Case No. LS20P01640

: The mother seeks a sum (£5,000pa) to cover the cost of therapies for Zoe (physiotherapy, speech and language, occupational health); this is included in the HECSA;ix)Flights to/from USA: She requests that the father pay for business class flights and all costs of accommodation for Zoe, the mother and nanny;x)Security: The mother seeks an order that the father take out life insurance in the sum of £8m or a lien on his home.The father’s case44.At an earlier stage of the proceedings, the father took the position that he would pay for Zoe whatever order the court considers appropriate, and that there was therefore no need for the mother or the court to require him to provide extensive financial disclosure– a ‘Millionaires Defence’6 (see §11-16 of Re Z (No.2)). He disputes some (but not all) of the mother’s descriptions of his extreme wealth and asserts that his ability to settle large sums for Zoe are likely to be affected by cash flow problems given the extent of his leverage, and the turbulent state of the investment markets; he deposes to a net annual income as at 11 December 2022 of over £2.7m. The father’s assets appear to be held within a ‘Living Trust’, which also clarifies how the father proposes to pass on his wealth on his death. He has named a number of beneficiaries, including his butler. When the trust was created, Zoe had not been born; I have not seen any evidence which indicates whether, and if so how, the father proposes to provide for Zoe from the assets held in the Living Trust now or in the future.45.The father has repeatedly referred to the undisputed fact that the relationship between the mother and him was a brief one, ending before Zoe had been born. He infers (certainly in the early statements) that the mother pursued him (rather than the other way around, as the mother suggests). The father’s clear view is that the mother has set her sights far too high in her claims; he says that the mother’s “excessive financial demands were a feature of our 6-month relationship and that approach has not abated since she returned to England”. He refers to the mother’s litigation conduct (see §55 below) which, he says, has destroyed the last remnant of trust between them.46.The father proposes that the mother should make use of her earning capacity immediately, and he disputes the mother’s need to employ a nanny (“I do not understand why [the mother] needs a nanny. She is young, healthy and does not work. I would hope that [the mother] can take care of Zoe without the need for a nanny”). He makes the point that the spending habits of the mother “are not entirely child-focused”, and that she now “seeks to achieve for herself a lifestyle which she has never previously enjoyed, and which has little bearing on a proper assessment of Zoe’s needs”. 47.The key features of the father’s open offer (adopting the same sub-headings as in §43 above) are as follows:i)Housing: The father proposes that the mother and Zoe continue to live in rented accommodation for the long-term; he offers the sum of £4,750pcm in this regard (the figure which I had allowed for the mother in late-2020, although the mother chose a more expensive property and her current rent is actually £6,500). When Zoe’s educational needs have been better identified, he would be willing to consider purchasing a suitable property to a maximum of £1.75m7 in the area of West Hampstead or Queen’s Park; he has provided property particulars in the region of £1.3m to £1.6m. His proposal is a little ambiguous as to whether he envisages that the costs of purchase (SDLT and other purchase costs) would need to be deducted from this figure8, but this uncertainty is of relatively little consequence as I am satisfied that his offer is considerably wide of the mark. No furnishing fund is offered to the mother, as (he says) this was covered in the interim award;ii)Moving fund: The father will provide £5,000 for a moving fund;iii)Nanny: The father proposes (October 2022) £35,000pa (£2,916 per calendar month) gross in respect of a nanny; he proposes that “[t]here shall be a review of this provision once Zoe begins nursery, at which point this provision shall terminate unless otherwise agreed or ordered”. As it happens, Zoe commenced nursery attendance in January 2023. It is not clear to me whether the father would accept the need for a nanny at all going forward; the father envisages that the nanny can undertake some light housekeeping duties in addition to caring for Zoe;iv)HECSA: The father proposes periodical payments to the mother for Zoe in the sum of £60,000pa until Zoe commences secondary school whereupon the sum then payable will be reduced by one third;v)Nursery/schooling: The father submits that state schools and nurseries are typically better resourced, and better able to deal with children with developmental needs; “it is in Zoe’s best interests to attend a state school from nursery so the support she needs can be ascertained at the very early stages of education, and she can access this support as soon as possible”; the father disputes the need for a 1:1 personal teaching assistant in school; vi)Debts: The father makes no offer;vii)Medical / health insurance: The father offers to procure suitable medical insurance for Zoe to cover any time she spends in the US for the purpose of staying with him. The father makes no offer in relation to private