Case No. NE21P00484-&-NE21P07404

5.The applications have been made under the Part 19 FPR 2010 procedure (in accordance with rule 8.1 FPR 2010). There is limited assistance, from Practice Direction 19A or otherwise, to guide the process of an application such as this; MacDonald J refers to the lack of procedural ‘clarity’ (my word not his) at §10(i)-(vii) and §11 of Re H No.23 and has proposed (see §74) consideration of the procedural issues and associated implications by the Family Procedure Rule Committee. I support his proposal.Ms L’s application6.At an earlier case management hearing, I determined on the facts that, within the meaning of section 55A(2), (3) and (4) FLA 1986, Ms L is domiciled in England & Wales, and that she has sufficient interest in the determination of this application to justify her in making the application. I joined Ms T to the application; she is the executrix of the estate of the man whom Ms L asserts is her birth father (who I shall refer to as ‘PJ’). His estate has not yet been distributed. Ms T has been served with notice of the hearing, but has not attended. Ms L’s adoptive parents are both deceased; they would otherwise have been automatic respondents to the application. I considered, but regarded as unnecessary, the joinder of PJ’s known children; for reasons which I do not need to discuss here, they did not have any contact with PJ or other members of his family since the early 1970s.Ms M’s application7.At the same earlier hearing, I determined on the facts that, within the meaning of section 55A(2), (3) and (4) FLA 1986 Ms M is also domiciled in England and Wales, and that she too has sufficient interest in the determination of this application to justify her in making the application. 8.I was asked to consider whether Ms M’s birth mother should be joined as a party to the application. Rule 8.20(1) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (‘FPR 2010’) defines who should be respondents to an application for a declaration of parentage. The respondents “will be”: i)“The person whose parentage is in issue except where that person is a child;ii)Any person who is or is alleged to be the parent of the person whose parentage is in issue, except where that person is the applicant or is a child”.It is also incumbent on the applicant to “include in [her] application particulars of every person whose interest may be affected by the proceedings and his relationship to the applicant” (rule 8.20(2) FPR 2010).9.Notwithstanding the clarity of those rules, the FPR 2010 further allows the court the opportunity to retain general control (in fulfilment of its overriding objective) over the joinder of parties to any proceedings (see rule 1.4(2)(b) FPR 2010). Ultimately the question of who should be the respondent to such an application is a matter for the court, and is likely to be fact-sensitive in each and every case.10.Ms M opposed the joinder of her birth mother as a respondent. She made clear that if her birth mother were to learn of the existence of this application, this would bring to a certain end their fragile relationship. Ms M does not want this; the relationship – albeit not altogether easy – is important to her. She said this:“She has been clear that she wants nothing to do with the past. I do not think that she will want to be involved and there is a real risk that by serving her with notice I have made this application will just make her shut down and I fear that my relationship with her will be severed by her. When my mother fell pregnant with me, she told no one. She did not tell her parents or her friends. She had me in secret and when she signed the paperwork for the adoption in 1964 giving me up for adoption, I do not doubt that she thought that was forever. The world has changed, but I believe that my birth mother is entitled to her own space, privacy, freedom and anonymity … if this court were to write to her, I do not think that she would engage in these proceedings and I know that to take this step would emphatically mean the end of our very fragile relationship … I still want to retain, where possible, some semblance of relationship with my birth mother. My mother’s name is not being removed from the birth certificate. The application I am making is about my father and I. It will not affect her status on my birth registration.” 11.I took the view, encouraged by Ms Fottrell QC and supported by Mr Murray, that there was no obligation on me to join Ms M’s birth mother in order to do justice to the case, and, in fulfilment of the overriding objective to that end, I so ruled. In reaching this conclusion I exercised the wide discretion afforded to me to regulate this legal process – this power entitles me to exclude parties from hearings, to withhold information from parties, to discharge parties from the proceedings, and to dispense with the rules altogether. These powers can be, and often are, exercised in accordance with the overriding objective provided that they cohere with the principles of law and justice which have been developed and recognised both at common law and under the Human Rights Act 1998. I find that there is no prejudice to Ms M’s birth mother by not being a party to the process, but I am satisfied that much potential harm could be done to her and to Ms M by alerting her to, and possibly drawing her into, this litigation.