Disposal
15.The two live applications are determined by the criterion of best interests, although for the former there is no statutory obligation to consider the matters set out in the checklist in section 1(4) of the Children Act 1989. 16.The case law in respect of an application to remove or discharge parental responsibility emphasises the individuality of the application before the court. However, it behoves the court to consider particularly the hypothetical situation where the respondent (normally in the cases the father) is positively applying for parental responsibility at this point rather than resisting an application to remove it. In that hypothetical situation, it is of course inconceivable that parental responsibility would be awarded, and so the merits of the father’s resistance to its discharge should be assessed in that light. In my judgment the analogy is good as far as it goes, but, like all hypothetical questions, they are not rooted in actual reality. This father has had parental responsibility for all of these children’s lives, and the application has to be assessed in the light of the actual facts, not non-existent facts.17.A key factor in determining the applications is the Gillick-competency of both children. In An NHS Trust v X, otherwise known as In the Matter of X (A Child) No 2 [2021] EWHC 65 (Fam), at paragraph 30 Sir James Munby stated, “in some non-medical contexts the decision of a Gillick-competent child which is not objectively foolish or irrational will be determinative”. Sir James cited Re Roddy (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) [2003] EWHC 2927 (Fam) and AS v CPW [2020] EWHC 1238 (Fam). In the former decision, he stated at paragraph 57: “57. In my judgment (and I wish to emphasise this) it is the responsibility -- it is the duty -- of the court not merely to recognise but, as Nolan LJ said, to defend what, if I may respectfully say so, he correctly described as the right of the child who has sufficient understanding to make an informed decision, to make his or her own choice.”In the latter decision I stated at paragraph 22:“… it is not merely a question of giving ‘due regard’ to the wishes of a Gillick-competent child on a particular issue. In my judgment, if the decision of the House of Lords in Gillick is not to be hollowed out, the wishes of a Gillick-competent child on a particular issue, where they are not objectively foolish or unreasonable, should normally be given effect.”18.Here, the children have been unambiguously clear that i.they do not wish their father to retain any form of parental responsibility in respect f them; andii.they wish to change their surname to that of their mother. Indeed, they have already informally started using their mother’s surname. 19.In my judgment the choices made by these children are informed decisions and cannot be characterised as foolish or unreasonable, and I can see no good reason why they should not be given effect. 20.I accept that the choices made by a Gillick-competent child are not absolutely determinative and that the court retains, indeed, is obliged by the terms of the statute to apply a best-interests analysis. However, I believe that Ms Bewley put it well when she said that the court has to recognise that the children’s choices will be nearly determinative. 21.Quite apart from the question of the Gillick-competent choice made by these children, there is a formidable imbalance on the welfare balance sheet in favour of these orders being granted. These factors include prominently the depth of evil to which this father descended. 22.That depth of evil is reflected by the calculated planning that went into the lethal assault coupled with his complete disregard for the welfare of his children, who he must have realised would be likely to have witnessed at least some aspects of this prolonged assault. 23. It is compounded by the father’s complete lack of remorse for, indeed, any kind of considered comprehension of the grotesque moral obloquy perpetrated by him. During the hearing before me on video, when the matter was being opened by Ms Bewley objectively and reasonably, the father stood up in the video suite at the prison, harangued the court with delusional rage at what he perceived to be a pack of lies and stormed out of the hearing. 24.The depth of evil to which I have referred is also evidenced by his calculated attempt to disrupt the placement of the children with Stacey’s own mother following Stacey’s death. 25.This factor strongly militates in favour of granting the application. The plea made eloquently on the father’s behalf by Ms Gilbourne was that his motive in opposing the applications was to maintain a tenuous link to his children in the hope that in the future that link can be reinforced and rebuilt and that at the end of the day, he is asking for no more than to be kept informed about significant events in his children’s lives. In my judgment that plea is belied by the grotesque moral void into which he descended and which even now I am satisfied he continues to occupy. It would not be in my interests in my judgment for this man to exercise any form of parental responsibility over them. He does not have beyond mere biological parenthood anything to offer them for the remainder of their childhood. 26.Similarly, the conduct of the father leads me to conclude that he must forfeit the symbol of parenthood which is the sharing by him and the children of his surname. For precisely the same reasons, I conclude that the scale of the infamy practiced by the father is so extreme that all links between him and the children should in the children’s interests be severed. It is also a practical recognition of what is already happening informally. 27.There are sound practical reasons why these orders should be made. In the absence of the first order, the local authority would have had to have kept the father abreast of any care planning, and this would in my judgment not be in the interests of the children at all. Once the orders have been made, the children will also be enabled, as I have already indicated, to make formal as regards their surname what is already happening informally. 28.In his sentencing remarks, HHJ Dickinson QC stated: “The attack was at Stacey’s own home in the garden. Her home is the one place above all where she should be safe, and the children, her children, your children, present in the house and Michaela Edgar found them outside in their pyjamas. They have lost their mum. They have effectively lost their dad.”29.I agree that by his conduct the father has ensured that these three children have not only lost their mum but in addition they have effectively lost their dad. By his conduct he has effectively orphaned these children. It is now necessary for the court to set in place the necessary formal measures that recognise that loss. 30.The final word in my judgment goes to T, who in his interview with the police was asked when he started calling the father Matthew. He replied, “When the incident happened, I started calling him Matthew then, because by doing that, he doesn’t deserve the title of dad”.31.For these reasons both applications are granted.