health care in England, proposing that all health care (medical and dental) should be provided on the NHS;viii)Therapies: The father offers to fund therapies for Zoe at £3,600pa monthly for three years; he stipulates that there shall be no increase on this figure at any point in the future. It is suggested that this sum will allow Zoe to have two sessions per month of either occupational therapy, speech and language therapy or additional physiotherapy. He adds: “[t]here shall be no further provision for private treatment, given Zoe’s care is being undertaken primarily by the NHS (and this should continue)”;ix)Flights to/from USA: The father has offered to pay for all flights (business class) and reasonable accommodation costs and expenses for the mother, Zoe and a nanny (if required and/or for as long as she has a nanny) in order to facilitate time spent with him. In an open letter (14 October 20229), he specifically proposed this:“[The father] will fund business class tickets and one night’s layover in [City] on the outbound journey and one night on the return journey. [The father] would also be prepared to fund a relative or friend of [the mother] to come with her. … [The father] will pay for suitable accommodation for [the mother] in [State A] in close proximity to Zoe [while Zoe is staying with the father together with her nanny]. While Zoe is with [the father], [the mother] can remain in [State A] or fly to [City] (or elsewhere) if she wishes. If your client wanted to fly elsewhere during this period, our client would provide her with $500 per day for accommodation.”x)Security: The father will make available a sum insured of £1.5m as security for the figures he proposes for the HECSA and for provision for Zoe’s nanny. This sum is to reduce pro rata as payments for the mother’s HECSA and nanny are made.Conclusions48.I have set out my conclusions under the relevant sub-headings below. Before I turn to the specifics, I make some general comments about my approach so that the father, in particular, understands the context in which this award is made.49.First, the matters to which I must have regard are set out in Schedule 1, para.4, CA 1989. I have rehearsed those above at §13. It may well be understood that “the physical or mental disability of [Zoe]” and her corresponding “financial needs” are the magnetic factors in my assessment in this particular case; the father’s “financial resources” are fortunately such that those needs may be amply met by him. 50.While ‘standard of living’ is not a statutory principle to be brought into the reckoning in settling on the appropriate award (see again §18 above), it is clear from authority that Zoe’s lifestyle, and the comfort in which she is raised in England, should not be ‘out of kilter’ with the standard of living enjoyed by her father. I take this view notwithstanding that Zoe never actually enjoyed a standard of living with her parents together, the parents having separated some months before she was born. 51.It was reassuring to note that the father, when he wrote to the mother on 27 January 2023 (see §6 above), made plain that his “main priority” is the “well-being of Zoe”; I was further comforted to note his intention to ensure that Zoe has a “safe, secure life” enjoying relationships with both sides of the family. In conducting the discretionary exercise under Schedule 1 in this case, I can confirm that Zoe’s welfare is and has been my ‘constant influence’ (per Re P above). As I hope that I have made clear through my judgment (see in particular §31 to §38 above), Zoe is a very special little girl in so many ways. Her medical condition (Williams Syndrome) will be a life-long condition for her; the syndrome will affect, and in all likelihood materially inhibit, her development in many ways as she progresses through childhood. I am satisfied from all I have read – both generically about the condition and specifically about Zoe – that Zoe will require particularly special care over the course of her childhood in the home and at school. It is reasonable to assume that the condition will further limit Zoe’s choices in life, and her facility for independence, as an adult. These are all difficult issues for both parents to absorb. 52.I am conscious that, in presenting his case both formally (witness statements) and informally (in correspondence), the father has repeatedly referenced the relative shortness of the relationship between himself and the mother (see §45 above). This is of no real consequence under the English law in a claim under Schedule 1; the father’s obligations towards Zoe were firmly established as a matter of law the moment she was born.53.I know that the father would have been anxious to emphasise to me that I should be careful to guard against unreasonable and inflated claims made on Zoe’s behalf by the mother for her personal benefit, with the disguised element of providing for Zoe. I can reassure him that I have been so careful. That said, picking through the mother’s budget has been a complex exercise (see §72-75 below); in this case, as in many of its type, it has not been easy, nor would it have been altogether appropriate, strictly to apportion the budget in such a way as to isolate only those matters which are referable to expenditure on the child.54.Given the way in which the mother has presented her claim from the outset (see §40 above) I have