one of three children, had been found to have six fractures. In contested care proceedings, the expert evidence was unanimous that the probable cause of the fractures was child abuse, rather than brittle bone disease. Care orders and freeing for adoption orders were made on all three children, who were later adopted. Subsequently a fourth child was born to the parents. In care proceedings relating to that child the previous fact-finding conclusion concerning the cause of the 2 year old’s fractures was reopened. Fresh expert opinion was obtained from a number of experts, who all concluded that, rather than physical abuse, the probable cause of the original fractures was scurvy. The care proceedings were discontinued and the fourth child remained in the parents’ care. About one year later, and 3 years after the adoption orders had been made, the parents sought permission to appeal against the adoption orders.52.The Court of Appeal [Wall, Moore-Bick and Wilson LJJ] dismissed the application for permission to appeal. Whilst there were other reasons supporting the court’s refusal of permission, relating to the absence of a positive fact-finding that the injuries were caused by scurvy and the failure of the new evidence to pass the Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 test, the court separately stressed that, once made, an adoption order would only be set aside in highly exceptional circumstances. Giving the leading judgment, Wall LJ described the approach to be taken: