Case No. SE20C00603

49.My findings in this case applying the discipline of the checklist (as amended) are as follows:i)In my judgment there is no advantage at all to IW in his mother being subjected to the toll of a contested fact-finding hearing. Indeed, I consider that it would be contrary to his interests for that to happen. VW is extraordinarily vulnerable. I judge that the toll of a contested hearing would likely overwhelm her. IW would be likely at some stage in the future to learn that a case about her conduct towards him had led to widespread anguish. I believe that such knowledge would be harmful to IW.(I deal with the whole truth factor below.)ii)The cost to public funds in having a five day fact-finding hearing in September, with leading counsel and junior counsel for each of the local authority, VW and IW would be, I estimate, around £300,000. This cost, which will fall entirely on the public purse, simply cannot be justified.iii)The time taken to undertake the fact-finding hearing should be confined to the five days already allowed in September, although one has to anticipate that there could be spillage to a much later date, especially bearing in mind that there are already over 4,200 pages in the bundle.iv)The relevant evidential result is the result of this case, and no other case. I cannot predict what the relevant evidential result will be. Either way, the ordeal for VW will be considerable.(I deal with the different child and perpetrator identification factors below.)v)The future care plans for the child may well have to be reviewed by the local authority if factual findings were made. So, obviously, there is going to be scope for the future care plans for the child to be influenced by the result of such a local authority review. vi)The consumption by a fact-finding exercise of the local authority’s resources and professional time that might be devoted to other children, is, in my judgment, strongly relevant.vii)No legitimate question can arise concerning the fairness of the trial that VW would receive should the fact-finding hearing in September be allowed to proceed.viii)When surveying the justice of the case I confirm that I have stood back and rechecked that I have taken into account all relevant matters, including all matters relevant to the implementation of the overriding objective. I am not persuaded that there would be any particularly material “gulf” between the facts that would underpin a care order without a fact-finding exercise, and the apprehended factual findings were I to permit the matter to proceed to trial. This exercise is quintessentially conjectural and hypothetical. However, I have taken into account the level of seriousness of the disputed allegations and I have satisfied myself that the process I have ordained does justice to the reality of the case.50.Fundamentally, I am not persuaded that a fact-finding hearing is necessary. During argument I asked Mr Sampson QC: cui bono? By which I meant, for whose benefit would a fact-finding judgment accrue? In the Oxfordshire case it was foreseeable that the father would apply for direct contact in the future. Plainly, a judgment containing clear factual findings would be highly relevant were such an application to be made. In this case, however, VW will agree to a care order and a placement order being made. It has been suggested that there is a possibility that the VW will apply in the future either for leave to oppose the making of an adoption order under s. 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, or for leave to revoke the placement order under s. 24(2)(a) of the same Act. Each provision requires proof of a change of circumstances since the placement order was made. The change of circumstances must be significant and unexpected. Then the court must go on to make the familiar evaluation whether in the light of such a change of circumstances, and all other relevant facts, the application should be allowed to proceed. At that stage the applicant has to show that there are ‘solid’ prospects of success.51.It is my considered estimation, having regard to (i) the history, (ii) VW’s admissions, (iii) the terms of the uncontradicted expert evidence, and, above all, (iv) her agreement to the making of the orders, that the probability of VW obtaining leave under either section is very close to zero, and that this spectre can thus be safely ignored.52.I have held above that the different child purpose is not a legitimate purpose of a fact-finding trial of superfluous un-admitted allegations. If I am wrong about that, I am clear, on the specific facts of this case, that the probability produced by a combination of the likelihood of (i) another child being born to VW, and (ii) care proceedings being initiated in respect of that child, and (iii) findings about VW’s conduct before 26 March 2020 (now nearly 2½ years ago) being material in such proceedings is so small as to rule out this factor as a relevant consideration in the discretionary exercise. 53.I have also held above how the original authorities implicitly reject as relevant the whole truth purpose. If I am wrong on this point, then I make clear that on the facts of this case I am far from satisfied that a judgment is needed on the un-admitted allegations in order to be able to reveal the whole truth to IW. If (and I emphasise if) there is an advantage to IW in the years ahead coming to understand the whole truth about his adoption, then I do not believe that the interlocutor who chronicles that whole truth will have any difficulty in assembling the story from the existing schedule of admitted allegations, and the 4,200-odd pages of evidence including the uncontradicted expert evidence referred to above. I do not believe that the chronicler needs the assistance of a judgment in order to assemble that story.54.Similarly, if I am wrong as to the general irrelevance of the perpetrator identification purpose then on the specific facts of this case it is a completely irrelevant consideration. Taken at its highest, the case that the local authority wishes to prove could not conceivably be for the main purpose of later enabling the public identification of VW as a child abuser. That is not a relevant factor on the facts of this case. 55.The answer to my question cui bono is therefore nemo. I am not satisfied that the criterion of necessity is met in this case. 56.That conclusion is reinforced when I introduce into the mix the terms of the overriding objective. In particular, I have regard to the need to be able to allot to the case an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases. In my opinion the five days in September would be much more appropriately occupied by dealing with a case where the resolution of factual issues will have a direct bearing on the outcome of the proceedings. 57.The result is all one way. In my judgment it would be a deplorable waste of valuable resources for the un-admitted allegations to be formally adjudicated in a state trial. I cannot see any upside to allowing this to proceed; by contrast I can see (and have seen) huge downsides. The downsides include the unquestionable toll that the process would take on VW. 58.For these reasons, I am satisfied that the proposal to conduct a fact-finding hearing in relation to the un-admitted matters cannot be justified.59.Finally, I observe that on 14 February 2022 IW’s Guardian made an application to reopen the findings made by Recorder Bugg in relation to AW. On 27 May 2022 the Guardian limited the application to the finding about dihydrocodeine. On 29 May 2022 Her Honour Judge Marson dismissed the application. Over the following weekend she prepared a lengthy and, if I might respectfully say so, impeccable judgment giving her reasons. At [113] she held:“I have not been persuaded it is necessary to relitigate the dihydrocodeine finding to dispose of the proceedings which relate to IW.”And at [115]:“I am persuaded it is disproportionate to the issues which are now in dispute in this case to reopen historic findings or to delay again to obtain further expert opinion. Neither parent is actively pursuing the return of IW to their care or opposing his final care plan of adoption.”I have deliberately not allowed Her Honour Judge Marson’s reasoning to influence the formation of my own views. However, I have been pleased to note, on reading it after I had formed my views, that we have reached the same destination, applying the same principles virtually identically.60.I therefore direct that the five-day fixture on 5 September 2022 be reduced to one hour and that on that occasion the court shall make a care order and placement order without opposition from the parents. There shall be no further forensic investigation into the un-admitted allegations._______________________________