regarded it as necessary to cast a particularly critical eye over her claims at this final hearing of her application. I found in 2020 that she had launched her claim for Zoe with unrealistic expectations and disproportionate and inflated figures in her proposed interim budget and said so (see [45] [2020 EWFC 80)10. Having revealed her hand at that stage in that way, the mother’s claims thereafter have been subject inevitably to higher levels of judicial scrutiny. I find that, while her extravagant aspirations have moderated a little over time, she still has a tendency to exaggerate Zoe’s and/or her own needs.55.Just as significant in my deliberations, if not more so, I must record here again that during the interlocutory stages of the proceedings I had cause to condemn the mother for misleading the court. This has happened not once but twice: i)In July 2021, the mother misled me about an alleged debt to her father in the sum of £25,000 (see §49-59 of Re Z (No.2)). At the final hearing, Mr Thorpe unsurprisingly tried to play down this incident, describing the £25,000 as “loose change” when contrasted to the father’s great wealth. I do not accept this description. But in any event, my concern was not so much about the sum itself, but that the mother had lied on oath: “At 29 years of age, I am embarrassed that I have had to ask my dad for help…. I need to pay this money back to my dad as a matter of urgency for the sake of my own self-respect. It is humiliating to have to ask my dad to pay for items, and I do not like the feeling of dependence”. “The understanding between me and my father was that he would allow me to borrow £25,000 from him, on the basis that I would ask the court for repayment of this on 20 July. He is expecting to be repaid then. If this court does not assist me, this will put a strain on my relationship with my father, and add to the significant stress and worry I am already shouldering.” Moreover, at the hearing in July 2021 she had gone on to instruct Mr James Roberts KC (then acting for her), to tell me that the debt had put an “enormous strain” on the relationship between the mother and her father. None of this was true.ii)Notwithstanding that she had been caught lying in July 2021 (see (i) above), in May 2022 a further scam was revealed: the mother had claimed a not insignificant interim sum in respect of the costs of Zoe’s nanny/ies, only then to require the nanny/ies to repay some of that money back to her in cash, using her family on occasions, to launder the money; the mother then salted away these sums away. This fraudulent scheme was revealed in a letter from Hunters’ solicitors dated 24 May 2022 (in answer to a pointed query from the father’s solicitors11):“[The mother] informed us that she has entered into arrangements with some of the nannies by which they were paid more than they actually charged, on the basis that repayments were made to her in cash in a variety of ways… [The mother] accepts that full disclosure must be made to you and to the Court, as it conflicts with statements entered into the proceedings in evidence.”Through this scheme, the mother pocketed a little under £10,000.56.The mother has not served Zoe well by behaving during this litigation in the ways described above (§54/55). She has, in fairness, apologised for her dishonesty: she filed her own Position Statement to the court in July 2022 (when she was briefly unrepresented) stating that she “remorsefully regret[s] my financial misconduct. I apologise profusely to all involved unreservedly. I am ashamed and embarrassed by my actions”. In any event, I remind myself that the Schedule 1 award is for Zoe’s benefit, and I am therefore conscious not to mark my disapproval of the mother’s conduct during the litigation by reducing the award in such a way as to compromise Zoe’s welfare. Housing57.As the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Re P makes clear, the housing award is “the starting point” in any Schedule 1 determination, and from it will flow the scale of furnishing and equipping costs and (where the court has jurisdiction) the level of income provision too. 58.I am entirely satisfied on the facts of this case that the ‘security’ to which the father refers in his recent e-mail, and to which I attach a premium when considering Zoe’s welfare in the round, would be best achieved by the father purchasing a property which is settled on Zoe for her childhood or until the completion of her tertiary education. In this respect I explicitly reject his case that the mother and Zoe should rent long-term. As it happens, it seems to me that the mother might well have sought to present a case that Zoe is so overwhelmingly likely to be long-term dependent, given her special needs, that she should therefore receive a lump sum in her own right now as a housing fund. The mother has not presented the case in this way, perhaps because of Zoe’s very young age and uncertain prognosis. 