Article 5
(1)The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child's person or property.(2)Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child's habitual residence to another Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction.”18.The aim of Art 5 of the 1996 Hague Convention is described in the Explanatory Report at [37] as being intended to centralise jurisdiction in the authorities of the State of the child’s habitual residence and avoid all competition of authorities having concurrent jurisdiction. Within this context, the Explanatory Report makes clear at [38] that Art 5 entrusts to the authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child the principal jurisdiction to take measures of protection of the child’s person and property.19.Habitual residence is a question of fact. The meaning of the term habitual residence is shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. Proximity in this context means the practical connection between the child and the country concerned. The Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention paragraph 4.5 makes clear that habitual residence is an autonomous concept and should be interpreted in light of the objectives of the 1996 Hague Convention rather than under domestic law constraints. In the context of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003, in Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) (C-532/01) [2009] 2 FLR 1 the Court of Justice of the European Union held, in a case expressly referred to in the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, that for habitual residence to be established the situation of the child or children must reflect some degree of integration in a social and family environment.20.As made clear by the passage from the learned Greek Judge’s judgment describing the purported jurisdiction of the Greek court set out above, reliance was also placed by the learned Judge on the concept of urgency as one of the foundations for jurisdiction. A little later in the judgment, the learned Judge again referred to a principle that “in urgent cases, it is possible to regulate the communication of the minor child with his/her next of kin through the process of interim measures.” In this context, in cases of urgency Art 11 of the 1996 Hague Convention provides an exception to the general rule of jurisdiction set out in Art 5 as follows, but only in circumstances where the child or children are present in the Contracting State exercising the urgent jurisdiction:“