59.Accordingly, I accept the mother’s case that the father should settle upon Zoe a property until the later event of (i) Zoe reaching 18 or (ii) leaving tertiary education (limited to a first degree). It is accepted, of course, that the property will not become the mother's home. It is proposed, in this particular case, that the property would be purchased and owned by the father with an arrangement providing for the terms of occupation by Zoe and the mother governed by trust deed, or lease. In this way, the mother would have the benefit of living there during Zoe’s childhood and for as long as she is Zoe’s carer, but it would be settled for the benefit of Zoe. It will be apparent that the father can fully expect to regain his capital asset at the end of the period, probably enhanced in value; it is in this sense merely a loan of resources by the father for the benefit of Zoe rather than an outright payment.60.As the property will effectively be the father’s investment, I shall make provision in my order for the father to have some right of veto over the choice of home. The mother will have a degree of freedom of where to buy and the type of home (within the budget) but no purchase shall be made without the father’s consent, albeit that his consent must not be unreasonably withheld.61.In July 2022, I directed that the parties were to exchange housing particulars setting out up to 5 examples of properties they say are suitable for the child by a date in late-November 2022. Both parties did so. The mother has presented particulars of several properties in the St John’s Wood area; she has chosen this area as it is close to where she is currently living, and close to Zoe’s school. At this hearing, Mr Thorpe and the mother have talked me through the properties. The mother says that she needs “approximately £4m”; all of the properties are in this financial territory. The father’s proposed properties (in the region of £1.6m), are in the main apartments and are of a different calibre altogether. The mother has viewed the properties proposed by the father, and has taken photographs which I have seen. I am satisfied that the father has significantly underestimated the proper provision for Zoe in this regard; he will require little persuading, I apprehend, that his proposed accommodation for Zoe was not just ‘out of kilter’ with his own home but several leagues different.62.It seems to me that the following criteria should reasonably apply to the choice of home and location for Zoe:i)It is reasonable for the mother to have a property with a minimum of three bedrooms and a maximum of four bedrooms (bedrooms for the mother, Zoe, and the nanny; and possibly a spare bedroom for family and friends to visit);ii)There should be a family room – specifically space for Zoe; ideally there should be a garden or outside space;iii)The property should be in central London; this is reasonable given that the mother has a network of friends in the area (“[a]ll of my closest friends are in central London”) and family; St John’s Wood is a reasonable choice;iv)The property needs to be close to amenities; ideally it should be near Zoe’s therapies, Zoe’s general practitioner, and Zoe’s nursery school; (although it would not cause Zoe significant detriment if she were required to change surgery, school, and the provider of therapies, in the event that I ordered that she live further afield);63.Given the father’s non-participation at this hearing, there has been no challenge to the mother’s case; I have nonetheless had to cast a critical eye over her proposal. I expressed my concern to Mr Thorpe that the mother’s favoured property of those particulars presented, a beautiful 4-bedroom coach house in St John’s Wood, does not appear to be particularly well-appointed to meet Zoe’s needs, there being, for example, no family room. It is a small matter of concern to me that the mother had not prioritised this in her search.64.What should the housing budget be? The mother currently says that she needs £4m or “approximately” £4m to purchase suitable accommodation for herself and Zoe. At the conclusion of her evidence and argument I was left unpersuaded of this. The mother and her lawyers chose to show me only properties at the £4m mark, and none cheaper so that I could make any comparison; for sure, the £4m properties were luxurious and not at all out of kilter with the father’s standard of living. To be clear, I was equally unpersuaded by the father’s proposal as I have already indicated (see §47 and §61 above). Although I have no details of properties priced in between the figures proposed by the mother and those proposed by the father, I have reached the conclusion that the sum which the mother initially proposed in her open letter a year ago, namely £3.5m would in fact be likely to purchase an entirely suitable property which will amply meet Zoe’s needs. I am fortified in this approach by reference to the fact that she then contemplated spending the sum “within 24 months” of her proposal (i.e., still within the next 12 months). She had also proposed that the final sum awarded should be linked to any changes in the Savills Prime London Index applicable to North West London. Accepting this, for present purposes, as a reasonable qualification to her proposal, I shall simply increase the budget she proposed 12 months ago by £150,000. Thus, £3.65m is my award under this head. If she finds that this is insufficient to buy a suitable 3 or 4 bedroom property in St John’s Wood, I am nonetheless sure that this sum will be sufficient to enable her to buy a suitable property in a desirable part of North West London which still meets the criteria which I laid out at §62 above.65.I should observe, as a post-script on this issue, that I believe an award of £3.65m for housing for a child represents a figure at much the higher end of the scale for awards under Schedule 1, albeit, I recognise, not the highest12. On the particular facts of this case, I am satisfied that it is justified.66.The mother seeks provision to be able to acquire a replacement home during Zoe’s minority. Of course, under the CA 1989 I can only make one property order. I have had regard to the decision of Cohen J in MT v OT [2018] EWHC 868 (Fam), esp. at [18]/[19], and I am satisfied that the proposal sought by Mr Thorpe simply contemplates the replacement of one property by another and this does not amount to a new settlement of property. My order will reflect this provision.67.I shall award the mother the sum of £50,000 to cover the cost of any redecorations and refit of the home she chooses. She has already been awarded a £70,000 fund for set-up costs, and I expect that most of this sum will have been spent on furniture which will still be relatively new, and can be moved into the new property with the mother and Zoe. I shall award her one further lump sum of £25,000 for further redecoration and/or the cost of adaptations to the property in the future as Zoe grows and as her needs may dictate.Moving fund:68.I am satisfied that the mother’s claim for a moving fund in the sum of £7,500 is reasonable, and that shall be my award under this head.Nanny:69.I needed no persuading in the early stages of these proceedings that the mother needed a nanny ([2020] EWFC 80 at [49]). The mother was adjusting at that time to first-time motherhood, on her own, and I was satisfied that Zoe would benefit from the attention of an experienced maternity nurse. In July 2021, I said that:“I expect this current need [for enhanced practical and emotional support at home] to be temporary, and a more proportionate / cost-effective housekeeping / nanny provision can be arranged for the medium and longer term, post-recovery.”I fully expected then that the mother would be able to fall back on a more “conventional” nanny arrangement (and cost) going forward. 70.Since my first judgment, Zoe was diagnosed with Williams Syndrome and her health and development needs have become all too apparent; they are significant, and I am sure that care for her is both physically and emotionally tiring. It is entirely reasonable on the facts of this case for the mother currently to benefit from the assistance of a full-time nanny; having regard to the medical evidence I consider that she will have that need for some time to come. At present it is only the nanny who has any real success in persuading Zoe to feed; the nanny is also adept in ensuring Zoe sleeps. I am satisfied that this mother needs another ‘pair of hands’ around the house for most of each week to help her care for Zoe. If I needed any further persuasion of the appropriateness of nanny care for Zoe for the foreseeable future, I remind myself of the not insignificant staffing levels which exist in the father’s own home, to care just for him.71.The mother’s claim for the cost of a nanny working a 72-hour week from a reputable agency is £5,961.11 per month or £71,533.32 per annum plus agency fees. I propose to allow the mother this sum until Zoe reaches her ninth birthday (i.e., while she remains at junior school, but will be preparing for senior school), at which the ongoing need will be reviewed. The cost of nanny provision shall be index-linked.HECSA72.The ‘HECSA’ (‘Household Expenditure Child Support Award’) is a creation of Mostyn J and was first given life in his judgment in Collardeau-Fuchs (see especially at [129]). The HECSA is designed to cover the direct expenses of the child together with the expenses of the mother’s household, to the extent that the mother cannot cover, or contribute to, those expenses from her own means. Historically, the courts have considered whether a parent in the position of this mother should be entitled to a ‘carer’s allowance’ under this heading. This phrase (‘carers allowance’) has rightly fallen into abeyance for any number of good reasons; what is appropriate is the recovery of sums for the household of the subject child(ren). 73.The mother’s case at the final hearing that this award should be met by the sum of £174,372pa. I propose to award her £148,250pa (index linked). My approach to this award has taken account specifically of the following matters: i)First, I have considered whether the mother has her own resources in funding her household before she looks to the father to meet, or contribute to, that cost (Fuchs at [109]). I find that she currently does not;ii)Secondly, I have considered whether the mother has a current earning capacity, such that she could be expected to start bringing money into the household in the foreseeable future. I conclude that the mother is currently unable to work because of Zoe’s special needs and that her earning capacity will probably not be realised for at least ten years (i.e., for as long as Zoe is at junior school). In this regard, I accept the mother’s argument that her own needs (as distinct from luxuries) can therefore (subject to what follows) currently be reflected in the award for Zoe: in this regard, I have followed what was said in Haroutian v Jenkins [1980] 1 FLR 62 at p.64;iii)Thirdly, and importantly, I recognise that reasonable financial provision must include elements which directly benefit the mother, given that she is caring for Zoe, and indeed the only parent who currently has any relationship with Zoe. This is all the more important given that (as per §ii above) the mother currently has no earning capacity of her own. In my judgment the father should make provision (within the HECSA) at a level and for purposes which:a)enables the mother to live with Zoe to a standard of living which, while not necessarily equivalent to as the father’s, bears some sort of relationship to it – is not ‘out of kilter’ with it; in this case, the short time that the mother personally enjoyed the father’s standard of living and the fact that Zoe has not yet sampled that standard of living (although she may experience it should she spend time with him, particularly at his home, in the future) are very much subsidiary factors;b)has some bearing on the proposed budget which the father was himself considering had the mother and he remained together (see §40 above: he contemplated spending £12,500pcm on her rent, for example);c)will sustain the mother emotionally, socially and physically; the mother is more likely to be available to offer her daughter emotional, social and physical care if her own well-being is assured in these regards;d)provides the mother and Zoe with a good degree of comfort, without indulgence or excessive luxury; the mother should have sufficient funds to discharge her proper parental responsibilities without financial anxiety;e)does not equate, across the board, to the level of provision to which she would have been entitled had she and the father made the commitment of marriage; the father has no obligation to maintain the mother and a standard periodical payments budget for a wife in matrimonial proceedings is therefore not helpful.The authorities have made clear that this should be an essentially impressionistic assessment (rather than a detailed accountancy exercise13), in which it is necessary to apply a fairly broad brush to the sums under review. This, I may add, does not make it much easier;iv)Fourthly, I have had regard to the fact that the mother has misled the court on two occasions about her claims; once, in relation to an alleged ‘debt’ to her own father, and secondly in relation to nanny costs (see §55 above). I am all the more sensitive to the need to ensure that there is true justification for the sums claimed, and there is no identifiable scope for ‘slack’;v)Fifthly and finally, I have considered the detail of the budget itself. I should acknowledge at once that the budget presented at this hearing (£14,531pcm) was a significantly pared back version of a budget (of £34,000+ pcm) which had been prepared for an earlier hearing; this earlier sum had perhaps unsurprisingly attracted some judicial incredulity. That said, and while I bear in mind (per Macur LJ in Re A) that the child of a wealthy man may well expect to be dressed in designer rather than high street store clothes, there are still aspects of the budget presented for my approval even now which stood out as being either inflated, or inappropriately as exclusively for the benefit of the mother and unconnected to her role as carer. Thus, I could not help, for example, but flinch at the claim of £4,800pa for toys for Zoe; £2,000pa for photos of Zoe; £6,000pa gym membership/yoga/massage for the mother; a salary of £15,360pa for a cleaner (for a 3-4 bedroom property, where there is also a nanny working a 72hr week, who could reasonably be expected to take on some light domestic duties). I recognise that I should not take a nit-picking approach to the budget, but instead apply a broad brush, as Bodey J exhorted in Re P and Mostyn J in Collardeau-Fuchs.Thus, having regard to all the matters outlined above, and as in Maktoum, where Moor J applied a discount of 27% to the budget, and as in Collardeau-Fuchs, where Mostyn J (at [149]) applied a discount of 15% “across the board”, so do I consider it appropriate to apply a discount to the mother’s HECSA. Like Mostyn J, I shall apply a 15% discount across the board from the mother’s claim; this achieves, in my judgment, a “fair and realistic outcome by the application of broad common sense” (see, again the judgments of Thorpe LJ and Bodey J in Re P respectively at §15 and §17 above). 74.I hope that the mother will appreciate that, notwithstanding my discount of her claim, this is still a very sizeable periodical payments allowance indeed; it will, I am confident, enable the mother and Zoe to live in considerable comfort. I suspect that the mother will need to keep a closer eye on her finances than she has been accustomed to in the recent past, to prioritise spending on Zoe, and rein in her personal extravagances. 75.The award will be CPI index-linked, and will endure until Zoe is 18 or completes full-time tertiary education, if later.Nursery/schooling:76.Zoe attends a private nursery for three hours each weekday morning, and has done so since January 2023. It is envisaged that her hours will increase over the upcoming months. 77.The father may be right in his suggestion that resources available in state education for children with special needs may be adequate to meet Zoe’s needs in the future. I am aware that there are many schools in the state sector which cater extremely well for children with special needs. However, I am also of the view that Zoe can reasonably expect to be educated privately if the specific privately funded provision is – in the particular circumstances as they obtain from time to time – in her best interests; the father, in my judgment, ought to make funds available for this. 78.It is very clear that Zoe needs 1:1 teaching assistant support in school; this is true now, and it is likely to be true for some time. The current headteacher has made this requirement plain; the Williams Syndrome Foundation publication echoes this, as a clear expectation. The mother’s application for an order for payment of 1:1 teacher assistant support was adjourned at the PTR to this final hearing on the basis that pending the final hearing, the father’s proposal [i.e., that he pay the costs of the 1:1 support to be employed by the nursery for the spring term 2023] was endorsed by the court. As I earlier mentioned (§43(v)) it is possible that the local education authority will make a payment from its SENIF (Special Educational Needs Inclusion Fund), but if not, I shall direct that the father augment his provision of funds for education to include the costs of 1:1 support in the schools.Debts:79.The mother has a number of debts:80.In deciding whether, and if so to what extent, the mother can claim sums from the father to settle her debts, I have had regard to the judgment of Sir Jonathan Cohen in the case of G v W [2022] EWHC 1101 (Fam). In that case (an appeal) one of the specific issues was:“Should the father clear all of the mother's liabilities, however they may have arisen, because it is in the best interests of [the child] that his mother should at the conclusion of this case be debt free?”Following analysis of the various debts, Sir Jonathan Cohen allowed the recovery from the father of debts which had legitimately and reasonably been incurred, but not those which were the product of “reckless over-expenditure”. I note also the decision of Theis J in PG v TW (No 1) (Child: Financial Provision: Legal Funding) [2012] EWHC 1892 (Fam) at [22] re: “historical costs”. I have myself contemplated the recovery of costs as a debt in the earlier judgments in this case. All of these decisions essentially hark back to the comments of Thorpe LJ (and others) that at the conclusion of this process, the mother should not be “burdened with unnecessary financial anxiety”, particularly when the father is able to live so lavishly.81.In this regard, I have no real difficulties in requiring the father to provide a lump sum for the mother to settle debts to her electricity supplier (EDF) and to Barclays in respect of the loan. The father has agreed to pay the sum owed to Mr Okimoto. The debts to the lawyers engaged in the failed pre-nuptial negotiations ought also to be covered by the father as they appear to have been incurred in good faith. However, I find myself unable to support the payment to the mother of a sum to reflect her debt to Hunters (the mother’s former solicitors). It will be remembered that I was critical of the way in which that firm ignored the specific terms of my legal services order, and incurred costs on behalf of the mother far beyond those allowed. I said in terms at the time that “they can only have assumed that this overspend would be retrospectively authorised by the court. They were not entitled to make that assumption” (Re Z (no 2) at [32]). I am not prepared to foist the largely unauthorised expense on the father at this stage.82.My award under this head shall therefore be £87,450.26. 83.I should add, in this regard, that although the father has made extensive payments to the mother’s solicitors over the months of this litigation, he is currently in default. Pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of my Order of 27 October 2022 he was ordered to pay £175,100 to Levison Meltzer Pigott (mother’s current solicitors) by 4pm on 24 January 2023 to cover their costs to final hearing. It appears that he is in breach of this order. I will make separate provision for the mother to collect and if necessary enforce this amount.Medical / health insurance:84.In my judgment it is appropriate that the mother and Zoe should have the benefit of private health insurance whether in this country or in the USA. They have indeed been covered by insurance until very recently. At a hearing in November 2022, I had ordered the father “promptly to pay all premiums due in respect of the medical insurance policy and the life assurance policy and take all necessary steps to ensure that the policies shall remain in full force, until further order, and shall provide the applicant with written evidence that he has done so on her request.” It appears that he is in breach of this order. Of course, Zoe is able to benefit, where appropriate, from the excellent health care provided by the National Health Service (indeed, her major operation in November 2021 was performed on the NHS). But she should have the flexibility of accessing private health care (particularly given her special needs) should this be required. 85.It has proved unsurprisingly difficult to find health insurance which will provide cover for Zoe given the existence of Williams Syndrome. Even if the health insurance were to cover all medical aspects other than her Williams Syndrome, this would still be advantageous and appropriate.Therapies:86.The mother has made provision for uninsured medical costs in her HECSA. She claims the sum of £5,000pa (£417pcm) for therapies which I regard as reasonable.